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ABSTRACT
Republican Autonomy:
Extending Freedom as Non-Domination
by
THIBAUD Ezechiel
Doctor of Philosophy

In political philosophy, the concept of autonomy is often associated with liberalism: it
serves as a justification for the liberal values of state neutrality and value pluralism,
and seems coherent with the liberal definition of freedom as the absence of
interference. Neo-republicans have pointed out that freedom as non-interference fails
to acknowledge the fact that one may be unfree while non-interfered with, while on the
other hand, not all forms of interference are freedom-limiting. They have proposed to
replace the concept by freedom as non-domination, which they define as the absence
of actual or possible arbitrary interference. Although their definition is promising,
neo-republicans tend to neglect the concept of self-government and therefore, are
vulnerable to the same accusations of incompleteness faced by liberals. By focusing
on the negative part of freedom as non-domination, they have omitted two aspects:
first, that there are other ways to be unfree than to be the subject of mere arbitrary
interference, and second, that the real value of non-domination is the capacity to act
as a non-dominated being, which requires a level of self-mastery. To fix this problem,
I propose an extension of the concept of non-domination and argue that the theory
would benefit from including autonomy in the list of its conditions for freedom.
Following the republican idea that one is only free in a free state, I propose a definition
of republican autonomy that is political in nature, and depends on globalized nondomination.

I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, and
I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have been
duly acknowledged.

(THIBAUD Ezechiel)
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INTRODUCTION

The neo-republican concept of freedom as non-domination responds to the
necessity to replace the liberal definition of freedom as non-interference. This
definition is promising in that it accurately identifies the gaps that the liberal approach
leaves open, and provides a broader perspective on the matter of freedom. The topic
of this thesis comes from the observation that although neo-republicans have rightfully
highlighted the limitations of freedom as non-interference, they remain largely silent
on the question of self-government and autonomy, and therefore, their
supplementation is too negative to adequately provide robust solutions to the failures
of the liberal approach. This thesis, therefore, explores these concepts from a
republican perspective.
Chronologically, my research was motivated by the conviction that first,
autonomy is a valuable good worthy of attention, but that its innate nature is not
evident: I endorse the position that autonomy is a normative concept – the idea that
people are better off personally, morally and politically when they are autonomous –
but I am doubtful of the idea that it is an intrinsic characteristic of men. My conviction
is that although people may have a natural right to autonomy – idea I am not tackling
here – they may also spend their entire life without reaching an adequate level of selfgovernment. In short, my intuition is that autonomy requires certain conditions to
emerge, and that these conditions are not only emotional or psychological, but also
social and political. Secondly, the topic of this thesis was motivated by the rejection
of liberalism as capable to harbour the concept of autonomy, because of the
inadequacy of its definition of freedom, and what I consider to be its inherent
paradoxes – idea I develop in chapter I – and this, despite the standard association
between the theory and the concept.
If liberalism is inadequate, looking at republicanism, one of its most promising
alternatives, may produce fruitful results. Neo-republicanism appears to be an ideal
candidate for this task: it highlights with accuracy the shortcomings of the liberal
definition of freedom, it follows a rich tradition of thought centred around the concept
of liberty conceived as opposed to servitude. My hope was, therefore, that more room
would be left for a positive concept to emerge; that freedom as non-domination, as a
1

richer concept than freedom as non-interference, would in consequence be able to
provide a deeper insight into the question of self-government. However, I have noticed
that the concept is rarely mentioned, if mentioned at all, by neo-republicans. I believe
that this poses a series of problems, that this thesis attempts to rectify. My endeavour
is therefore, while staying faithful to the concept of freedom as non-domination, to
find ways to extend, solidity and complete the concept, based on the conviction that it
would only benefit from including autonomy in the list of its conditions. Autonomy is
a rich concept, and a multitude of definitions have been given in the literature. My goal
is not to cover them all, nor is it to commit to a specific one: it is to argue that autonomy
broadly construed should be a feature of republican freedom.
Philip Pettit is one of the first to identify the limitations of freedom as noninterference; he accuses liberals of providing a theory of freedom that is at the same
time too broad and too narrow. According to him, liberals fail in two simultaneous
ways: they identify as non-problematic a number of experiences that intuitively appear
freedom-limiting, but they also unnecessarily identify all acts of interference as
problematic. The liberal theory, therefore, is too inclusive when it comes to actions
that don’t directly involve an interference. But they are too exclusive when they label
every interference as threatening. Freedom as non-interference leads to counterintuitive conclusions: if the only threat to freedom is that an agent is actually
interfering with my preferred choice, or my available options, it means that I can obtain
freedom by either adapting my preference or by manipulating the agent such that she
does not interfere. Both propositions are concerning: the idea that freedom simply
requires that one adjusts her preferences to the available options seems absurd, but so
is the idea that one can obtain freedom through manipulation.
Neo-republicans, therefore, reject this view. Their goal is to propose an
ambitious definition of freedom, that covers a broader spectrum of experiences and
actions, while recognizing that some interferences may be desirable, because
conducive of more freedom. In doing so, they challenge a notion that has generally
been accepted as the norm in political philosophy, and go back to the old, rich and
complex tradition of republicanism. The kind of freedom they advocate for takes roots
in Ancient Rome, Italy of the Renaissance, Civil War England, or France of the
Enlightenment. While recognizing it may have taken many forms and shapes, neorepublicans like Pettit argue that fundamentally, a common definition of what
2

constitutes freedom can be traced through republican history – definition they wish to
revive. The concept is shaped around the absence of domination, or dependence on the
will of another. Unfreedom, therefore, is typically compared to servitude rather than
frustration: the example of the slave to master relationship is often used to illustrate
this definition, but also to highlight the limitations of freedom as non-interference. If
a slave has a benevolent master, who never interferes with her life, according to the
liberal view she may qualify as a free agent. However, the master maintains her ability
to interfere, even though she may never choose to do so: she is in possession of power,
and this power is arbitrary and idiosyncratic, because directed towards the realization
of her own wishes, and not towards the interests of the slave. The only fact that
interference is possible leaves the slave at the mercy of her master’s capricious will,
which for republicans is enough to constitute a loss of freedom. But the kind of
interference that may be exercised must also be of a certain kind to be freedomthreatening: it must be arbitrary, as rooted in the will of the interferer with no
consideration for the interferee’s benefits. This nuance allows republican to accept
some interferences as non-problematic. The slave is unfree because under the
domination of her master: she is in a situation where arbitrary interference is not only
actual but possible. Freedom, for republicans, is the absence of dependence on such
idiosyncratic will: the absence of domination.
This thesis is a continuation of this point of view. It endorses the republican
perspective and recognizes it as promising. However, as I have said, observation has
led me to notice that, although neo-republicans thoroughly explore the concept of
freedom, they remain largely silent on the question of autonomy. The general idea is
that republican freedom remains a negative concept – despite the claim that it actually
transcends the traditional dichotomy between negative and positive liberty. Pettit
makes it clear that republican freedom is not self-government, and that it is not a
positive view 1 . Quentin Skinner also mentions that it is an alternative to the
mainstream view of freedom as non-interference defended by Isaiah Berlin, but that it
is a negative view of a second type2. Although freedom as non-domination may indeed
be a third type of freedom, it seems to largely be kept within the conceptual box of
negative liberty, as freedom from rather than freedom to. In general, autonomy and
1
2

Pettit, 1997
Skinner, 2004.
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self-government don’t often feature in neo-republican discussions, and don’t seem to
be points of concern or care. As I will explain in chapter III, Pettit briefly mentions the
possibility that autonomy may be a richer ideal than freedom as non-domination, but
argues that it must anyway come second, as a natural consequence of the freedom he
wishes to endorse. His hope is that a society in which freedom as non-domination is
implemented will organically produce autonomous citizens, and that there is no need
for the state to take any responsibility in promoting autonomy as a separate and
specific value. Therefore, he clearly affirms that no particular attention needs to be
paid to the concept. Apart from these brief mentions, the notion is generally simply
absent. The few neo-republicans who defend self-government as part of the theory are
typically excluded from the mainstream thought3.
What are the reasons for this apparent lack of interests, and should proponents
of the republican theory be concerned about this state of affairs? There are a few ways
to explain why neo-republicans might be reticent about endorsing the concept of
autonomy. My first hypothesis is that this notion is typically endorsed by liberals –
idea that I fully develop in my first chapter. Because autonomy provides a justification
for values liberals tend to defend – neutrality, pluralism, individual rights, and so on –
the concept tends to be associated with this school of thought 4 . Because neorepublicans oppose liberalism on the question of freedom, the natural tendency may
simply not be to endorse any of its perceived constitutive concepts, or at least not to
defend them with fervour. My second hypothesis is somehow opposed to the first, and
has to do with the link between autonomy and positive freedom, and the caution
associated with it. Neo-republicans may be concerned about endorsing a theory of
freedom that would be too positive, because it would presume that agents must meet
highly-demanding conditions in order to be free. Following Isaiah Berlin, they may
fear that endorsing such view would be equivalent to saying that agents can only be
free if they find harmony with their “higher self”5, their “true desires”, and so on. The
concern would then be about determining which entity would be qualified to make
such normative evaluation without being intrinsically coercive. The traditional worry
about positive freedom may therefore be the reason neo-republican insists that their

3

See Sandel 1996, Pettit 1998, and the debate between neo-Athenians and neo-Romans.
For a description of liberal theoretical values, see Waldron 1987
5
Berlin, 1969
4
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definition of freedom is not a positive one, and that non-domination is not selfgovernment. They may also truly believe, following Pettit, that autonomy will be a
natural consequence of non-domination: this claim is convenient because it means that
no positive definition needs to be explicitly endorsed.
However, the general claim of this thesis is that this situation is dissatisfying
for a variety of reasons; the lack of concern for autonomy in neo-republicanism leaves
too many gaps open and needs to be attended to. This claim is motivated by two
observations: first, that the association between autonomy and liberalism must be
challenged, for reasons I present in chapter I. If liberalism cannot account for the
concept, due in part to its inadequate definition of freedom, my hypothesis is that
republicanism may be better suited for this role – because of the promising nature of
its definition of freedom. The second observation that follows this hypothesis is what
I have described above: neo-republicans fail to recognize the importance of providing
a specific definition of autonomy that goes hand in hand with non-domination. This is
problematic for two main reasons. First, I will argue that part of the reasons that neorepublicans had to reject freedom as non-interference – the accusation of narrowness
– should lead them to extend their own definition. The idea I will defend is that
freedom as non-domination as it is, is also too narrow, and that there are other ways to
be unfree than to be the subject of domination as Pettit describes. I argue that these
ways have to do with the level of self-government an agent can display. Not seeing
this is problematic because it creates a gap between what neo-republicans consider
freedom-limiting – domination – and the various other ways agents may experience
unfreedom. The dismissal of autonomy as part of republican freedom produces a
situation where a large variety of intuitively freedom-limiting actions and experiences
stay under the republican radar.
The second reason for which I believe this lack of concern to be problematic is
that by focusing on the negative aspect of freedom only, neo-republicans have omitted
the pragmatic value of the freedom they advocate for: the capacity to exercise it, or to
act as a non-dominated being. This leads me to the normative conclusion that neorepublicans should extend their concept of freedom, such that non-domination
includes the condition of autonomy-facilitation on top of the pre-existing others. I
argue that denying the importance of this claim means advocating for a theory of
freedom without providing the necessary tools for its realization. I also argue that
5

adding the autonomy condition to our definition helps solve some of the problems the
current definition is facing, such as the vagueness of what constitutes an arbitrary
interference, or the possibility of domination from non-intentional forces.
As I have said, the goal of this thesis is not to reject the concept of nondomination, but to improve it by adding an element to the list of its conditions: to
extend it such that it can cover a broader range of freedom-limiting experiences. It is
to show that the value and sustainability of republican freedom increase when this
condition is added. My claims are the following: freedom as non-domination is a
promising but insufficient definition. It fails to cover important aspects of what makes
us unfree, leaving us with only two options: either these experiences are not cases of
unfreedom – which seems intuitively problematic – or there are more things to
unfreedom than described – which means that freedom is not only the absence of
domination, and the whole theory needs rectification.
I attempt to attend to these intuitively freedom-limiting instances, without
arguing that non-domination is not all there is, but by saying that arbitrary interference
is not all there is. Domination, I believe, is an adequate concept that potentially grasps
everything that needs to be covered about freedom and unfreedom. My hope, and what
I wish to show, is that it carries more than what has been described, including a more
positive aspect. The solution I propose to get out of this bind is to say that domination
is broader than we may have originally thought, and that non-domination includes that
agents must be capable of a certain level of self-government. Adopting this new
criterion means evaluating people’s freedom on the basis of their autonomy rather than
the absence of arbitrary interference only. But the two concepts are certainly not
foreign notions: in fact, I also argue that the absence of arbitrary interference is a
necessary condition for autonomy to emerge, and that the more autonomous a person
is, the more capable she will be to identify, resist, and eliminate the risk of such
interference in the future.
I am aware that arguing for a more positive definition of freedom goes against
the mainstream and may raise a series of concerns. As I have said, the typical worry
about positive freedom is that it may lead to moral perfectionism at best,
totalitarianism at worst, and this worry may be the reason neo-republicans are not too
keen on mentioning it. One may be worried that my endeavour may result in the claim
that to be free from domination, people need to adopt a certain way of conduct, or
6

respond to normative moral rules, and that this would be incompatible with value
pluralism. Simply put, it would lead to a highly-demanding substantive view of what
constitutes our freedom: the idea that political institutions may have authority in
attributing such quality to agents is all the more terrifying. Anticipating this objection,
I wish to make it clear that my project has very different purposes. Positive freedom
need not be as threatening as Berlin presented it: as Charles Taylor has noticed, the
main problem is that its caricatural form has been accepted as standard, and so has
been negative liberty6 . My conviction is that the two concepts are not necessarily
exclusive; they may very well meet and cooperate with each other. In the case of
republican freedom, the negative aspect of non-domination serves as a guarantee that
the promotion of the positive one will not be coercive. I believe that freedom as nondomination is rich enough to harbour, promote and protect both aspects. As long as
the risks of domination are accurately identified and avoided, any threat of coercion or
invasion is equally minimized. But I also believe that the promotion of positive aspects
will only strengthen agents’ capacity for such identification and resistance. On the
contrary, not providing these positive tools about how to be “free to”, will lead to
inconsistency and cluelessness about how and why to be “free from”: this goes back
to my initial claim that the real value of being free from a threat is to be able to exercise
such freedom.
But I will also respond to this potential objection by saying that my purpose is
not to establish rules about how to evaluate people’s personal and moral autonomy, in
a way that would have political consequences. The rightness or wrongness of personal
choices is not my concern, nor do I believe the state should be the judge of how
autonomous its citizens may be in their private life. However, determining what
freedom is, and what the state is responsible for, are two different things. Trying to
promote as much autonomy as possible is also different from coercing people, or
punishing them if they don’t display as much of it as expected. There is a balance to
be found between the public promotion of a value, and the respect for people’s
personal choices – as long as they comply with the rule of law. Again, the negative
principles of freedom as non-domination should serve as a guarantee that such balance
is found. My conviction is however that the state – keeping in mind that in a republic,

6

Taylor, 1985
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the state is nothing more than the representation of people’s will – should bear some
degree of responsibility in the promotion of autonomy in the affairs that have a public,
social, and political dimension. I also believe that the degree of autonomy citizens are
capable of, is directly proportional to the autonomy their state is capable of vis-à-vis
other states, idea that I defend in my last chapter. Finally, I want to put forward the
idea that the autonomy of republican citizens, is in fact directly linked to their active
role in the public sphere. I will explore the idea that republican autonomy should be
seen as the exercise of public power through the making of laws: self-rule as collective
self-government is therefore expressed through the elaboration of regulations that
correspond to citizen’s true needs, previously identified through public deliberation. I
believe that a firmer step towards positive freedom is therefore needed to put this
picture forward: in consequence, the view I defend is both an alternative to liberalism,
and to the neo-Roman version of republicanism, which remains as negative as the
liberal view it wishes to replace.
To the objection that realizing complete autonomy is unfeasible, I would say
that it may very well be, but so is the realization of complete freedom as nondomination. We may need to give up on the ideal that either of these concepts can be
fully realized in all aspects of people’s lives. Instead, we should accept that
domination, just like heteronomy, may come in degrees, with more or less intensity.
But this should not take us away from the goal of avoiding them both as much as
reasonably and sustainably possible. Maximizing freedom as non-domination and
autonomy is an ambitious enough goal to satisfy our demand for justice and freedom,
while recognizing the limitations imposed by reality.
Initially, this thesis was not motivated by a direct wish to endorse and defend
the republican standpoint, but by a rejection of the liberal one. A rigorous analysis of
various liberal concepts and of the objections they have been faced with, has led me
to notice significant cracks in the theory. The most important of them being the
disconnection between liberalism’s minimalistic approach on values, and its
attachment to autonomy as a constitutive right. My first chapter argues, amongst other
things, that the liberal standpoint is inherently paradoxical: liberals, as proponents of
a strictly political theory, refuse to endorse specific moral claims about the nature of
the good or people’s interests. However, they rely on the respect to people’s autonomy
in order to justify this neutral claim. But the defence of such concept is far from neutral,
8

and in itself constitutes a significantly morally loaded claim. This paradox, added to
the problematic definition of freedom as non-interference, had led me to conclude that
liberalism is not equipped to provide a satisfying definition of autonomy. Because my
starting point is the idea that autonomy is valuable and worth pursuing, idea that I also
justify in this chapter, I come to the conclusion that we must find a better candidate
for it.
I argue that this candidate could be republicanism: because the theory is built
as an opposition to the problematic liberal view on freedom, and because it displays
promising features. My second chapter is historical and aims at contextualizing the
theory, it goes over the tradition of republicanism in its various forms. My goal in this
chapter is to present the theory to the reader, but also to identify common features that
run through the tradition, that may help us grasp the subtleties of the current movement
– the main one being the importance given to the rule of law. Because neo-republicans
claim to follow this tradition, looking at the history of it seems a worthwhile
endeavour. This chapter ends with a brief analysis of the concept of freedom in classic
republicanism, in light of our current debates: I conclude that although room is being
left for nuance, the traditional conception of freedom is largely positive, and that this
positivity may have been overlooked by modern theorists.
Chapter III looks at the neo-republican theory in closer details. It has two
purposes: establishing the necessity of freedom as non-domination and its advantages,
and highlighting the various limitations imposed by the current definition. In this
chapter, I make it clear that my goal is to follow the neo-republican theory because I
consider it to be a sustainable alternative to liberalism. More specifically, the appeal
comes from the fact that neo-republicans have adequately highlighted the failures of
freedom as non-interference. This chapter also identifies the new features of the theory
in comparison to the old, presented in the previous one. Here, I argue that my intuition
was correct: republicanism in general is better equipped to provide a substantial and
ambitious definition of autonomy, because it defends a substantial and ambitious
definition of freedom. However, the current definition of republican freedom – or at
least Pettit’s view – leaves many questions unanswered. This chapter goes over the
main limitations of the definition as it is, and argues that most of them are a
consequence of this lack of concern for the question of self-government. It also argues
that Pettit’s mistake has been to construe freedom or unfreedom as a matter of
9

interpersonal relationships only – as the slave to master example shows – and not as
dependent on socio-political or systemic states of affairs.
Chapter IV is a development of my argument for the extension of freedom as
non-domination. This argument has two sides: first, I draw a parallel between liberal
freedom and republican freedom as it is. I argue that we should extend the concept of
non-domination – or adopt a stronger, more positive version – for the same reasons
that made us reject non-interference, especially the problem of narrowness. Because
of its limited vision, liberal freedom was leaving many cases of unfreedom unattended.
Similarly, freedom as non-domination as it is falls into the same trap, if it does not
consider that there are other ways to be unfree than to be the subject of mere arbitrary
interference. The consequence of this, I argue, is the failure to recognise a large range
of experiences as freedom-limiting, and the failure to give them appropriate political
attention – when such attention is relevant. The second side of my argument comes
from the conviction that the value of any kind of theory of freedom is the possibility
for agent to actually exercise it in the best conditions possible – both individually and
politically. The real value of non-domination, in this instance, is for people to reach
the status of non-dominated being, which in itself is only valuable if followed by a
capacity to act as such. The conclusion of this argument is that neo-republicans should
focus on autonomy as a part of freedom as non-domination, because it gives pragmatic
weight to their theory.
Comes the question of the kind of autonomy we may choose as republicans.
As I have said, presenting all the existing definitions isn’t my goal, and would be a
colossal task. My goal in Chapter V is to go through a quick literature review of the
main standard theories, and some that could bring relevant answers to our questions.
The purpose of this endeavour is to determine, once the need for autonomy is
established, whether republicanism can comply with the conditions of standard
accounts, and if so, which ones. I start by presenting rationalist hierarchical accounts,
and their limitations. I then go on with relational theories, present a few of their
variations, and some of the problems they also face. Before focusing on political
theory, Pettit has developed with Michael Smith a theory of autonomy as
“orthonomy”, which is a highly rational and substantive account. I go over their ideas
with the goal to find elements that would serve our republican purpose, but conclude
that the theory is unsatisfying and may even be sometimes at odds with non10

domination. The conclusion of this compatibility checking is that republicanism is
more compatible with rational definitions of autonomy than it is with rationalist of
hierarchical ones. However, I also argue that committing to any specific theory is
unnecessary and could potentially be limiting. Instead, I come to the recognition that
the specific nature of republican autonomy may be that it is indistinguishable from the
political autonomy of citizens vis-à-vis their state, and states vis-à-vis other states.
Chapter VI explores this possibility. It develops the traditional republican idea
that people can only be free if they live in free states. I extend this point to autonomy
as well, and argue that the autonomy of citizens is related to their political autonomy
and that of their state. The point I wish to defend is that this characteristic is precisely
what gives republican autonomy its specificity, and is what republicans should
ultimately be concerned about – rather than, for example, a psychological definition.
But what does it mean for a state to be free, and free from domination? Here, I explore
this question, and go over the various ways current socio-economic and political affairs
can affect the non-domination of states on the global scale. I present a few possible
solutions for the problem of globalized domination, and explain that while some are
promising, most of them fail to grasp the important distinction between a country’s
freedom and its capacity for autonomy. I argue that recognizing these as two separate
concepts, that can however work in favour of each other, is crucial in order to attend
to as many cases of political unfreedom and political heteronomy as possible. My
claim is that freedom as non-domination as well as political autonomy are internal and
external matters: they rely on the free and autonomous status of citizens within their
state, and of states within international order. The final part of this chapter goes over
what I identify as the main requirements for this status to be reached by states and their
citizens. Finally, I put forward the idea that our conception of republican autonomy
must be found in the link between personal autonomy and collective self-rule, and that
people become more aware of their through interests – both individually and
collectively – through democratic deliberation. I therefore argue that democracy is an
instrumental good, necessary for the realization of this conception, which lies in the
intertwined nature of the relation between one’s wishes and their expression through
law-making and exercise of public power.
I recognize this project is ambitious and its conditions are demanding; this
chapter only opens a door to the further exploration of these questions. Nonetheless,
11

I believe that aiming at the maximization of political autonomy rather than its full
realization, is a worthy enough goal, which requires that we extend the concept of
freedom as non-domination.
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CHAPTER I
Autonomy and the Limits of the Liberal Project

Introduction
The starting point of this thesis is the recognition that the concept of autonomy
is a valuable ideal, worthy of a definition that is at the same time morally coherent and
politically sustainable. The following observation is that in the history of political
philosophy, autonomy has often been associated with liberalism, which intuitively
seems consistent with the theory’s emphasis on personal freedom. The goal of this
chapter is however to question the feasibility of this association and to challenge the
reasons it has been made in such a generalized manner. Ultimately, I propose that we
look for an alternative political theory to define the ideal at stake: I argue that the
liberal theory presents inherent flaws that weakens its capacity to define not only
freedom, but also autonomy – values that paradoxically are at the core if its system.
The first part of this chapter is dedicated to the definition of autonomy broadly
construed, and the defence of the idea that it should be valued. It also goes over the
reasons this notion has been and continues to be conceived as mainly a liberal concept.
The second section presents the main features of liberalism upon which the idea of
autonomy rests; it defines the contours of the liberal standpoint. I argue that liberalism’
tendency to view autonomy negatively is mostly shaped around Isaiah Berlin’s
conception of positive liberty and the concerns this definition entail. The third section
points out the limitations of liberalism’s capacity to harbour such a concept, and argues
that the liberal project fails in its attempt to justify procedural claims on the basis of
ideas that are substantial and demanding in nature. In this section, I present a concept
of autonomy as not merely the attribute of individuals but as the capacity for members
of the political community to realize self-government through the exercise of public
power. I conclude that republicanism is better equipped to defend this positive
conception.
13

I.

Autonomy: Presentation

This section has the humble purpose to present a broad and general definition of
autonomy, and to defend the normative claim that it is a concept we should value. The
literature on the matter provides multiple definitions of the concept, which I will not
cover in this chapter. My goal is here to highlight the main and general components of
autonomy on which most if not all theorists can agree. This presentation will be
followed by an argument saying that autonomy should be valued, protected and
promoted. This comes as a response to some critiques, which question the importance
or even desirability of self-government. The state of affairs is that typically, autonomy
in Western philosophy has been and continues to be associated with liberalism. I will
briefly give some reasons for why I think this is the case, and introduce the idea that
questioning the legitimacy of this association is a worthwhile endeavour.
1. General Definition
Etymologically, autonomy comes from the Latin words auto-nomos, which simply
means “self-rule” or self-law”. It can therefore be translated as the law one applies to
oneself. Joel Feinberg gives a succinct but powerful definition of an autonomous agent
when he says: “I am autonomous if I rule me, and no one else rules I”7. This definition
relies on two necessary but insufficient conditions: first, that one is an agent capable
of formulating a rule, and second, that one is capable of following such rule. But both
these requirements raise numbers of questions about the agent’s capacity to pick a
specific rule, and her motivation for deciding that the rule is worth being followed.
Recognizing the multitude of perspectives on the matter, Gerald Dworkin defines
autonomy as a “term of art”, that we need to construe according to our theoretical
purposes.
“It is used sometimes as an equivalent of liberty (positive or negative
in Berlin’s terminology, sometimes as an equivalent to self-rule or sovereignty,
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sometimes as identical with freedom of the will. It is equated with dignity,
integrity, individuality, independence, responsibility and self-knowledge. It is
identified with qualities of self-assertion, with critical reflection, with freedom
from obligation, with absence of external causation, with knowledge or one’s
own interests.”8
It is however important to distinguish autonomy from mere freedom. The
difference can be illustrated by the classic case of Odysseus9. Because he does not
want to be tempted by the sirens who would bring him to his death, he asks his men to
tie him to the mast of their boat. He mentions they should dispense with his orders to
be set free until the danger is gone. Odysseus temporarily renounces to his freedom,
while remaining autonomous. The reason is that as Dworkin says, “he has a preference
about his preferences”, and prioritize higher desires above others – the desire to live
above the desire to follow the sirens. His action remains autonomous because it is
coherent with the rule he has applied to himself.
There is also a distinction between a mere act of volition and autonomy. What
seems to distinguish them is the recognition from the agent that the rule she decides to
follow is in accordance with a range of criteria make the decision to follow that rule
truly her own decision. To perform an autonomous act, I must follow a rule that I
identify as truly mine, and while doing so, I am truly being me. For example, I may
decide to buckle my seatbelt because I see the flight attendant walking down the aisle
checking each passenger, or because I see the sign above my head telling me to do so,
without anyone checking. The difference between the two decisions is that although
they are both motivated by an external necessity, one is generated by an external
constraint and the other by an internal recognition that buckling up my seatbelt is the
right decision for me. The first is generated by and injunction from a figure of authority
while the second results from my own awareness of my personal benefits in
performing the action.
But the absence of external injunction or coercion is not enough to make our
actions autonomous. Autonomy can also be defined as self-governance, and requires
self-control. It is also not enough to identify a rule, one must also exercise the capacity
8
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to follow that rule. For example, I may desire never to eat ice-cream, for I believe it is
impacting my health. But I may lack the self-control to actually refuse to eat an icecream when presented with one, though the rule I had established may be truly mine.
Not everything we do is autonomous, even when there is no external source of
authority forcing us: heteronomy can come from one’s own lack of self-governance.
The literature often distinguishes between personal and moral autonomy 10 .
Personal autonomy refers to the ideas presented above. It is the capacity for an agent
to form her own set of rules, according to the belief that these rules match what the
agent has authentically identified as valuable. It relies on the assumption that the
agent’s cognitive functions are intact, but also to some extent, here physical capacity
– in medical cases for example. The identification of one’s desires doesn’t require a
consideration for moral principles.
Moral autonomy is the equivalent of such capacity, applied to moral principles.
An agent is morally autonomous if she is capable of choosing moral values on the
basis of her independent rational capacities, free from coercion, pressure or influence.
Moral autonomy relies on a capacity for personal autonomy, however there’s no such
necessity the other way around. One can be personally autonomous simply because
they identify authentic desires, but without deliberating about moral laws. For Kant,
the universal nature of moral autonomy is the basis of deontology. It is the capacity to
endorse and apply principles of the universal moral law, and it is the basis of our
normative evaluations. It also justifies the equal treatment we owe to each other: as we
are aware of our autonomous status, we must also recognize that everyone shares this
knowledge about us and about themselves. Moral autonomy is also the basis of moral
obligation, moral responsibility and accountability.
But autonomy can also be a political value: it can be defined negatively as the
ability to form political opinions without political coercion, or positively, as the
participation in the exercise of political self-rule 11 . In the liberal tradition, the
legitimacy of political rules is based on the assumption that citizens are capable of
rationally understanding and accepting these rules without influence or pressure, and
that they recognize the mutual benefit of this cooperation12. We can view political
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autonomy in two ways: first, as the justification for the legitimacy of principles of
justice; second, as an ideal towards which democratic liberal societies should lean. If
we accept the second statement, then the role of society is to create such politically
autonomous individuals. In a negative way, political autonomy is associated with the
absence of political interference. At the heart of this idea is the traditional assumption
of a duality between society and the individual, expressed by John Stuart Mill: “There
is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual
independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as
indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political
despotism”13. There seems to be a durable caution, in the liberal thought, about the
necessary distance political subjects may have to take towards institutions and
collectiveness. The idea that individuals need protection from such interference is key
to understand this approach on political autonomy. But not every tradition of thought
carries this intrinsic conflict; in fact, political autonomy can also be understood
positively as participation in collective self-government. This is for example the case
for Aristotle – although he never speaks of autonomy – for whom a just society is one
where free citizen rule and are ruled in a system of equal rotation14.
The process though which an agent reaches the required level of selfgovernment is subject to numerous debates and interpretations. However, what seems
to be common ground, is that autonomy requires a more or less high degree of
coherence between a person’s behaviour and her inner state. A certain for of harmony
is required between the agent’s mental disposition, the desires she forms, and the
actions that follow. Autonomy may also simply be an ideal: something every agent
should look to obtain rather than a capacity they inherently possess.
2. Kant’s Rationalist Account
The concept of autonomy is at the heart of Kant’s moral philosophy: it is the
foundation of human dignity and is the mark of the persons’ capacity to act as rational

13
14

Mill, On Liberty, 2001, p. 9
Aristotle, Politics, 3.1277b

17

agents15. It is anchored in the idea of the self as a free individual, possessor of reason,
and capable of resisting dependence. Autonomy for Kant is also realized through
obedience to the moral law, as long as the law has been imposed by myself on myself.
Kant’s definition offers an ontological and normative aspect: autonomy for him is at
the same time an intrinsic feature of people, and a purpose, or a moral obligation. It is
the essence of persons to be autonomous, but autonomy is also the end towards which
they should direct their lives. Neglecting one’s autonomy is therefore denying them an
essential aspect of their identity as a person.
Autonomy is also a way to legitimate moral laws: rules can only be justified if
people are capable of applying them through self-determination. Kant can be
understood as presenting some form of contractarian theory, in a moral sense. Morality
is based on the contractarian idea that men are equal rational beings capable of selfimposed ends and self-government. They are conscious of their own features and
aware that others are conscious of them as well. Morality follows the mutual
recognition that we all share these same basic features. Kant is not a political
contractarian the way Hobbes or Locke are, but he can be seen as a moral contractarian
because his morality is based on the agreement that men are equally autonomous and
rational in essence, therefore all deserve the same fair treatment. Velleman explains
that the basis of Kant’s morality is the mutual recognition of rationality amongst
individuals.
“In Kant’s view, being a person consists in being a rational creature, both
cognitively and practically (…). Rational creatures have access to a shared
perspective, from which they do not only see the same things but they can also see
the visibility of those things to all rational creatures.”16
Rationality is therefore at the centre of Kant’s deontology. It is because we are
rational that we are capable of free will, which makes us capable of making moral
choices. Even if, as Heiner Bielefeldt notices, Kant’s conception of freedom is also
duty-based, the will remains the first component of our moral obligation. He writes
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that “his philosophy of duty is freedom based on the most radical sense, since it states
that there are no moral duties prior to and outside of, the will”17. The essence of Kant’s
moral philosophy relies on the idea that we are a free will first, and that this will is
capable through rationality of forming duties and responding appropriately to them.
Autonomy is the capacity for the will to be self-legislative: since the laws of duty are
internalized, obedience to such laws is nothing other than obedience to internal
motives. Kant’s account places personal and moral autonomy at the same level, as
there is no significant distinction between the law one applies to oneself and the moral
law.
The influence of the Kantian perspective on autonomy, human dignity and the
respect that is due to these inherent features is significant in moral and political
philosophy, especially amongst liberals. Rawls has been understood by some as a
direct descendant of Kantian deontology, from which justice as fairness takes its
universalist approach18. If various critiques of the Kantian rationalist account have also
emerged, it is difficult to contest that his definition has had and continues to have a
significant influence on our discussions about free will and human dignity.
3. The Value of Autonomy
One can however wonder why we should care about autonomy, what makes it
valuable, or why it needs to be protected, if it is an inherent quality of men. I take as a
given the idea that autonomy is valuable both intrinsically and instrumentally, and will
argue for this as a response to the few critiques that question its purpose or its
feasibility.
The main set of objections has to do with the idea that autonomy is largely
associated with the liberal Western conception of the self as independent and
individualistic. According to Alasdair MacIntyre for example, we see ourselves as
autonomous agents based on the false idea that we are individual and sovereign moral
agents, free from any teleology19. He attributes this belief to the Enlightenment, which
carries a project that according to him, was doomed to failure. By rejecting an
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Aristotelian framework and shifting the focus from virtue to reason, the West has
embraces a conception of rational autonomous subjects that is fictional and
illusionary20. The relevance of such autonomy is also questioned on a more relativistic
basis by Eastern philosophers for whom autonomy is used as a way to shape Western
democracies21. They oppose this view to Confucian approaches on agency, for which
community and conceptions of people as role-bearing rather than right-bearing play a
more significant role in the way people shape their lives22. These critiques don’t argue
for the complete rejection of autonomy, but highlight the cultural nature of the concept,
and question the very possibility that we may be the sole authors of our existence23.
They accuse Western liberals of relying on an unrealistic picture of “ghostly agents”
according to which men are expected to have a causal impact on the world, when
Confucian approaches define agency as harmony between people and the natural or
social laws of the world they live in24.
I take this set of objections – or the anti-liberal critique of autonomy – seriously,
and in fact, I will show in subsequent sections than I share most of the worries about
the definition of the autonomous self as it is presented in Western political and moral
philosophy. But the fact that the concept of autonomy has been wrongly described, or
that it has been problematically associated with questionable ideas, does not mean that
it loses relevance in and of itself. The critiques of autonomy as it is should not lead us
to abandon the concept, which I believe has instrumental as well as intrinsic value.
Firstly, I follow Stephen Darwall in his claim that the instrumental value of autonomy
is that it enables us to legitimately demand respect for the claims we make25. The value
here is not about autonomy as such, but about the fact that by attributing autonomy to
people, we give more weight to their demands, and recognize that they are entitled to
their own decisions. In this case, autonomy is a way to claim respect for our own
authority in deciding the course of our lives. I would add that this entitlement is what
grounds moral and juridical responsibility. People’s accountability depends on their
capacity to decide of their own actions, and their level of responsibility is equally
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proportional to their level of autonomy. Politically, autonomy has an instrumental
value also: it seems reasonable to say that people can only be expected to create laws
as autonomous agents, and also while knowing everyone is able to accept the law and
follow it as one’s own. For political principles to claim any kind of legitimacy, they
must be decided by and for autonomous individuals. For example, if it is revealed to
the public that a lawmaker is caught up in a manipulative relationship with a lobby,
which influences her political decisions through blackmailing or intimidation, the laws
that result from such relationship could be considered illegitimate – not simply because
what caused the making of the law was not a concern for the public good, but because
the author was not acting freely. But we can also say that the quest for autonomy
provides a valuable political common purpose: for a state to promote the autonomy of
its citizens is a noble goal that seems worthwhile in and of itself. The same goes with
the treatment we ought to each other: because we wish to be recognized as autonomous
beings and claim the rights that go with it, and because we recognize the political value
of living in such a society, we become responsible for promoting the autonomy of
others.
But it would be limiting to say the value of autonomy is simply instrumental.
Autonomy has an intrinsic value because it is directly linked to what we are as human
beings and what we take the purpose of our existence to be. Dworkin says that by
exercising autonomy, “persons define their nature, give meaning and coherence to
their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of persons they are”26. A commitment
to autonomy is a commitment to what a person sees herself to be, and to the idea that
we are the best judges of what our interests and values are. Autonomy shapes one’s
life, gives weight to one’s action, provides meaning, and grounds the moral respect we
ought to each other as equally capable of such agency.
4. Autonomy as a Liberal Ideal
In moral and political philosophy, autonomy is often associated with liberalism,
and used as the basis and legitimation of principles of justice. Because persons possess
autonomy as an innate good, the role of the state is mostly to respect and preserve this
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autonomy: this is the basis of liberalism’s “freestanding” approach27. Autonomy is
then mostly conceived as the right to be left in charge of one’s decisions and opinions.
We have seen that rationality and autonomy are what justifies the treatment we owe to
each other in Kant’s deontology. This conception is largely embraced in liberal
political philosophy, as the justification of individual rights, state neutrality, and
pluralistic values28. Recognizing each other’s equal right to autonomy and freedom, if
they are essential features of men, should lead us to adopt principles of justice that will
avoid interference with these essential features. Isaiah Berlin explains the direct
connection between essential autonomy and freedom as non-interference, and the
political implications of this connection.
“For if the essence of men is that they are autonomous beings – authors of
values, of ends in themselves, the ultimate authority of which consists precisely in
the fact that they are willed freely – then nothing is worse than to treat them as if
they were not autonomous, but natural objects, played on by casual influences,
creatures at the mercy of external stimuli, whose choices can be manipulated by
their rulers, whether by threat of force or offer of rewards.”29
Liberals have largely been influenced by the concept of autonomy as an essential
feature of people and conceived largely as negative freedom, based on the assumption
that men are rational beings. According to this idea, anything that goes against men’s
natural features can be considered a violation of their individual rights, and therefore
cannot be legitimate. These conceptions are the ideological platform for liberalism’s
main conditions for justice, and as Manson says, justify state neutrality: “Liberals
often seek to connect respect for persons with the requirement of state neutrality
though the notions of autonomy: respect for persons requires respect for each person’s
autonomy; since the exercise of autonomy may lead to the acceptance of a variety of
conceptions of the good, respect for each person’s autonomy requires the state to be
neutral between different views of the good life”30. Rationality is also the basis for a
contractarian conception of political justice: it is because men are rational that they
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recognise their own autonomy and the other’s legitimate demand for the same type of
recognition.
Most critics of liberalism would argue that the figure of the rational self, possessor
of will and creator of her own destiny, is directly influenced by Kant and the theories
of the Enlightenment, as opposed to a more teleological and scholastic framework31,
and this, irrespective of what these critics have to say about the outcomes of such
theory. These critiques point out that the picture of persons upon which liberal
autonomy is based is flawed or unrealistic32. I meet these critiques in their concern for
such a definition, and the implication it may have on the political decisions that derive
from it – mostly regarding state neutrality. My project is here to show that the
association of autonomy with liberalism is paradoxical and problematic. It is
paradoxical because the nature of liberalism is to be ethically minimal and
metaphysically neutral, but relying on a picture of people as autonomous, or
expressing wishes for autonomy to be promoted and preserve, already constitute moral
commitments. Furthermore, I will show that autonomy is a concept that requires more
than simply the absence of interference of others, and that associating it with negative
freedom only is too limiting. But in a broader sense, I claim that liberalism is unable
to account for autonomy, because it relies on definitions of people, freedom and justice
are already flawed. I will go over these worries in the third section of this chapter.
Before I do, I need to present what the liberal standpoint on freedom is, and what are
the ideological basis of autonomy they defend.

II.

The Liberal Standpoint

I have briefly described the concept of autonomy, and argued that we have reasons
to value and promote it. I have also pointed out that this concept of often associated
with liberal values, as the core principle that justifies most of its political claims, and
presented my concerns about this association. But before I describe these worries, we
must understand what the values of liberalism regarding freedom are. In this section,
I go over Berlin’s traditional dichotomy between negative and positive freedom, and
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show that the concept of autonomy liberals tend to favour is of a negative type. I also
present the main characteristics of Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, with the
intention to highlight the strictly political nature of his claims. The aim of this section
is to present what the broad arguments of liberalism are regarding the kind of freedom
they embrace, and the moral and political standpoint from which they speak.
1. Negative and Positive Freedom
The distinction between negative and positive liberty is drawn by Isaiah Berlin and
constitutes the cornerstone of most debates regarding freedom. Even if this distinction
has been questioned and re-interpreted in various ways, it remains central if we want
to caption the main characteristics of the types of freedom political theories wish to
endorse, and the moral and political impact of this endorsement. Adopting one or the
other determines the kind of political picture we want to defend. Understanding this
distinction is key to grasp the ideological root of most liberal concepts today. Berlin
defines negative freedom as follows:
“I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men
interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which
a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from doing what I
could otherwise to, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other
men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be,
enslaved.”33
Berlin interestingly links negative liberty and political liberty as if they were
the same concepts. Political liberty is necessarily negatively defined, and it is coherent
with the ideal of freedom as the absence of interference. Berlin distinguishes the lack
of negative freedom and mere incapacity, anticipating the objection that if I am unable
to buy a loaf of bread because of financial restrictions, I am as unfree as I would be if
the law was stopping me from buying it instead. His response is to say that this would
be to jump too quickly into theories of oppression: it would be implying that the reason
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I cannot buy the bread is that I am the victim of a system perpetuated by others and
prohibiting me from doing what I want to do. Berlin does not deny that this can be
true, and that this sort of system could in fact interfere with my desire to buy the bread,
and could potentially produce a lack of political freedom. But what makes the
difference between the two is that the causes of interference are caused by human
beings other than me – as opposed to an illness, an accident, a natural catastrophe, etc.
Whether the interference is direct or indirect – in the case of systemic interference – it
has to be initiated by people to count as a freedom impediment. If we subscribe to the
idea that for example, poverty is the result of a system made of human decisions, we
could claim to lack political freedom when poor. But if the incapacity to fulfil our
desires is caused by non-human factors, or by my own personal disposition – for
example, unwillingness to work – then the problem has nothing to do with freedom.
Berlin says that “the criterion of oppression is that part that I believe to be played by
other human beings, directly or indirectly, with or without the intention of doing so, in
frustrating my wishes”. Political liberty so conceived is always a freedom “from”,
rather than a freedom “to”.
Positive freedom refers to the ability for an individual to act in order to fulfil her
desires and realize her own wishes as a subject of rational choices.
“The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of
the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on
myself, not on external forces of whatever kind (…). I wish, above all, to conscious
of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices
and able to explain them by the reference to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free
to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am
made to realize that it is not.”
Positive freedom is an internal matter: it is obtained through the features and
capacities that are found in the individual herself. A lack of positive freedom is
independent from the interference of external factors, but refers to a lack of ability for
the agent to be self-determined and self-governed. Etymologically, autonomy is closer
to positive freedom, as it is the capacity to be self-ruled. Berlin, however, because of
the concerns he has for what he sees as the threats of positive freedom, clearly takes a
25

stand for the negative conception. Autonomy in this case, can be negative – as the
absence of anything that would interfere with my choices. Berlin is aware that his
definition of positive freedom needs further clarifications, since internal capacities are
more complex to obtain than simply the absence of external interference. It is easy to
see that I am stopped by someone, but less so to identify internal barriers that may
prevent me from fulfilling my wishes. It is also important to distinguish alienated
internal motives – passions, impulses – from rational motives of a higher degree –
what Berlin refers to as the “realization of lower and higher nature”. But Berlin is
mostly concern about the notion of “true self” apparently necessary for positive
freedom to be achieved. First, because the conditions for identifying a true self are
unclear, but also because this injunction carries the risk of paternalism and
perfectionism. It leads Berlin to say that positive freedom is paradoxical in nature: in
the case that I don’t identify my true self, others could legitimately reveal it to me, and
justify coercion on the basis that it is aimed at the realization of my own true interest,
whether I am aware of it or not. His worry is based on historical examples, in
particular, French Jacobinism during the Revolution of 1789: “The French Revolution
(…) was (…) just an eruption of the desire for positive freedom of collective selfdirection on the part of a large body of Frenchmen who felt liberated as a nation, even
though the result was, for a good many of them a severe restriction of individual
freedoms”. He also refers to Rousseau’s infamous declaration that men will be “forced
to be free” when they enter the civil state. In this, he follows Benjamin Constant in his
critique of the Social Contract, on the basis that it promotes positive liberty – or the
liberty of the Ancients as opposed to the liberty of the Moderns: “Constant saw in
Rousseau the most dangerous enemy of individual liberty, because he had declared
that ‘by giving myself to all I give myself to none’. Constant could not see why, even
though the sovereign is ‘everybody’, it should not oppress one of the ‘members’ of its
indivisible self, if it is so decided”. The caution for positive freedom comes from the
worry for the preservation of pluralism and the freedom of ‘recalcitrant’ individuals
who may not have realized their ‘true selves’.
As Berlin has pointed out, positive liberty is not merely an individual matter, but
also a political one, and is directly linked to self-government as the capacity to take
part in the elaboration of laws in a self-governing society. When negative freedom
implies that institutions stay under watch, such that the possibility of interference is
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minimized, positive freedom requires participation to the elaboration and expression
of public power. Rousseau articulates this idea, when, according to Berlin, he describes
freedom as “the possession by all, and not merely by some, (…) of a share in the public
power which is entitled to interfere with every aspect of every citizen’s life”34. Selfgovernment is not, then, only a matter of personal self-determination or realization,
but relies on contribution to public power: in this sense, I am free insofar as I take part
in the elaboration of rules that will govern not only me but all members of society with
whom I share that same capacity. Political freedom is also obtainable through
obedience to such rule: the same way individual sovereignty is obtained through the
following of the law one prescribes to oneself. Berlin is cautious of this idea, which he
qualifies as a case of moral and political monism – an idea that he says, has historically
always been proved appealing35, although it also is at the root of all political evil. The
problem Berlin emphasizes is that positive liberty leads to the desire, for people in
charge of public power to “place authority in their own hands”36, in favour of the
pursue of one supposedly superior political course of action. Political self-government
in this sense, can only function if political unity is maintained: a condition that for
Berlin, cannot be met without the annihilation of individuality and pluralism.
Berlin makes it clear that these two conceptions are not two sides of a same coin,
but “two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the ends of life”37. As I
have said, autonomy in its semantic roots refers to the capacity to follow the rule one
has applied to oneself, and therefore can easily be associated with positive freedom. It
also contains the political component and condition of participation to collective selfgovernment – idea that is rejected by Berlin as the cause of political paternalism and
monism. In consequence, affirming that liberals value autonomy as a core idea while
endorse a negative definition of freedom as non-interference, seems like a paradox.
However, the concerns expressed by Berlin had led many to adopt a negative view of
the concept. It is possible from this standpoint to describe autonomy as freedom from
the influence or coercion of another. It is the kind of autonomy I assume to be preferred
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in liberal political philosophy, from which most of the liberal values emerge – state
neutrality, ethical minimalism, emphasis on justice, etc.
2. Justice as Fairness: Main Features
Rawls’ essay Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical comes as a response
to the various objections provoked by the Theory of Justice, and seems to capture the
main components of modern liberalism38. In particular, it emphasizes the idea that
liberalism is a strict political theory that should not be concerned with specific moral
claims. Rawls’ intention is to remind us that his theory is not based on a psychological
or metaphysical definition of persons, nor does it commit to a universal definition of
the good. He denies that such claims are needed for liberalism, and in fact, claims that
they would most likely undermine the theory, which relies on concepts of an opposite
kind – neutrality, pluralism, cooperation, procedural justice. Rawls also argues that
this view should be shared by democratic liberal societies. In this section, I will
highlight the main components of justice as fairness, in an attempt to identify the
contours of modern liberalism in general, and of the liberal definition of autonomy in
particular.
A particularity of Rawls is that unlike classic liberals like Bentham or Mill, he
clearly affirms his opposition to utilitarianism, on the basis that it relies on a moral
claim about the value of utility. For him, justice needs to take a distance from any sort
of moral conception: “The essential point is this: as a practical matter no general
conception can provide a publicly recognized basis for a conception of justice in a
modern democratic state” 39 . One of the goals of such society is to arrive to an
“overlapping consensus”, an agreement between bearers of opposite beliefs and
values, who recognize their mutual need to cooperate. This is what can be considered
Rawls’ social contract: irrespective of each person’s values, principles of justice must
be made in such a way that all members of society can recognize their own benefit in
accepting them. Rawls’ goal is therefore first and foremost pragmatic, it is to stabilize
the acceptation of principles of justice at the scale of the whole society rather than a
majority of people, such that they can protect all members’ basic rights.
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Rawls’ account of justice is rather minimalist and procedural, it is restricted to the
two principles: each person has an equal right to basic rights and liberties, and
inequalities need to satisfy the conditions of fair opportunity, while benefiting the most
vulnerable members of society. These principles are based on a vision of people as
free and equal. Rawls’ anthropology seems strictly political as well, he says that a
person “is someone who can be a citizen, that is, a fully cooperating member of society
over a complete life”40. The essential characteristic of persons is therefore linked to
her capacity for citizenship and cooperation. But the characteristics “free and equal”
are also taken as intrinsically constitutive of person.
“The basic intuitive idea is that in virtue of what we may call their moral
powers, and the powers of reason, thought, and judgement connected with those
powers, we say that people are free. And in virtue of their having these powers to
the requisite degree to be fully cooperating members of society, we say that
persons are equal.”41
The two powers Rawls mentions are a conception of justice and a conception of
the good, that each person is assumed to be capable of42. The good here is not to be
understood with a teleological lens, nor is it a claim about virtue. A conception of the
good is simply a capacity for each person to pick their own ends and recognize their
own benefits in pursuing them. Free and equal are therefore not being defined in any
substantial way, coherently with Rawls’ wish to avoid metaphysical claims. They are
simply characteristics derived from the empirical observation that people are able to
cooperate based on their own conception of themselves. The intuition that they are free
and equal relies on the fact that they recognize a need for cooperation as much as their
own rational power. But it is a definition that is made a posteriori: Rawls starts by
observing the capacities of people for cooperation, the claims that ensue, and then only
ascribes them the properties that make cooperation possible.

40

Ibid., p. 233
Ibid.
42
Ibid., p. 244
41

29

Rawls stresses that his definition of people should be purely restricted to a political
conception, and should not be taken as a moral doctrine, otherwise it would contradict
the ideological basis of liberalism.
“The conception of the citizen as a free and equal person is not a moral ideal
to govern all of life, but is rather an ideal belonging to a conception of political
justice which is to apply to the basic structure. (…). Recall that as such – political
– doctrine, liberalism assumes that in a constitutional democratic state under
modern conditions there are bound to exist conflicting and incommensurable
conceptions of the good.”43
Liberalism’s essential feature is therefore this absence of commitment to
comprehensive moral ideals broadly speaking. People can therefore adopt this
procedural and political conception of themselves and apply it to any political
discussion about justice, “without being committed in other parts of their life to
comprehensive moral ideals often associated with liberalism, for example, the ideal of
autonomy and individuality”. Here we have a glimmering of the possibility that
liberalism may not be adequate to harbour the moral ideal of autonomy, although this
ideal is often considered to be at its core. Rawls, however, values autonomy as a
concept that is likely to arise when principles of justice are applied in a well-ordered
society44. Rawls endorses the heritage of Kant and Mill’s emphasis on autonomy and
individuality, but declares that his theory specifies the value of such concepts through
political conceptions of justice and not through a comprehensive moral doctrine.
We have seen that Rawls follows the contractarian tradition in that the structure of
justice relies on these conditions: acceptance of rules and procedures regarded as
adequate regulators of social life, mutual reciprocity, and a rational sense of one’s
advantage. These structural ideas are prior to Rawls’ conception of the nature of the
self, or persons. Indeed, justice as fairness “starts from the idea that society is to be
conceived as a fair system of cooperation and so it adopts a conception of people to
go with this idea”45. Rawls’ originality is to put the Kantian definition of people as
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rational beings at the service of political purposes. If this rationalist conception is at
the basis of Kant’s morality, for Rawls, it is what gives weight to our political decisions
and makes cooperation possible. From the recognition of this need for cooperation
derives our identity as persons. However, Rawls also differs from the contractarian
conception because of the absence of psychological definition of persons, and the
priority of justice over men’s nature. Originally, social contract theories seek to solve
the problem of how to live in society given the nature of men as it is – often, described
as selfish and independent. They rely on a psychological claim about what people are,
and try to reconcile it with the need to cooperate. Therefore, their political claims are
based on these metaphysical considerations first, and come as a way to cope with
reality. Rawls’ minimalism on these questions, magnified by the original position,
distances him from this tradition and marks the specificity of modern liberalism.

3. The Original Position
The original position is a central aspect of Rawls’ theory of justice and of modern
liberalism in general. Understanding its characteristics is necessary to understand the
legitimacy and value of the way people come to accept the two principles. In this
section, I will briefly present its main characteristics, then show that the value of the
original position relies on the assumption that parties are not only rational but also
autonomous.
The original position is a thought experiment which imagines what happens when
people, assumed to be rational but unaware of their specific features, come to pick
political principles according to their own benefit. Rawls’ bet is that their innate
rationality and sense of justice will lead them to agree on principles that would work
to their advantage were they to end up as the least well-off. In A Theory of Justice,
Rawls gives the main features of the original position as a thought experiment46. First,
he says that people must be aware of the world’s state of scarcity. They enjoy mutually
disinterestedness – or what he calls limited altruism – meaning that people don’t
necessarily want to take advantage of each other and are naturally relatively
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benevolent. Rationality is the core value of the original position: it is what each
decision is based on, for people search to “take effective means to ends, with objective
interpretation of probability”. Finally, the ground for people’s consent is defined in
terms of self-interest, and what Rawls calls their preference for primary goods.
As Ronald Dworkin says: “Rawls tries to show that if these men and women are
rational, and act only in their own self-interest, they will choose his two principles”47.
Put in the context of social contract theories, it can be seen as Rawls’ equivalent of the
state of nature, the moment where people come together to form society. Although
people share some basic knowledge about the world and themselves, they are not
citizens yet, as they have not agreed about ways to cooperate with each other. Just like
for any social contract theory, Rawls’ purpose is to find fair terms of cooperation,
which means that they must be agreed on by those who are engaged in this mutual
relation. But agreement is not sufficient for fairness: the conditions of the agreement
also need to be appropriate. The purpose of the veil of ignorance is to reassure us of
the fairness of these conditions: it covers the “contingent advantages” of the parties
and guarantees the neutrality of their decisions. Rawls assumes that awareness of these
contingent facts would corrupt the terms of cooperation: “we must find some point of
view, removed from and not distorted by the particular features and circumstances of
the all-encompassing background framework, from which a fair agreement between
free and equal persons can be reached”48. The original position seems to provide a
picture of ideal political agents, and gives us indications about how principles of
justice should be properly picked. These agents’ motives are also strictly political,
because they are metaphysics-free: decisions are devoid of moral content and only
concerned with procedures. Rawls explains that this innate sense of justice is prior to
the concept of the good as particular moral commitment, and that this is the essence of
liberalism, as well as the reason for its stability.
“The absence of commitment (…) to any particular comprehensive ideal, is
essential to liberalism as a political doctrine (…). The concept of justice is
independent from and prior to the concept of goodness in the sense that its
principles limit the conceptions of the good which are permissible (…). I believe
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this priority is characteristic of liberalism as a political doctrine and something
like it seems essential to any conception of justice reasonable for a democratic
state.”49
The original position illustrates this conception, it is easy to see what is appealing
in such a procedural view on political deliberation. More generally, it is easy to
understand the appeal of Rawls’ theory, and why it remains a cornerstone of liberalism
today. He has rejected the idea that political theories need universal moral concepts
for their principles to be justified and provided a method that puts an unprecedented
emphasis on procedures. Rawls also affirms the existence of basic rights without
committing to any particular definition of a right: this idea is appealing because it
leaves room for a variety of rights to be picked out in the original position. As Dworkin
mentions, it is because we have abstract non-particular basic rights that we can
adequately pick specific rights in the original position:
“The basic right of Rawls’ deep theory, therefore, cannot be a right to any
particular individual goal (…). The original position cannot itself be justified on
the assumption of such a right, because the parties to the contract do not know that
they have any such interest (…). So the basic right of Rawls’ deep theory must be
an abstract right, that is, not a right to any particular individual good”50.
Finally, I will argue that the requirements of the original position are not only for
people to be rational but also to be autonomous, for the theory to stand. It relies on the
rationality of parties, as the guarantee that they will agree on principles that benefit
them while satisfying conditions of fairness. But parties are also autonomous, for the
same reason. The legitimacy of their choices relies on the fact that these choices are
made in a state of freedom from external influence – of from other’s coercion, or from
the contingent advantages or disadvantages of life. In this sense, they need to be
negatively autonomous, the way Berlin describes it. The lack of awareness of these
contingent factors guarantees the autonomy of their choice. But parties must be
autonomous in a deeper way: they also must recognize themselves as autonomous.
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Rawls says that “the second respect in which citizens view themselves are free is that
they regard themselves as self-orienting sources of valid claim”. These claims “have
weight apart from being derived from duties or obligations specified by the political
conception of justice, for example, from duties and obligations owed to society”51. It
is precisely because people see themselves as self-oriented and non-influenced by
external obligations, that their claims are valid. It means that only autonomous
individuals can formulate valid claims. It is clear that the value of principles of justice
picked in the original position also relies on this assumption. For what would be the
value of such principles, if the terms of deliberation were corrupt by external
influence? For fair cooperation to happen, parties must choose with self-produced
considerations about what they may want, but also with the insurance that they will be
able to apply the principles to themselves in the future without being coerced. But
agents must also be autonomous as, able to identify what their desires, needs, and true
interests would be, should they end up in a vulnerable position, and able to endorse
these as authentic.
Lastly, I will mention that for Rawls, autonomy must be an innate characteristic of
persons. Because the original position is a content-free state where people are unaware
of their specific features, and because people think of themselves as self-orienting,
then autonomy cannot rely on these specific features. Therefore, it is an independent
quality of people, and it does not derive from any contingent fact about people’s life –
for example, it does not depend on one’s upbringing, education, or status in society. It
is an innate characteristic of people, alongside with rationality. Interestingly, the
original position is also what allows for full autonomy, because acting fully
autonomously is acting according to principles that have been picked under the fair
conditions of the original position. Autonomy is also likely to be fully realized in a
society governed by such principles.
To conclude, I will say that autonomy is a necessary feature of the original
position, and by extension of Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness. First because the
value and legitimacy of the principles depends on the capacity to pick them as a selforienting subject, and because the purpose of the original position is precisely to reach
a place of independence from contingent influence. Then, if autonomy is necessary in
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the original position, it must be innate, since all other characteristics of human life are
covered by the veil of ignorance.

III.

Limits of the Liberal Project

We have established what the main features of the liberal viewpoint broadly
construed are, and that liberal freedom is negatively conceived by liberals as the
absence of interference. We have also shown that one of the goals of liberalism is the
preservation of people’s freedom on the basis of their innate right to and capacity for
autonomy, which explains the association often made between the concept and the
political theory. In this section, I will argue that this association is however mistaken,
and that in contrast with the common assumption, liberalism is not an adequate
candidate to provide a sustainable theory of autonomy. My argument has two sides:
first, it says that we should reject liberalism in general because of its limitations and
inconsistencies regarding the definition of freedom, the self, and its problematic
emphasis on justice. Second, these initial concerns produce a caution about autonomy:
if liberalism relies on a flawed structure, it becomes questionable whether it can
harbour a concept as demanding and substantial. I start with a brief description of the
problems of negative freedom or freedom as non-interference, through the critiques
that have been addressed to Berlin. I will insist on the idea that Berlin’s positive
freedom or autonomy is not described merely as individual capacity but as the capacity
to form laws and exercise public power. I will later argue that this view of selfgovernment is what republicans should favour as a way to attend to the limits of
liberalism. Secondly, I introduce the limitations of the liberal definition of persons and
its emphasis of justice over the good. Finally, I argue that the association between
autonomy and liberalism relies on a paradox: liberalism’s essence is a lack of
commitment to moral values, with the goal to protect autonomy as a moral ideal, which
itself requires an identification of values. My conclusion is that liberalism’s procedural
nature prohibits it from providing any sustainable definition of a concept it claims to
defend – concept that is fundamentally demanding and substantial in nature. On the
other hand, if they don’t claim to defend autonomy, then we are left with no indication
of why we should value and protect the freedom of individuals.
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1. Limits of Negative Liberty and Freedom as Non-Interference
Liberal’s preference for negative freedom is clearly expressed by Berlin and is
coherent with the liberal traditional defence of freedom as non-interference, which
goes back to Hobbes52. Charles Taylor has raised various concerns about the Berlin’s
dichotomy between the two kinds of freedom. He accuses Berlin of describing the two
versions based on their most “caricatural” pictures, which Taylor calls, “the crudest
versions of the theory” 53. Positive freedom is described according to a stereotypical
image of totalitarianism, that Berlins attributes to the Rousseauist principle of forcing
people to be free. According to this reading, strong opponents to negative liberty
favour positive liberty as a tool to impose collective purposes, in the name of selfrealization: “When people attack positive theories of freedom, they generally have
some left totalitarian theory in mind, according to which freedom resides exclusively
in exercising collective control over one’s destiny in classless society, the kind of
theory which underlies, for instance, official Communism”54. Taylor rightfully adds
that this view is also caricatural because it does not recognize that some form of
collective control can in fact provide more freedom – for example, if it results in the
loss of freedom for a powerful minority wishing to oppress a larger group. I share with
Taylor the assumption that this historical imagery has caused proponents of negative
freedom to consider positive freedom threatening, but that this association need not be
made55.
But negative liberty can also be the subject of caricature, as Taylor mentions when
he refers to it as the “Hobbesian/Bentham view”. This perspective reduces freedom to
the absence of obstacles and does not consider that psychological inner factors may
have an impact on one’s capacities for action. If this line doesn’t seem too far from
Berlin’s view, it remains stereotyped because “it rules out of court one of the most
powerful motives behind the modern defence of freedom as individual independence,
the post-romantic idea that each person’s form of self-realization is original to
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him/her, and can therefore only be worked out independently” 56 . Proponents of
negative liberty, even of the strictest kind, therefore need to be concerned for internal
impediments to freedom: it is in fact unclear why, under such strict and unreachable
conditions, one should advocate for it.
Taylor notices the interesting asymmetry about the fact that proponents of the
negative view accuse the positive view according to a caricatural picture, but also seem
willing to embrace the most stereotyped and hard-line view of their own theory:
“Whereas the extreme ‘forced to be free’ view is one which the opponents of positive
freedom try to pin on them, as one would expect in the heat of argument, the
proponents of negative liberty themselves often seem anxious to espouse their extreme,
Hobbesian view”. But another paradox is that often, negative freedom is defended for
the reason that it is in the removal of external obstacles that a person may discover her
true self. Negative liberty would be needed, therefore, to obtain what positive liberty
has been focused on from the start.
The fact that negative freedom is only concerned with external obstacles is in itself
a problem that threatens to undermine Berlin’s standpoint. As Taylor point out, even
if we endorse negative freedom, we must discriminate between the various external
obstacles that we can expect to find in our way. That means that we have judgements
of significance according to personal purposes, and these judgements are internal.
What lies behind our judgements is the fact that we make evaluations about our desires
in qualitative terms, and that these evaluations may also indicate what level of freedom
we are enjoying – for example, we are not free in the same way when we experience
an overriding desire of low-significance, stopping us from performing an action of
higher-significance. As Taylor says, “the internally fettered man is not free”. One way
to discriminate between our desires, or between the desires that will bring about the
least of external obstacles possible, is to check whether we identify with this
preference. This means that internal evaluations are important to determine if we are
free, even from the perspective of negative freedom.
But as we have seen, positive liberty is not only explained by the capacity to form
desires or choices, but also by the capacity to form laws in a self-governing
community, through which public power can be exercised. These laws are at the same
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time the expression of and the means to freedom in this way. Citizens express positive
liberty through the making of laws and deliberative processes; they also exercise
freedom through obedience to the laws that have been picked under the right
conditions, as this is the process through which they gain public power. Not only did
Taylor emphasize the unfeasibility of a strict negative view with regards to desire
prioritization – as a horizon of significance is necessary – he also pointed out the value
of positive freedom as an “exercise” concept – idea that goes hand in hand with selfgovernment. Negative freedom can be said, in contrast, to be an “opportunity” concept,
where its proponents are only concerned with removing the obstacles that undermine
our independence57. Taylor explains that opportunity is not a necessary condition for
negative freedom; we can interpret it as such, but nowhere is Berlin putting forward
the idea that it must be that way. However, Taylor rightfully points out that a pure
opportunity concept is in fact an impossibility: as to have to opportunity to do x, I must
remove the external and internal barriers preventing me from doing x. This means that
I must already have the capacity to do so: I must be able to exercise freedom prior to
the opportunity58.
Positive freedom, as an exercise concept, can be translated in the political language
as collective self-rule, or self-government. For opportunities to be reachable, there
must be a collective capacity to not only remove obstacles, but also identify and choose
among them, and this capacity must come first. Exercising freedom is then taking part
in the collective deliberative process through which laws will be produced – activity
that is prior to the possibility to reach the opportunities that such laws creates. The
door cannot be open without the making of the door: similarly, opportunities require
that public power is exercised first.
Importance must also be paid on the collective aspect of freedom, which is not
merely a matter of individual preference. Amartya Sen adds to the dichotomy between
negative and positive liberty, the idea that freedom can be thought as effective power
on the one hand, procedural control on the other59 . He reminds us that “given the
interdependences of social living, many liberties are not separately exercisable, and
effective power may have to be seen in terms of what all, or nearly all, members of the
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group would have chosen”60. Positive liberty as collective self-rule can be seen as the
way people exercise collective control over their common course of action – through
the making of laws – which opens the door to effective power.
Construing positive freedom only in terms of individual capacity to make choices
is therefore limiting and inadequate. What Berlin warns us about, is in fact the
collective and political aspect of positive freedom, seen as a threat precisely because
it has collective and political consequences. However, the step between positive
freedom as self-government and the totalitarian regime Berlin is worried about, need
not be this small. In fact, Taylor reminds us that the pre-existing fear of totalitarian
threats may be the reason many political philosophers have abandoned the concept “to
the enemy”, and that it could largely be due to socio-cultural factors. The idea being
that people in Western Post-Romantic societies may simply value freedom as
individual self-realisation more than other conceptions, and are therefore eager to
preserve it against external threats 61 . Taylor qualifies this as the Maginot Line
mentality, which he says is doomed to failure, because it does not recognize that the
actions people wish not to be prevented from performing are necessarily subject to
qualitative classification, that is, they are picked according to a pre-existing horizon of
significance. Although Berlin agrees that totalitarian theories of positive freedom may
include this type of substantive discrimination, he also does not say that there is a
necessary consequential link between the two62.
We may add to this critique the idea expressed by Arendt that freedom is in fact
intrinsically linked to political activity and cannot be separated from the public sphere.
Arendt identifies freedom as the exercise of public power through acts of speech and
deliberation. According to Shmuel Lederman, Arendt’s view on freedom is
participation in government, but also “appearance in the public sphere in which we
disclose who we are”. He explains that for her, freedom “is not something we have,
but rather an activity we share with others”, and is then, “identical with the power to
act”63. For Arendt, action and speech are closely related: “Speechless action would no
longer be action because there would no longer be an actor, and the actor, the doer
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of deeds, is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker of words”64. If we extend
this statement to the political sphere, we may conclude that political deliberation is
indistinguishable from political action. In speaking, men “show who they are”65, and
in consequence, can articulate political claims. Freedom for Arendt, as it requires
political action, also necessarily requires political deliberation. Arendt’s view seems
to express the republican idea that freedom is related to one’s representation and action
within the polis, and therefore, that it goes far beyond the strict negative view. Berlin’s
focus on non-interference would not allow for this kind of exercise-concept to flourish,
as it is limited to the obstructions people don’t face. Although Arendt’s view is not
directed to Berlin, it highlights the importance of public power and the impossibility
for proponents of the negative approach to clearly define political action.
We see from Berlin and its critiques that positive liberty is a much richer ideal than
simply the opposite to negative liberty, it involves more substantive concepts than
freedom as the absence of interference. Whether we agree with Berlin or not, it seems
clear that its political aspect should not be overlooked: positive freedom involves a
conception of freedom as necessarily realized through participation in the making of
the law and the elaboration of public power. Self-government, therefore, can only be
achieve through these means. A strong commitment to strict negative freedom fails in
the sense that it does not recognize the importance of this aspect: it is – purposefully
– blind to the idea that without collective self-government, discrimination between
what needs to be protected and what doesn’t become at best politically irrelevant, at
worst impossible.
I will detail in further chapters the conditions and implications of this claim, and
the way such definition of freedom as self-government may be conceptualized in the
neo-republican context. It seems crucial for the time being, that we question these two
things: the feasibility of strict negative freedom, and the necessary nature of the link
between a fuller commitment to positive liberty and moral perfectionism, or
totalitarianism. We must, in order to do so, keep in mind that positive liberty is not
only a matter of individual capacity, but a collective way to reach and exercise public
power, from which the former may emerge.
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Another trend of critiques of liberal freedom has emerged from neo-republicans
who, while they usually don’t question the preference for negative liberty, express
dissatisfaction regarding the condition of non-interference. I will largely go over the
distinction between this view and the kind of freedom republicans favour in
subsequent chapters, as it is the objection that is most relevant to our purpose. Here, I
will simply give the broad structure of the neo-republican critique of liberal freedom,
and the reasons we should be cautious about the criterion of non-interference. The
charge against freedom as non-interference is first articulated by Philipp Pettit and it
is the core of the neo-republican movement66. Though neo-republicanism follows a
long tradition of thought that goes back to Greek democracies of the Roman rule of
law, the main reason for its re-emergence in modern political philosophy is the concern
about the liberal view on freedom. If freedom is only conceived as the absence of
interference, then it is either too narrow or too broad. It is too narrow, because it is
concerned with actual interference only, and omits that freedom can be limited by
other aspects, for example the possibility of interference. The common example is
often one of a slave with a benevolent master. The master may never interfere with the
life of the slave: in this case, the slave would be free in the liberal sense. But faced
with the counter-intuitive nature of this deduction, we are forced to admit that there
are other obstacles to freedom than simply the absence of actual interference. The fact
that the master has the possibility to interfere, even if she never actually does, is
enough to limit the slave’s freedom. A better condition for freedom, conclude neorepublicans, is the absence of domination, which includes the possibility of
interference rather than its mere occurrence. However, liberal freedom is also too
broad, as it perceives every act of interference as an obstacle to freedom. Neorepublicans rightfully object that not every interference is a limitation of freedom, but
some may in fact produce more freedom. These interferences are permissible at the
condition that they are not arbitrary. This means that the interference cannot be the
product of an arbitrary will, if that will disregards or goes against the interests of the
person who’s subjected to the interference. I will go over the details of what this
definition implies in subsequent chapters. My goal was to show that the liberal view
on freedom is subject to reasonable objections, and that these compelling arguments
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draw caution on the credibility and sustainability of the theory. The idea being that if
the liberal definition of freedom is dubious, chances are their definition of autonomy
will be shaky as well.

2. Critique of the Liberal Self
Liberals have also faced numerous objections expressed by proponents of the
communitarian approach, mainly starting with Michael Sandel’s critique of Rawls’
Theory of Justice, in which he criticizes the liberal priority of the self over its ends,
and of justice over the good67. These communitarian objections are useful in that they
highlight legitimate concerns about a theory that has largely been accepted as standard
in modern political philosophy. Without going over the entire debate between liberals
and communitarians, I will briefly present what the main worries are: the picture of
the self as disencumbered and separate from its ends, as well as the priority of the right
over the good. My goal is to make sense of Sandel’s objection in light of this question:
if Sandel is correct in his critique of the liberal self, how then can we ascribe the quality
of autonomy to what seems to be an illusion?
Sandel points out that Rawls voluntarily puts a distance between the self and its
ends. What he considers to be a characteristic of liberalism is the idea that people are
fundamentally separate from their purposes and are what he calls “unencumbered”, or
free from the contingent facts that constitute their life – similar to the individuals of
the original position. This distance, Sandel argues, results in the concept of a person
as extremely individualistic; the inadequacy of this definition means that the liberal
enterprise is doomed to failure in two ways68. First, this theory would be inconsistent
with Rawls’ difference principles, and second, it is committed to a thin anthropology.
Sandel argues that Rawls’s theory undermines the role community plays in the
constitution of a person, and that it implies that a person’s identify is a matter of choice.
Liberals, he argues, tend to present a picture of the self as radically disembodied. “I”
in the liberal sense is defined as “always irreducibly, an active, willing agent,
distinguishable from my surroundings, and capable of choice”. Therefore, for liberals,
67
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“before an end can be chosen, there must be a self around to choose it”69. But why be
concerned with the volitional aspect of one’s ends? First, Sandel argues that by
focusing on volition, the Rawlsian picture neglects the importance of self-knowledge
and cognition in the formation of one’s identity. Sandel’s premise is that an agent’s
end is what determines her choices, and not the other way around: what matters then
is to discover pre-existing ends rather than choose or creating them. Because the liberal
picture is also unsubstantial – it does not define what a person is in substantial terms
– the only information available is that people are defined by their will first, according
to which they will choose their specific ends. But the reasons one chooses one end or
the other, must depend on some pre-existing factors – inclinations, preferences, etc –
that are specific to people. Without such information, we are faced with an inability to
experience real agency: “For a subject to play a role in shaping the contour of its
identity requires certain faculty of reflection. Will alone is not enough. What is
required is a certain capacity for self-knowledge, a capacity for what we have called
agency in the cognitive sense”70. This difficulty, Sandel claims, contradicts Rawls’
own difference principle, according to which societal inequalities must benefit the
least well-off. If people are individual subjects rather than group subjects, the
difference principle implies that some people’s attributes will be sacrificed for the
benefits of others, which is to treat people as a means to an end, and therefore go
against the Kantian roots of Rawls’ theory71.
For Sandel, the distance between the self and its ends implies that we must
distinguish between the properties that are “mine” and those that are “me”, between
what “I have” and what “I am”. Any account of agency, however it is construed, relies
on the assumption that the agent possesses enough self-knowledge to make the
distinction between the two. If persons are defined according to the features they
possess, it means there is a distance between the subject and the objects of
possession72. It also implies that dispossession is possible: the subject could lose what
she has obtained. Sandel links dispossession with disempowerment, arguing that when
“the possession of an object fades (…), my agency with respect to the object is
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diminished as well”73. Disempowerment can occur in two ways: first as we had said,
if the self is conceived as possessor of ends, it can lose possession and become distant
from ends, given that these are always and necessarily external. Agency is impacted
because the agent becomes incapable of identifying what end to identify with, given
that identity is construed independently. It becomes unclear on which basis the agent
can therefore choose her ends. The second form of disempowerment occurs when the
self and its ends are undistinguishable, to the point that it becomes impossible to detect
what is “mine” and what is “me”.
The value of Sandel’s critique is to highlight the inconsistency between the liberal
picture of the self and the emphasis put on agency and autonomy. The argument saying
that one needs to reach a certain level of self-knowledge to act autonomously is
compelling; it shows that if we value self-agency, we should endorse a definition of
persons that provides information about the basis of our choices. The voluntarist
Rawlsian picture of people is too minimal to provide such knowledge. If Sandel’s
critique is convincing on this level, we can forecast the responses that Rawls’ theory
is built on a minimal definition precisely because it serves a minimal political purpose.
This is illustrated by the following quote from C. Edwin Baker:
“Sandel is persuasive in arguing that the thin, denuded image of the person or
moral subject that he attributes to Rawls is inconsistent with our experience and
understanding of ourselves, and with our aspirations. The question remains,
however, whether Rawls is committed to this image of the person as a general
account of what we are. I will argue that Rawls construct this limited conception
of the person for a limited but appropriate purpose and that this enterprise does
not commit him to any general account or theory of the person.”74
This claim may adequately represent Rawls’ project, but it highlights the
problem even further: the limited conception of people, actually relies on “unlimited”
conceptions of liberal values – autonomy, equality, rights, and so on. These
conceptions are never fully endorsed or defined, but without them, the proceduralism
of liberalism cannot be justified.
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3. Compatibility of Liberalism and Autonomy
The concerns raised about the liberal framework regarding freedom and the self
are strong enough to question the theory’s ability to provide a sustainable definition of
autonomy, given that this concept is linked to both the idea of freedom and of the self.
But liberalism’s endorsement of the value of autonomy is in and of itself problematic
and I will argue that it relies on a paradox. My goal here is to show that liberalism’s
lack of moral commitment may appear as a political advantage but weakens the very
basis upon which its political claims are made: principally the respect for people’s
autonomy. I will start by presenting what I consider to be the paradox of neutrality and
explain that if we follow liberal claims, autonomy is simply not achievable. I will then
illustrate the problem through the picture of the individual in the original position,
arguing that such person is only capable of a certain kind of autonomy – of a Kantian
type. I will explain why I believe we should reject this definition, and argue that it is
too limited to be satisfactory for our purpose of definition autonomy as selfgovernment.
Moral neutrality, and Rawls’s clear reluctance to commit to specific moral claims
is what characterizes justice as fairness, which I take to be the cornerstone of modern
liberalism. This leads to the claim that the condition for fair institutions is that they are
content-neutral, and simply respond to structural demands. I believe that, as Bielefeldt
mentions, the reason for this is probably due to a genuine consideration for people’s
entitlement to their own values and moral choices75. The liberal standpoint on state
neutrality may in fact be based on a sincere devotion to the value of autonomy and
respect for human dignity. This devotion may simply be grounded in a Kantian picture
of autonomy, which most liberals seem to endorse: the idea that autonomy is an
essential characteristic of persons that requires minimal or no conditions.
Unfortunately, sincerely caring for an ideal does not make up for the lack of
robustness in the definition of that ideal. More problematically, the justification for
moral neutrality is itself paradoxical: liberals ground their reluctance to commitment
on the basis of a commitment to higher values, that are never explicitly or normatively
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justified. The lack of moral substance is based on the belief that each person’s
autonomy ought to be valued and protected, which is in itself a moral claim that has
two components; first, that autonomy is intrinsically valuable, second, that people are
naturally capable of and entitled to it – which in itself is far from self-evident. As
Bielefeldt says, whatever the reason for the reluctance, “it seems to be a paradox that
the liberal reluctance in appealing to common moral and political principles is itself
based on a moral and political conviction, a conviction which nevertheless rarely finds
clear expression” 76 . He concludes that liberalism is more demanding than many
liberals are themselves willing to admit, and that this lack of willingness weakens the
theory because it makes it vulnerable to anti-liberal charges. A solution for this, he
argues, is a higher sensitivity from liberals to the normative ideas that guide their
political concerns. Interestingly, classic liberals such as Locke or Mill did not seem to
show the same level of reluctance. In fact, they make numerous metaphysical claims
– about God, the law of nature, and so on – which tend to be universal, that is,
applicable to all human beings. But this kind of commitment seems at odds with the
way most modern liberals describe their own theory77. Showing concern for normative
ideas, as Beilefeldt suggests, would be taking the risk for liberalism to simply become
a different theory, for the reluctance to commit to moral claims is precisely what
distinguishes it from the rest of political views. Assuming that the universal moral
claims of classic liberals are inapplicable today, the main issue remains: liberals justify
their ethically minimal theory with the help of claims that are themselves ethically
loaded.
The problem is even more evident when we look at autonomy, because it is at the
same time the justification for liberalism’s structural demands, and a concept that
cannot be defined without substantial conditions – even minimal. If we accept that the
ideal citizen is one that is capable of making politically rational and autonomous
choices, we are making a moral judgement about the value of such a capacity – and
even more so if it is followed by the claim that a fair society must promote it. But by
assuming that the capacity for autonomy is a natural feature of persons, we are making
a morally-loaded point that requires explanation as where this natural feature comes
from. But if this quality is non-essential, then it becomes unclear why we must shape
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our entire political views around its protection. As I have mentioned before, the liberal
standpoint on dignity and autonomy is derived from Kant’s picture: liberals don’t
question nor do they define the conditions for these qualities, given that they are part
of the essential features of human beings. Rachel Bayefsky reminds us that on most
accounts, “Kant’s contribution to the development of dignity consists in attributing to
each human being an equal and unconditional worth grounded in moral autonomy”78.
The attribution of these qualities to people is not questioned, the same way Rawls
assumes people to be free and equal, without providing a clear picture of his reasons.
I have two problems with this picture. We may first simply question what grounds the
validity of the claim that people are bearer of unconditional rights. The Kantian idea
of dignity and autonomy, especially when used by liberals, seems unquestioned
because needed to justify their theory of justice. The question of rights is a broad topic
that I will not describe in detail here. It is however worth mentioning that their
unconditional attribution to human beings requires justification.
Let us however assume for a moment that these properties are in fact inherent
human traits. My second problem with the Kantian framework is that it seems to omit
that there is a difference between a right and a capacity. If we look at autonomy in
particular, we may accept the idea that people are naturally entitled to it, and that it
should be unconditionally respected. It does not follow from this belief that people are
capable of reaching or exercising it. The fact that one may be heteronomous means
that even if we assume autonomy to be an innate trait, if uncultivated, it may simply
remain a sleeping trait. The Kantian picture on which liberals base their view on
autonomy does not give us indications on how to properly use it, therefore, we may
question its pragmatic value. I believe these reasons should be enough to make us
cautious about endorsing the Kantian view.
My intention is not to deny that persons may be bearers of natural rights, or that
autonomy may in fact be a human trait, but to highlight the inconsistency between this
claim and the rejection of commitment to specific moral claims. It is however
important to mention that Rawls distinguishes comprehensive moral ideals from moral
conceptions; he explains “as comprehensive moral ideals, autonomy and individuality
are unsuited for a political conception of justice” and that if they are taken as such,
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nothing distinguishes liberalism from another sectarian doctrine 79 . But Rawls
concedes that justice as fairness is a moral conception, that includes conceptions of
persons and society, of right and fairness80. This allows him to reject the idea that the
overlapping consensus is Hobbesian in nature; that it is only a modus vivendi based on
self-interest with no care for the conception of justice in and of itself. Even if we agree
with Rawls that comprehensive moral ideals and moral conceptions are two distinct
things, we may wonder what the former is based upon. If justice as fairness is a moral
conception, it requires some level of moral commitment, even if it is as minimal as the
commitment to justice – which is not a simply moral conception but a comprehensive
moral ideal. Because Rawls rejects the Hobbesian view, we know that he attributes
some level of substance to the concept of justice. But moral conceptions cannot be
empty shells, they exist in relation to moral ideals – comprehensive or not. Saying that
“the value of autonomy is specified by a political conception of justice and not by a
comprehensive moral doctrine”81 implies that there is a commitment to justice first,
but such commitment must come from a moral evaluation about justice. And if justice
is restricted to the basic structure of society, it is because it serves a political purpose
ultimately aiming at the preservation of people’s autonomy. We see that the
commitment to such ideal is unavoidable, but that this is precisely what liberals are
trying to reject.
This lack of commitment is illustrated by Joel Feinberg in an attempt to
reconcile liberals they their opponents, who accuse them of excessive individualism:
“The liberals can give up the excesses of individualism, acknowledge the social nature
of man, and still adhere to liberalism’s essential normative commitment to personal
sovereignty”82. Feinberg here acknowledges not only that liberalism is committed to
personal sovereignty, but that it is also one of its essential components. First, this claim
seems to contradict Rawls’ declaration that the nature of the self and personhood are
“deep and unresolved matters” on which no political view can depend 83 . But the
problem goes further: if liberalism, as Feinberg says, is inclusive of the sociallyconstituted self, how can strict personal sovereignty be possible, given that people’s
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identity will always be tinged with these social aspects? Liberals are therefore torn
between two impossible commitments: if men’s social nature is acknowledged, then
personal sovereignty is not all there is. But if personal sovereignty is the ultimate
essential characteristic of persons, then the accusations of excessive individualism
become unavoidable. The difficulty lies in reconciling the two pictures without
undermining what each of them entails. Feinberg seems willing to reduce liberalism
to a simple normative commitment to personal sovereignty; but in order to govern
oneself, one needs a clear picture of what a governing agent is – picture that liberalism
has failed to provide.
Feinberg goes further and affirms that “first of all, liberalism is a theory about the
limits of state power”84, and in so, recognizes its deeply negative roots – which only
reinforces the concern. In order to define the limits of state power, we need a
substantial definition of what the state would impose power on, such that we can
legitimately explain the reasons such power should be limited. If action X must be
limited because it harms agent A, the justification for the limitation of X depends on a
definition of A’s interests, that is, to not be the subject of X. Without a claim about
what people’s benefits are, the value of state limitation may be constantly questioned.
Why after all, is state neutrality a higher good than the opposite? The answer can only
be found in a normative claim about what people’s benefits are, which itself relies on
a metaphysical or psychological claim about them.
Feinberg’s attempt to reconcile the two claims about the self is praiseworthy, but
his mistake is to give priority to the political claim over the anthropological one, which
inextricably should be the cause of our political commitments. Martin Rhonheimer
points out that “liberalism is a specifically political theory that, like every coherent
political

philosophy,

inexorably

implies

significant

anthropological

presuppositions”85. The problem lies on two grounds; first, the denial that the theory
harbours these significant presuppositions, second, even if liberals acknowledged such
pre-requisites, their theory is too substantially weak to provide any satisfying
definition – if it weren’t, it would simply not be liberalism. We can conclude that
liberalism needs a commitment to autonomy to sustain, but this commitment is
impossible because it goes against the essential minimalism of the theory. In contrast,
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autonomy is essentially a substantially loaded concept, that implies at least a
conception of people’s interests and a method to identify them – none of which can be
provided by liberalism due to its essentially procedural nature.
Liberalism’s ethical minimalism finds perfect illustration with the original
position. The thought experiment is the ideal picture of the way justice as fairness may
be achieved; it represents the perfect situation in which individuals may pick principles
of justice, under the right conditions. It is also the illustration of liberalism’s lack of
substance: although it serves the procedural purposes of the theory, it also highlights
its limitations. Here, I want to argue two things: first, that the legitimacy of principles
picked under the veil of ignorance also relies on parties being autonomous in their
decisions. Second, I will argue that the individual in the original position can only be
autonomous under a Kantian view of autonomy – a view I believe is based on premises
that lack justification – for example, the innate nature of autonomy. This view is silent
regarding the origin of this capacity, and the ways to reach and exercise it. I conclude
that individuals in the original position cannot be properly autonomous and that this
weakens the legitimacy of their claims for justice.
Parties in the original position are assumed to be rational, free, equal and selfinterested86. We know that under the veil of ignorance, they pick procedural principles
of justice – supposedly applicable universally – according to a very short list of
motives: shared rationality, a certain sense of justice, limited altruism, basic
information about scarcity and the world structure87. All the while being ignorant about
their contingent properties. I have two problems with this picture. Firstly, such
assumption about people’s capacities can be seen as wishful thinking when not
preceded by an explanation of how and from where these capacities emerge. Secondly,
because people under the veil of ignorance have no self-knowledge, they also cannot
form self-rules – which is the purpose of the original position. Autonomy in a nonKantian way is not separable from a person’s desires, wishes, benefits, and so on.
Simple rational identification of self-interest isn’t the same as defining what makes
one’s desire truly theirs: autonomy and ignorance of oneself are incompatible. But the
parties’ self-knowledge is limited to the structural features they share with every other
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participant, and ultimately every other person – rationality, freedom, a sense of justice,
etc. Particular self-knowledge is therefore impossible by definition under the veil of
ignorance – this ignorance is the very condition of the original position’s fairness.
The self-interest that motivates parties’ decisions is related to their rational
capacities to picture themselves as the least well-off, but is not related to any content
regarding what they truly value – given that they don’t know any of that. This
guarantees the strictly procedural nature of principles of justice. It follows from this
that people in the original position cannot be autonomous, if autonomy is defined as
self-rule that requires self-knowledge. There can be no causal relation between such
kind of autonomy and the principles of justice people will end up picking. Parties can
only be autonomous from a Kantian perspective, that is, if we accept that autonomy is
simply a rational, innate, and universal capacity of moral agents. I however have
argued that the equal and unconditional attribution of this capacity lacks justification.
If we reject the Kantian view, we are left with a picture of the original position
where parties pick principles of justice without being autonomous. I believe that this
picture is problematic for a few reasons. First, it is at odds with liberalism’s emphasis
on the importance of autonomy and its innate nature. I also believe it intuitively poses
a problem regarding the legitimacy of principles of justice; it contradicts Rawls’ own
idea that parties must be free, self-oriented individuals, aware of their own freedom.
When they leave the original position, parties can only make claims for justice based
on the recognition that those are aligned with the rational evaluations they have made
under the veil of ignorance, and not because they take these principles as the authentic
expression of their true interests. I believe Rawls’ mistake is here to undermine the
idea that what gives laws and regulations weight, is the recognition that they work in
favour of what people value as individuals and as members of their community. Once
parties leave the original position, commitment to rational evaluations may start to
appear too abstract and distant from their own needs and desires to work as regulative
principles. We may need to consider the possibility that the sustainability of justice
relies on the identification people experience with its principles – as members of the
collective political entity as well as singular individuals.
Furthermore, if people under the veil of ignorance are not autonomous, then what
are they? We may think they are automatically heteronomous: in this case, their
evaluations and decisions are made according to conditions that are not of their own
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making. This would pose a serious problem; indeed, justice as fairness relies on the
fact that participants make choices freely because they recognize their own interest in
doing so. The idea that fairness results from heteronomy is also counter-intuitive.
However, it seems fallacious to affirm that parties are completely heteronomous, as
they are not subject to external influences – they can’t communicate with each other,
for example. They therefore seem to be in an in-between space: choices can only be
made according to a rational capacity to identify self-interest, based on an abstract
knowledge of what the world is structurally like. But they cannot be made according
to one’s sense of self, or one’s belonging to the political community; this definition
automatically excludes the possibility that what makes our choices valid and
sustainable is their anchorage in our political and social nature.
Simply put, if we reject the strict rationalist picture of autonomy as an innate
human trait, we should also reject the possibility that parties under the veil of ignorance
can be autonomous. But if we maintain the Kantian view, even if autonomy is granted
to parties, we face the following difficulty: first, we need a stronger commitment to
the value of autonomy such that it does not simply constitute a desideratum. Second,
we need indications about how to properly exercise it.
One may object that parties make decisions according to their own rational
capacities, their sense of justice as well as their conception of the good, and that it is
enough to qualify as autonomous. They may say that moral conceptions and
comprehensive moral ideas are not the same thing, and that liberals can use the former
without having to commit to the latter. I believe that the commitment to these preestablished conditions lacks justification and shouldn’t be taken as an axiom. I have
already said that rationality as the only ground of autonomy may be too weak if it is
not accompanied by knowledge about one’s specific interests. A universally shared
cognitive ability is only a structural tool, and says nothing about the specificities of
persons. The postulate of Rawls’ argument also relies on the assumption that
rationality is a stable component of people’s cognitive state; that it does not come and
go, and that it is always maximal. Holding on to this assumption would however be
misconceiving the nature of people’s rational abilities and skills.
It is true that moral conceptions and comprehensive moral ideals may not be the
same thing, but I have already explained that the former is unconceivable without the
latter, even in a minimal degree. Evaluations about morality must be linked to the value
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we attribute to moral concepts, and the capacity of these concepts to become
comprehensive ideals. A lack of commitment on the one hand, makes it difficult to see
how such evaluation may take place.
As for the sense of justice, aside from the fact that it is also a shared unspecific
tool, we have very little information about where it comes from; Rawls says that it is
“the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice
which characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation”88. If the personal sense of
justice is the ability to apply the public conception of justice, it means that the latter
must come first; but in the absence of principles of justice, we are ignorant on how it
is that can we form this public capacity. The sense of the good is reduced to a capacity
to recognize one’s interest, and is independent from any moral doctrine: “the capacity
to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of one’s rational advantage,
or good”89. But the decisions made are based on a hypothesis about what our own
advantages may be, and who we may end up being, since we are unaware of our
specific features. Rawls recognizes that hypothetical agreements cannot bind, but fails
to provide a clear solution, and only says that the original position is simply a device
of representation90.
Finally, can we say that self-interest is enough for autonomy? Not if, just like
rationality, it does not come with the content of the specific interests that constitute
one’s desires and motives. As we have said, parties may not be heteronomous either:
this imaginary situation may in fact describe agents that are neither autonomous nor
heteronomous, but stuck somewhere in the middle, essentially choosers, but incapable
of choosing. Is the fact that choices in the original position are self-interested – in a
limited way – enough to ensure their sustainability? I believe that rooting political
adherence to principles of justice in rational evaluations about their benefits only, runs
the risk of making them too abstract. Adherence may be better preserved in a system
where laws and institutions find legitimacy through the recognition that they serve
people’s interests as members of the political community.
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The lack of ethical substance of the original position tells us two things about the
theory it represents: first, that the ideal liberal political actor must paradoxically be
selfless and essentially self-interested at the same time – because when picking
principles of justice in the best conditions she must ignore her characteristics, but be
also moved by the desire to benefit from them as much as possible. Second, because
of its ethical minimalism, liberalism is doomed to provide strict procedural definitions.
Although it may be the very goal of the theory, it is also what limits it: liberalism is
indeed unequipped to provide a definition of a concept as demanding as autonomy.
Conclusion
From these various considerations, it seems clear that liberalism carries essential
contradictions that weakens the political claim it is designed to defend. These defects
are not superficial but constitute the core of the theory. Although they are significant
enough to question whether they are sustainable at all, the goal of this chapter was not
to deny that liberal ideas may have intrinsic value, but simply to contrast them with
the concept of autonomy, and to challenge their presupposed association. Given that
the liberal view on freedom and the self presents inherent flaws, one can legitimately
conclude that the definition of autonomy, directly linked to these two notions, will
suffer from these inconsistencies. Moreover, the paradox of neutrality and the
emphasis on procedures highlight the impossibility for liberalism to harbour a
definition of any demanding concept – this difficulty is amplified by the fact that these
concepts are in fact needed to justify the procedural approach that characterizes the
theory. Having established that liberalism isn’t equipped to provide a satisfying
definition of autonomy, a solution could be, if our aim is to find a political ground for
this definition, to look at republicanism as an alternative. I have briefly shown that this
theory has posed a serious challenge to liberalism regarding the perspective on
freedom; this is the standpoint that I am endorsing and from which I believe many
answers can be found. My starting point is that republicanism is by nature better suited
to define autonomy than its rival, first because of the adequacy of their definition of
freedom, but also for reasons that I will explore in the following chapters. However,
as I will explain, the republican theory itself is surprisingly dismissive of the concept
of self-government, and its definitions, though promising, leave many gaps open. The
54

purpose of this thesis is to see in which way adding the concept of autonomy to
republican considerations about freedom constitutes an improvement for a theory that
has not yet gone far enough. My observations were meant to show that liberalism’s
failures are also due to the impossibility to endorse a positive view of autonomy as
self-development and to anchor it in the structure of political institutions. Therefore, I
will suggest that neo-republicans need to consider the political nature of freedom and
take a firmer step towards a positive view of autonomy as collective self-development.
Before going into the development of my arguments, it is necessary to understand what
we mean by republicanism in the first place, and in which way it significantly differs
from liberalism. The next chapter will present the history of the movement, in order to
better understand neo-republican claims.
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CHAPTER II
The Republican Tradition: History and Main Features

Introduction
Republicanism re-emerged in contemporary political philosophy as an alternative
to liberalism regarding primarily the definition of freedom. Following Philip Pettit,
various theorists have emphasized the necessity to add more nuance to the traditional
strictly negative definition of freedom liberals have adopted since Hobbes. But
republicanism itself, far from starting with Pettit, is a tradition old of a few millennia:
its origin is typically associated with Ancient Rome, especially through the figure of
Cicero. The republican tradition, though only named a posteriori by contemporary
theorists, has taken various forms over the course of history. In this chapter, I will go
over some of the major schools of thought that have shaped what we consider to be
classic republicanism today. I have three goals: first, to introduce neo-republicanism
in light of its own tradition, so as to better understand the contemporary advocates of
the theory. Second, I wish to highlight the distinctions, but most importantly the
similarities between the schools of thought, in an attempt to find some common
ideological ground, which is believe can be found in the rule of law. I also have a more
epistemological goal, which is to see if the tradition can help us understand the
foundations of the contemporary debate on freedom. This chapter is an attempt to
answer this question: has the definition of freedom as non-domination always been a
constitutive element of republicanism, and if so, how was it defined in the tradition?
This is why I will mainly focus on classic republican freedom. By tracing a line into
the history of republicanism, I hope to better understand the roots of the contemporary
debate, in order to analyse it as not merely an opposition to liberalism, but as the last
stone to a rich and complex school of thought.
In this section, I will present the main characteristics of traditional republicanism,
and explore the similarities and differences between four main republican theories:
Ancient – (Athenian and Roman), Italian/Renaissance (through civic humanists and
Machiavelli), French/Enlightenment (through Montesquieu and Rousseau), and
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Anglo-Saxon (through theorists of the English commonwealth and American
Revolution). This will serve as an introduction of our attempt to highlight the
complexity and singularity of republican freedom’s various components. I will also
look to trace an ideological link between the theories, through which I believe the idea
of republican autonomy can be found. My goal is therefore to highlight an ideological
thread that links the theories together, and through which we may see the contour of
the concept I wish to put forward. I will argue that the characteristics of classic
republicanism, though the theories may structurally vary, is not only the importance
attached to non-domination as in the slave and master relationship, but also the
emphasis on freedom as active citizenship, expressed by the predominance of the rule
of law. The rule of law, I will show, is a common theme that can be found in most if
not all classic republican theories, and roots the idea of freedom in both law-making
and law-following activities, which I believe is the essence of republican autonomy.
Finally, I will try to answer the complex question of whether classic republican
freedom is positive or negative. I will conclude that it mostly is positive, and implies
the idea that the absence of arbitrary obstacles relies on the proper understanding of
the rule of law – standpoint that neo-republicans have either failed to recognize, or
decided not to endorse.
This exploration of history is determinant to understand the current republican
standpoints, and may be at the origin of the distinction between two kinds of neorepublicanism, which related to different parts of the tradition and depends on what
each school of thought seems to value and take from history – especially regarding
freedom. This distinction has been addressed by Philip Pettit in a response to Michael
Sandel. Pettit identifies himself as part of what he calls neo-Roman republicans, when
Sandel belongs to the neo-Athenians. The key elements of this distinction are that neoAthenians tend to see liberty as self-government and democratic participation, while
neo-Romans view it as simply the absence of domination, which is closer to the
negative definition of freedom as non-interference – while also being an alternative.
My hope is that this chapter will give a clearer idea on how these rich contextdependent notions have been and can be articulated.
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I.

Classic Republicanism: Definition and Ancient Variations

1. Main Features of the Theory
Classic theories of republicanism share a common focus on the “public” aspect of
political theory. This may sound redundant, but it needs to be understood in the context
of the opposition with liberalism, which is a theory inherently focused on the
individual. This is not to say that liberalism is not concerned with the public domain,
but it means that the angle of analysis is reversed: when liberalism is mainly concerned
with how to build a society that serves best the interests of individuals and preserve
their natural rights, republicanism is more focused on how to create and sustain a wellordered society, given what people are capable of, and what their purpose in life should
be. The teleology of these two theories differ, and this is directly expressed
etymologically: res publica, “the public thing”, is at the same time the object of
political interest, and the way towards resolution of conflicts or the making of
legislation. Citizens under the common rule of law share a common responsibility and
purpose: the question is not merely about how to prevent abuse from a ruler, for the
citizen is a component of the republican state, not a separate entity with conflicting
interests. Liberalism, on the other hand, puts the emphasis on the rights of individuals
first, and institutions are only tools to serve this purpose.
I believe that we can see in the importance of the rule of law a common thread that
runs through the classic republican tradition. This focus can be articulated through the
promotion of public participation, civic virtue, the avoidance of corruption, and the
elaboration of a specific type of freedom. All these aspects contribute to the
organization of a well-structured and well-governed society, of which citizens are an
active part. The rule of law can simply be defined as the system of legal principles
according to which a particular state is governed. It can be understood procedurally as
the structure of institutions and the ways laws are created and promoted. It may also
be understood substantively, if we accept the idea that the rule of law must carry certain
substantive values. Republican, as theorists of the res publica, naturally pay close
attention to the rule of law and the impact it ought to have on members of the political
community. Christian List believes that the specificity of republicanism is that
“republican freedom has a built-in rule-of-law requirement, whereas liberal freedom
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does not”91. This requirement is what gives republican freedom its robustness: to be
free in the republican sense is to enjoy freedom across a broad range of “legally and
socially possible worlds”. I believe that this concern is shared throughout the tradition:
the idea that freedom is not a contingent matter but is only enjoyed when the proper
legal and social structures are in place. This requirement is necessary for freedom, but
it is also what secures its robustness. Most often than not, republican citizens are
expected to participate, directly or indirectly, in the making of the rule of law, which,
I will argue, is one of the constitutive elements of republican freedom and selfgovernment.
Political participation is therefore an essential feature of classic republicanism, as
much as a common sense of duty and responsibility for the well-being of the state. Not
only citizens are able to express their rights and answer the call of duty when they
participate in public affairs, they also realize their full potential and therefore, flourish
as individuals. The question of whether citizens realize their true nature, or go above
it, when acting in the republican state, depends on the school of thought one chooses
to subscribe to. In the Aristotelian tradition, the cultivation of character through the
practice of virtue allows the individual to fully express their natural capacities and
fulfil their purpose in life. Virtuous citizens are the necessary conditions of a virtuous
society: “A city can be virtuous only when the citizens who have a share in the
government are virtuous, and in our state all the citizens share in the government
(…)”92.
For the Greeks, however, any social activity can be said to be political
participation: people are political animals in the sense that they act in the polis – the
state, which is in essence a political act. Furthermore, it makes little sense in a Greek
perspective, to talk of the distinction between private domain and public participation,
as Richard Mulgan notices:
“Although Aristotle and other Greeks accepted a distinction between collective
and personal life, their notion of personal life did not carry a presumption that it
was the individual’s own business and therefore of no concern to the community.
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Aristotle himself sees the whole of an individual’s life, personal as well as common,
as properly a concern of the community and its laws.”93
Taken in the political context, one could think it is only through participation to
the formation of public good, that the individual realizes her true nature. But it is also
possible, if one subscribes to a more Rousseauist approach, to argue that political
activity is in a way unnatural, and goes above the self-interested instincts of men. But
each way of thinking would lead to the same conclusion: being a citizen, with the load
of responsibility it carries, is in fact a desirable end.
The promotion of civic virtue constitutes another cornerstone of classic
republicanism, and can easily be analysed through an Aristotelian lens. Classic
republicanism can be read as the application of virtue ethics in the political theory: the
state has a major role to play in the promotion of shared values among citizens, which
are a necessary condition to the development of a well-ordered society. In this sense,
the republican tradition seems opposed to the ideal of state neutrality, one of the pillar
ideas of liberalism – though we may wonder whether classic liberalism promotes it.
Civic virtue, just like political participation, is at the same time an end and a means:
jurisprudence is designed to promote common moral principles, and citizens under
such rule of law will naturally choose to act virtuously. The use of religion may also
be found, especially in Rousseau, as a tool to guarantee the solidity of citizens’ moral
judgment, and their involvement in the life of the city. This type of civil religion should
not be extreme to the point that its followers become detached from the affairs of the
state, but its principles should be strict enough to generate in them a sincere desire to
act morally in the public sphere. The promotion of civic virtue is a necessary
instrument for the development of a society in which citizen are free to express their
civil rights: because of the common rule of political and moral law, citizens are made
aware of the content of these rights and avoid the impulse to act according to selfinterest. This leads to the importance of avoiding any obstacle that comes in the way
of the discovery and the pursuit of said rights.
Another common feature of classic republicanism seems to be the avoidance of
corruption. Generally, corruption occurs anytime there is predominance of personal
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interests over common good in the formation of the rule of law, or during its
application. Aristotle expresses this idea when he describes the aims of governments,
irrespective of their form:
“The true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the
few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments
which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one or of the few, or
of the many, are perversions.”94
Arbitrariness, as we will see, plays a major role in neo-republicanism, but also
represents a constant danger for classic advocates of the theory. It is however
important to notice, that unlike liberalism, republicanism does not seem to intrinsically
carry a suspicion towards the state seen as ultimately corrupted. Corruption is more
likely to arise from individuals than from institutions, assuming these are created in a
well-ordered system of law.
The last feature that all theories of classic republicanism seem to have in common,
that I will describe here, is an emphasis on a certain idea of freedom. We should
however nuance this claim, and add that for the Greek, liberty may not play a role as
important as for example, it does for the Romans. Generally speaking, every political
theory is somewhat attached to a certain definition of liberty. The republican tradition
is no exception, but the ideal it aims to promote is a much more historical and
substantial definition than other theories. It takes its root in the Latin conception of
libertas, which is a concept that cannot be separated from the other values that govern
the ideal republican society. Freedom for republicans is the status of independence
from the arbitrary and tyrannical will of another, it is the attribute of one who is not a
slave. Libertas is fully enjoyed if citizens act under a rule of law that aims to promote
civic virtue and political participation. By the same token, a free citizen, in the
republican sense, will naturally chose to adopt such values. Republican freedom refers
to the situation of non-slavery or non-servitude, but it also has some positive
components: we will see that it also depends on the cultivation of virtues and on the
involvement of citizens in political affairs, in order to avoid corruption and remain in
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control of institutions. As opposed to the liberal tradition, freedom in classic
republicanism is not a pre-political right. Speaking of libertas as a fundamental and
natural right makes little sense in the republican tradition: it is not separable from the
res publica, it can only emerge under such civil arrangement, and sustain if all the
conditions to preserve the stability of the state and the pursue of the common good are
met. According to most schools of thought – maybe at the exception of English
commonwealth republicanism, republican freedom is not a universal good of the
individual inside or outside the state, but an ideal that is only reachable through
institutions. But the fact that it is not a pre-political concept does not mean it is less
substantial than freedom as a natural right would be. The idea is that freedom needs to
be cultivated to sustain, but also that it requires the right conditions. Other features
could be added to this list. My aim in this section was simply to draw the main
characteristics of classic republicanism, common in various degrees in all schools of
thought.
2. Greek Republicanism
Neo-republicans mostly aim to revive the Roman tradition of the rule of law, but
it has been argued that the ideological roots of republicanism may also be found in
Ancient Greece. In the two following sections, I will highlight the main differences
between the Roman and the Greek tradition as two variations of classic republicanism,
and argue that the two visions of liberty is linked to the rule of law, or in the Greek
case, the idea of political rule.
Barry S. Strauss argues that the democratic system of Athens applied the moral
and political principles neo-republicans argue for95 . He writes that “Athens was a
democratic republic, moderate, law abiding, and generally well balanced between the
interests of the many and the few”, but also that “Athens puts into action the principles
of liberty, equality and communitarianism which modern theorists of republicanism
advocate”. Interestingly, he argues that Athenians were as committed to democratic
procedures as they were to the rule of law, because of the recognition that the rule of
law served the interests of the population at large. This argument is used in order to
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eliminate the accusation of populism the concept of demokratia can often face: he
argues that democracy in Athens was “neither a fickle mob, nor a plebiscitarian
populism, but rather a constitutional republic rooted in popular participation to
secure popular interests according to an egalitarian ideology of liberty”.
Though the rule of law is crucial, popular political participation remains a
requirement, and a way to legitimate the republic. Strauss also mentions that
participation was not a self-sacrificing endeavour for the average Greek citizen, who
did not spend a significant or cumbersome amount of time in democratic activities96.
Aristotle’s definition of political rule indicates the importance of the rule of law:
laws are in fact neutral judges that can help protecting office-holders from power
abuse97. They are the guarantee that regimes remain properly run because they provide
the possibility of a fair judgement and are not based on one’s private interest – given
that good regimes must meet the condition of aiming at the general good. The political
rule also implies the equal sharing of political responsibility among office-holders,
who must take turns in the activity of ruling and being ruled. As Leah Bradshaw
mentions, “a good citizen will know how to rule and how to be ruled, and will see the
political association as an arrangement among equals”98. Bradshaw also mentions that
equality is what characterizes political rule, when mere democratic rule is based on the
freedom of citizens. We may a posteriori interpret the requirement of equality that the
political rule and the rule of law imply, as a sign of Aristotle’s republicanism: his ideal
regime is not merely based on the absence of obstacles for citizens but on their active
sharing of political responsibilities and on the formation of the proper kind of law.
Another interesting feature of Greek classic republicanism is the role rhetoric and
public debate play in the formation of citizenship. Strauss argues this characteristic
helps us understand the particularity of this kind if republican tradition. Hannah Arendt
also stresses the importance of the room language occupies in the constitution of the
polis:
“The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is
the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and
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its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where
they happen to be.”99
Rhetoric is therefore constitutive of the public sphere as it is understood in the
context of a republican state. However, as Strauss mentions, we need to distinguish
between two kinds of rhetoric. One is deceptive and is equivalent to manipulation of
the masses, and aims at persuading rather than convincing – a perverse form of speech
if we follow Plato. The form of rhetoric republicans promote, is one that aims at
generating perfection of character, while at the same time remaining attached to the
democratic requirement of equality, and in this way, avoids any kind of elitism.
“They (republicans) support a rhetoric that draws on the public intellectual’s
advantages – in education, theoretical sophistication, cosmopolitan outlook,
leisure and sometimes intelligence (…) – in order to engage in speech that makes
her work intelligible to a lay public without talking down to it.”100
He notices that this kind of rhetoric is found in the balance of Aristotle’s two
fundamental elements of democracy: liberty and equality. Aristotle writes that “a
fundamental principle of the democratic form of constitution is liberty – that is what
is usually asserted, implying that only under this constitution do men participate in
liberty, for they assert this as the aim of every democracy”101. He goes on saying that
“one factor of liberty is to be governed in turn; for the popular principle of justice is
to have equality according to number, not worth, and if this is the principle of justice
prevailing, the multitude must of necessity be sovereign and the decision of the
majority must be final and must constitute justice (…)”102.
What kind of liberty is Aristotle advocating for, and what makes it a republican
form of liberty? As we know, Aristotle says that liberty has two main components:
first, it is for all to rule and be ruled in turns in the state, second, it is for a man to live
as he likes, as opposed to slavery which is for a man not to live as he likes103. The
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presumption is that slavery then amounts to be ruled but not to rule, and vice versa.
Slavery is also to live as someone else likes, rather than what oneself likes. But
freedom for Aristotle is not to be understood in the negative slave to master
relationship only. It is not sufficient to be in a position of not being ruled, to qualify as
free for Aristotle: we need the positive aspect of ruling. But being ruled is not simply
compatible with liberty, it is also one of its requirements, for it is the necessary
condition of a proper political rule, itself condition of citizen’s freedom. Liberty for
Aristotle is directly linked to the state and to the status of citizen – we must not forget
that he uses the word slave literally and not merely as an illustration. There is no
freedom where there is no state or citizenship, and Aristotle clearly affirms that the
state is prior to the individual, the same way the whole body is prior to its parts104. The
organic conception of the state shows that liberty, therefore, is a good that cannot
emerge or sustain outside of the political frame.
We may ask whether for the Greeks, liberty and virtue are co-dependent. From a
teleological perspective, one may be tempted to say that they are: if virtue is the aim
of the good life, and if liberty is a valuable good, obtaining one must imply obtaining
the other as well. But things do not seem so clear, as Aristotle mentions slaves can be
virtuous, and we may be able to imagine that a non-virtuous man, though described as
“the most savage of animals”, can experience at least some form of liberty. The
answer lies in the middle, and in the distinction between types of virtues. The slave is
by nature unable to obtain the kind of virtues the freeman experiences, however, he
can be virtuous in a way that is compatible with his capacities, and serves his function
as a slave: “So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the moral virtues also; all
should partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by each for
the fulfilment of his duty”105. Though liberty is not the primary focus of Aristotle, it is
in nature linked to virtue, which in its purest form is only obtainable by freemen. What
makes this kind of freedom republican, is its dependence to the state and its correlation
with the status of citizen. Aristotle seems to say that liberty is also the aim and the
condition of democracy. Rhetoric is constitutive of the democratic republic, as speech
is an essential element of popular participation and a tool for the propagation of
opinions.
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To sum things up, the Greek form of classic republicanism is attached to both
public participation and the following of the rule of law, understood in the context of
proper political rule. The rule of law is therefore a critical element of public
participation: popular sovereignty can only be legitimised by a system of laws that
aims to promote equality amongst citizens. Rhetoric plays an essential role in the
unification of the citizen body within the polis, and seems to be a necessary condition
for the elaboration of laws that promote liberty and equality. As for liberty, it is a good
that is essentially dependent on the existence of the proper kind of political structure.

3. Roman Republicanism
But republicanism is more often associated with the Roman political structure, and
neo-republicans typically refer to this system. Pettit clearly affirms that “this tradition
had its origins in classical Rome, being associated in particular with the name of
Cicero”106. He argues that this shared enthusiasm for the Roman system of law is in
part what has unified republicans over time. Roman republicans also differ from the
Greeks in their rejection of a strictly democratic form of government. Democracy, for
Romans, runs the risk of mob rule, but it also conflicts with the elitist vision they have
of politics. As Nicholas Buttle mentions, the common belief was that some men are
more suited for politics than others, because they possess characteristics that are not
equally shared among the population. Politics, because it requires exceptional
capacities, should remain a domain of excellence107. Roman republicanism, like Greek
republicanism, is grounded on the concept of the rule of law, but depends in this case
on specific constitutional requirements. I will first go over the concept of libertas,
which can be understood as the foundation of the slave to master relationship upon
which neo-republican freedom is based, but also as a positive concept which depends
on the proper exercise of civitas, or citizenship. Finally, we will see that Roman liberty
in this sense relies on the adequate identification and application of the rule of law,
which depends on the right kind of constitution.
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Apart from a specific juridical system, it is also the concept of libertas that
constitutes the heart of classic Roman republicanism. Libertas describes the
characteristics of a person who is not a slave (liber), and therefore, enjoys the capacity
to possess and express certain rights, as well as the absence of domination or
subjection, which is the feature most emphasized by neo-republicans. Charles
Wirszubski mentions that, like each concept of freedom, libertas has a negative and a
positive definition.
“Libertas therefore consists in the capacity for the possession of rights, and
the absence of subjection. Obviously, the positive and negative aspects of libertas,
though notionally distinct, are essentially interdependent and complementary. The
negative aspect of libertas, as any other negative concept, is self-defined.”108
An important feature of libertas is that, for the Romans, and to use Wirszubski’s
words, “it is an acquired civic right, and not an innate right of man”. Therefore, just
like for the Greeks, it is essentially linked to the concept of civitas, or citizenship. This
characteristic of traditional republican freedom contrasts with the idea of rights classic
liberals are attached to, and that laws and institutions should aim to preserve rather
than create.
“A Roman’s libertas and his civitas both denote the same thing, only
that each does it from a different point of view and with emphasis on a different
aspect: libertas signifies in the first place the status of an individual as such,
whereas civitas denotes primarily the status of an individual in relation to the
community. (…). If then the libertas of a Roman is conditioned by his civitas, the
amount of freedom a Roman citizen possesses depends upon the entire political
structure of the Roman state.”109
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Elizabeth Depalma Diseger analysed the Roman concept of res publica as “a
community of citizens bound together by justice and common interest” 110 . The
preservation of justice is essential to the survival of the republic and avoidance of
tyranny. She says that for Romans, citizenship is a matter of rights, when the Greeks
attribute it to the worth of each person. Nicholas Buttle writes that for Aristotle,
“citizens are persons of a particular character whereby they are worthy of being
citizens”111, that is, if they possess the capacity to obtain moral virtues. But for the
Romans, citizenship is a matter of legal status and rights: “A (Roman) citizen (…) was
a person who enjoyed the status of freeman rather than slave and enjoyed this status
by possessing legal rights, such as property rights, and civil and political rights”112.
All Roman citizens are entitled to freedom, and the status of citizen aims at the
protection of individuals from arbitrary treatment. But these rights are intrinsic to the
republic. Res publica is the space in which rights are created and agreed on by the
assembly of citizens under conditions of non-subjection.
Classic Roman republicanism holds the figure of Cicero as a good
representative of the republican ideal. According to him, rights and duties go hand in
hand; they are social artefacts, not innate characteristics of people:
“Even in the early stages of his career, then Cicero had a clear
conception of the rights and duties of citizenship and the dynamic relationship
between citizenship and the health of the republic. A citizen of Rome was
entitled to expect his government to grant him libertas and justice, on the one
hand, and on the other, he was obliged to consider and treat all Roman citizens
as his equals under the law and as his kin.”113
If the essence of republicanism is typically found in Ancient Rome, it is
because of these three main elements found in the Roman system of laws that neorepublicans have generally adopted: the specific definition of freedom, the link of
interdependency between liberty and citizenship, and the social nature of rights and
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duties members of the community acquire and share. As we have seen, libertas is
mainly defined as the quality of the state of non-slavery, or non-subjection, which
Pettit will later on call non-domination. Understanding these notions in the Roman
context is essential in order to grasp the subtleties and specificities of republican
values, which are, as Quentin Skinner mentions, deeply embedded in history and the
cultural context of their time.
“The belief that we can somehow step outside the stream of history and
furnish a neutral definition of such words as libertas, freedom, autonomy and
liberty is an illusion well worth giving up. With terms at once so deeply
normative, so highly interdeterminate, and so extensively implicated in such a
long history of ideological debate, the project of understanding them can only
be that of trying to grasp the different roles they have played in our history and
our own place in that narrative.”114
This is also true of the concept of rights: but advocating for a neutral and universal
definition, like liberals tend to do, we are at risk of missing the complexity of a concept
that is no less socially and historically generated than liberty or equality. However, if
this idea is clear in Ancient Rome, the concept of rights for neo-republicans tends to
lean towards a more universal definition. A re-contextualization of the concept from a
more historical and cultural perspective, such that it would maintain a faithful link with
the tradition, may be a worthwhile endeavour for neo-republicans today. Nonetheless,
we clearly see that we would probably benefit from understanding libertas not only as
the absence of slave-master relationship, but also as a positive concept, linked to the
status of citizen and the rights that go with it.
A last point that seems important to address regarding the specificity of Roman
republicanism is the specificity of their mixed constitution. This point will later in
history be developed by Montesquieu and the theory of the separation of powers.
Buttle says that the particular Roman system, constituted by a mix of monarchy,
aristocracy and democracy “not only provided the Romans with a protection of their
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freedom from the arbitrary exercise of power, but also enabled them to exercise
control over events so as to shape those events to the pursuit of their own interest”115.
This was a way for the Romans to recognize some degree of sovereignty to the people,
without adopting a full democracy, while at the same time allowing for the excellence
of politics done by experts. The mixed constitution produces freedom by keeping an
eye on the possession of political powers and their balanced execution. Libertas
depends on the proper exercise of the rule of law, which derive from the constitution.
The rule of law is for the Roman an essential component of freedom because it aims
at the protection of citizens from particular arbitrary interests. These interests are
threatening for two reasons: not only are they likely to pave the way for the slave to
master relationship, but they also prohibit citizens from properly exercising their
positive civic abilities.

II.

Republicanism in the Renaissance

1. Republicanism as Civic Humanism
The republican ideals re-emerged during the Italian Renaissance, in the form of
what is called civic humanism116. This is not surprising, given the growing interest of
the intellectual elite of the time for Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome. In this section,
I will draw a brief picture of the main characteristics of civic humanism: the goal is
simply to highlight its features in order to define its specificity and introduce the
modern republican tradition.
Apart from the reference to Athens and Rome, neo-republicans often refer to the
writings of Machiavelli to explain the origins of their theory. Quentin Skinner explains
that the emergence of a new interest for Aristotelian values during the rise of
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humanism in Italy had contributed to the formation of republicanism117. Just like most
ideological movement during the Renaissance, Florentine republicanism gets its origin
from a rising interest for Greek values and sense of virtue. However, Skinner argues,
the reinterpretation of the Aristotelian texts most likely served as a means to legitimate
a system in place which directly came from the Romans’ civil code. What Skinner
identifies as one of the main features of this system, is the importance of Italian
sovereign and independent city-republics118 - idea that could easily be overlooked. The
emphasis on the necessity to have a small state seems to be a specificity of the theory.
The ideal of a city-state as the best form of society is common in the tradition: Greek
cities, the example of Sparta, the Florentine system, or Geneva taken by Rousseau as
the only city where his principles where applied, all show the importance of having a
small state for republican ideals to be obtained – whatever these ideals are119.
There are numerous virtues that can be listed as the main components of
Renaissance republican principles; and Skinner explains them as the result of both the
rediscovery of the Greek texts (especially through Aquinas), and the grounding
structure of the Roman rule of law. The main virtues of Italian republicanism of the
time rely on the basis of two main principles, which can be identified as such: attaining
greatness – in all aspects of life – and obtaining civic concord. All the republican
virtues derive from this goal, and are means to the end of reaching this ideal.
“The goal they (pre-humanist writers) emphasise above all is that of attaining
greatness – greatness of standing, greatness of power, greatness of wealth.”
“One of the problems that most preoccupies these writers is accordingly that
of understanding how civic concord can best be preserved. The authority to whom
they invariably turn at this juncture is Cicero, for whom the ideal of a concordia
ordinum had been of overriding importance.”120
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Skinner also mentions that according to Cicero, “the key to preserving civic
concord must therefore be to give precedence to the ideal of the common good over
any considerations of selfish or factional advantage”. This idea can be seen as the
origin of the republican focus on the avoidance of corruption and arbitrary power.
Skinner argues that this emphasis on the good of the whole body politic also derives
from a Platonic consideration about the importance for every citizen to place public
interest above her own, but also that it is supported by the way the Roman law defines
justice in the government of the city-republics. Justice is indeed the foundation of civic
concord and greatness in all aspects of public life. Justice and the placement of the
common good above any other consideration, are two interdependent concepts. The
question of how to reach the goal of the precedence of the common good finds an
answer in the need for the magistrates to act according to the Roman law, and to apply
its principles of justice in all aspects of their actions. As Skinner mentions, “to act
justly is the one and only means of promoting the common good, without which there
can be no hope of preserving concord and hence of attaining greatness”121. But what
does acting justly mean for the Florentine humanists? Justice itself is linked to virtue,
which in the public space, is related to distribution and participation. Skinner says that
“the essence of good government is to act justly; to act justly is to give each other their
due; to give each other their due is the key to maintaining civic concord”122. Pocock
writes that “virtue as devotion to the public good approached identification with a
concept of justice; if the citizens were to practice a common good, they must distribute
its components among themselves, and must even distribute the various modes of
participating in its distribution”123. Justice therefore entails an ideal of equality before
the law, which is the condition of civic liberty, itself being equated to a state of
independence, or non-subjection. However, it is important to note that equality is not
a value in itself for Renaissance republicans, but a means to the higher purpose of civic
concord and common good: a way for the republic to sustain itself. Pocock explains
that “equality was not a moral imperative (…) but (…) the only means of ensuring res
publica: of ensuring that imperium should be truly public, and not private
masquerading as public”. Here we encounter again the threat of corruption, defined
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as the precedence of a particular interest above the common good. Liberty is then only
possible if this risk is avoided, and if the city is governed by magistrates who act
according to this specific sense of justice and equality of distribution. We see the
emergence of the idea that one can only be free if one lives in a free state: following
the Roman tradition, freedom is not a right of people independent of the state, but a
social good that can only be obtained if the structure of res publica is properly
arranged.
I this section, I have chosen not to draw a distinction between civic humanism and
republicanism, for I think it would be anachronistic to do so. If it is clear that neorepublicanism and Italian civic humanism from the Renaissance are distinct theories,
it is also reasonable to acknowledge the influence of the latter on the former. I follow
Pocock in this idea that humanism is too broad of a term, and can be applied in various
ways, whether they are historical or ideological. According to him, what is relevant is
that both terms share the idea of man as a political being, only capable of full
flourishment within the structure of the state – which, if we had to make a short list,
may be one of the most important features of republicanism: “Nevertheless, the
affirmation of classical republicanism has something which is humanist about it; it
entails the affirmation that homo is naturally a citizen and most fully himself when
living in a vivere civile”124.
To sum things up, the main aspects of civic humanism I have tried to highlight in
this section as the importance of a city-republic system, the emphasis on the two
virtues (obtaining greatness and civic concord), which have justice as a foundation,
justice being defined by the Roman rule of law. It is interesting to see there is some
form of equality, in the sense that all are equal before the law. However, and this is
probably what neo-republicans have added to the theory, equality for civic humanists
is not a value in itself, but a means though which we obtain greatness and civic
concord. Whether equality is an intrinsic neo-republican value, as opposed to a liberal
value, but even to classic republicanism, will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.
Now that we have seem what the main characteristics of Italian Renaissance
republicanism are, let us turn to the figure of Machiavelli as its main representative.
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2. Machiavellian Republicanism
Machiavelli’s ideas provide an interesting platform to discuss and define
republican liberty. We will see that his definition serves an anti-corruption purpose
that is only reachable through the rule of law.
Machiavelli starts with the premise that people naturally desire freedom, and
in accordance with the republican tradition, this means people have a natural desire
not to be dominated or to fear to be subjected to the will of another. Just like the civic
humanists before him, Machiavelli is clear that, to be free, people must already be
living in a free state governed through free and fair institutions. As Skinner puts it: “It
(the community) must be kept entirely free from subjection to the will of any particular
individual or group (…) it must be free from any dependenza or servitù” 125 .
Machiavelli also revives the classic idea that, as Skinner says, “freedom is a form of
service”, because the only way to be protected from subjection, is for the people to
participate in the public life. Everyone must be willing to adequately play their role in
the citizen-body as a whole and serve the common good, if people desire to remain
free. If people want to remain in a free state, necessary condition of their own personal
freedom, they need to act with virtue, politically and personally. This idea comes from
a number of premises: first, the definition of freedom as the absence of dependence of
servitude only obtainable through res publica, and not as a universal pre-political right,
and the idea that this quality is desirable. Second, it relies on the belief that people are
not naturally inclined to adequately choose actions that will promote their own
freedom. The Machiavellian anthropological claim is quite pessimistic: although we
naturally desire to be free, we are often mistaken about the kind of direction we should
take to obtain freedom. This idea also relies in the premise that what freedom is
reachable through virtue and obedience to the law – assuming the law is made in a free
republic – and that self-interest inhibits its realization. However, the problem of selfinterest is not merely one of selfishness, but the problem of self-deception, as Skinner
explains.
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“For Machiavelli, accordingly, the fundamental threat to freedom is
not simply posed by the fact of human selfishness. The problem is rather that,
in pursing our self-interested desires, we are prone at the same time to be selfdeceived. We are prone to entertain false beleifs about the best means of
attaining our desired goals, including the goal of maintaining our liberty.”126
Machiavelli puts a strong emphasis on the role political leaders play in acting
with virtue, so as to set the right example for people. Corrupt leaders will likely
generate corruption within the citizen-body, and inspire people to follow their
particular interest in their quest for freedom. Machiavelli considers other options for
people to acquire a sense of virtue, such as good fortune – including the fact that a
virtuous leader is a product of good fortune, good education, and even manipulation
of the masses through religion. But none of these seem reliable enough, and the only
option may be to take human nature as it is: easily corrupt. The solution is therefore
not to be found in human nature but in the nature of the law. Pettit mentions that this
position is typical of the republican tradition:
“The importance of having civil norms that mesh with political laws
has been recognized from the earliest days in the republican tradition.
Machiavelli is quite clear, for example, that there is no hope of enforcing a
republic of laws in a society that is not already characterized by buoni costumi:
by good customs or morals.”127
Skinner clearly explains that the problem of maintaining freedom considering
our self-interested tendencies, is different according to the school of thought we belong
to. Though both admit people are capable of limited altruism, what he calls modern
gothic theorists of liberty – or advocates of a Hobbesian and then Rawlsian standpoint
on freedom – and neo-Romans differ in the way the solution is found. This distinction
remains useful to understand the liberal and republican fundamental questions
regarding human nature, and the role institutions and laws play in promoting or
maintaining liberty.
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“(For modern gothic theorists) The problem is solved when each person
is able to enjoy an equal right to the most extensive system of basic liberties
compatible with a like system of liberty for all. For a neo-Roman theorist, by
contrast, the further problem is that of finding some means of transmuting our
natural but self-destructive tendency to corruzione into a virtuoso concern for
the common good.”128
Machiavelli, however, does not seem to think human nature is truly changeable
and places every hope in the law as the only way to redirect people towards the
common good, which includes their own personal liberty. Interestingly, he seems to
think one change is possible: men easily become corrupt and change their initial good
nature, but this is unlikely to occur the other way around.
“In this matter of the decemvirate we may likewise note the ease
wherewith men become corrupted, and how completely, although born good
and well brought up, they change their nature (…). Careful consideration of
this should make those who frame laws for commonwealths and kingdoms more
alive to the necessity of placing restraints on men’s evil appetites, and
depriving them of all hope of doing wrong with impunity.”129
This leads to the crucial idea that the rule of law plays a determining role in
establishing and maintaining freedom in the state, along with a virtuous leader who
also respects institutions. If men are taken as they are, only the power of law can
change the course of their actions. As Skinner mentions, Machiavelli offers a good
example of how the law can force us to be free, for “he places all his trust in the
coercive power of the law to act as a guardian of our liberty”130. The law guarantees
freedom in two ways: first, it prevents others from interfering unfairly with our chosen
course of action – assuming our choices are in fact virtuous. Institutions need to be
strong, so that there can be no possibility of wrong-doing with impunity. The second
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way laws guarantee our freedom is that they help us avoid the self-deception that
comes with placing our own ends above the common good: “it (the law) can force us
to promote the public interest in a genuinely virtuoso style, thereby enabling us to
preserve our own liberty instead of undermining it”131. This relies on the premise that
freedom can only be based on virtue, therefore, any power that reduces corruption can
only generate more freedom, both in the public and the private sphere. We can hope
that the law will be able to adequately accomplish this task if it is strong enough to
coerce efficiently.
One may ask the moral value of acting virtuously out of fear of punishment,
but the question is not as relevant as we may think for Machiavelli. What matters is
not, like Skinner says, “to bring our desires in line with those of a higher self”, but to
find the most efficient way to maintain civic concord, which is a condition of our
liberty. Therefore, reading Machiavelli through a Kantian scope would lead us to miss
what his goal really is. It is important to grasp this distinction, as it is somehow
representative of what distinguishes classic republicans from liberals: it makes no
sense for a classic republican to speak of freedom as a right which needs to be
protected, and of moral duties to be subjected to a universal and neutral criterion of
evaluation, because rights and duties are all dependent on institutions and on society
being well-ordered. What comes first is the question of maintaining the civic condition
under which liberty can emerge. But the coercion of the law is legitimate because it
enables people to avoid the self-deception that comes with pursuing ends based on
self-interest.
We find in Machiavelli the expression of the traditional republican emphasis
on the role played by the rule of law and on institutions in the construal and pursuit of
liberty. If neo-republicans have a much softer approach on the legitimacy of coercion,
they have kept from Machiavelli the idea that one can only obtain freedom in a free
society, and that freedom is not necessarily a neutral concept to be preserved but rather
that it must be created under the right conditions.
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III.

Republicanism in the Enlightenment

1. The ambivalence of Montesquieu
Montesquieu is somehow an ambivalent figure: he is often associated with the
liberal tradition, but republican advocates sometimes see in l’Esprit des Lois the best
example of the theory. As Céline Spector says, “all sides seem to seek his seal of
approval, and to situate his work at the centre of the tradition which they are
advocating” 132 . This debate raises the question of the distinction between classic
liberalism and classic republicanism, or civic humanism. Montesquieu may be a useful
figure for a believer of the possibility that these two theories are not fundamentally
distinct. I share with Spector the idea that Montesquieu is a good example of a theorist
who embodies a little of both traditions, depending on the topic, and the filter through
which we read his work. There are a few points we can take from Montesquieu as
republicans. The first of them may be the importance attached to the rule of law, in the
form of the separation of powers, meant to preserve the independence of each body.
Montesquieu also praises the advantages of complex laws, which he opposes to the
simple and arbitrary laws of tyrants 133 . Stewart notes that Montesquieu remains
faithful to the Aristotelian commitment to division of labour and distribution of power;
the difference being that Montesquieu’s terms are legal134. Stewart also explains that
interestingly, “Montesquieu’s puissance législative, although explained as lawcreation, is already characterised as a mode of governance (pouvoir), so that lawapplication might be assumed to be included”135. Despite the necessary division and
distribution of powers, Montesquieu seems to recognize the intertwined nature of lawmaking and sovereignty – which we may see as emblematic of republicanism. The
focus on the rule of law is what structures and characterizes Montesquieu’s political
thought: the insistence on the legalized separation of powers is the cornerstone of his
theory and serves as necessary condition for constitutional legitimacy.
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Montesquieu also follows the traditional republican idea that laws must promote
virtue and help avoiding corruption, which comes from the prevalence of particular
interests.
“The description of virtue offered by Montesquieu is similar to that
provided by the Ciceronian humanists. It is a kind of virtue that requires selfabnegation and denial of one’s interests (…). The corruption of the republic occurs
precisely in the moment where public values lose their legitimacy in the face of an
emerging individualistic moral order.”136
Virtue for Montesquieu has a patriotic component, it is the love one feels for
the republic, which naturally generates good maxims: “Virtue in a republic is a most
simple thing; it is a love of the republic, it is a sensation, and not a consequence of
acquired knowledge (…).”137 This idea is similar to what Machiavelli thinks of the
power of the law: good principles will improve men’s character, and redirect their
focus towards their true interest. Passions are associated with corruption, which is also
common in the republican tradition. However, Montesquieu differs from Machiavelli
in that he believes men capable of feeling this genuine love for the republic, when
Machiavelli has a more pessimistic picture. Virtue and good morals will come
naturally to men who sincerely feel attached to the state and concerned by public
affairs.
Montesquieu also shares the belief that public participation is of crucial
importance, and it is characterised by “the inclusion of all in a vivire civile
characterised by homogeneous aspirations and communal customs”138. Corruption
occurs when the people lose interest for the political sphere. Montesquieu uses the
example of the systems of Athens and Rome, as a way to show the result of the
adequate implication of citizens into the affairs of the city.
“The misfortune of a republic is, when intrigues are at an end; which
happens when the people are gained by bribery and corruption: in this case
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they grow indifferent to public affairs, and avarice becomes their predominant
passion. Unconcerned about the government and everything belonging to it,
they quietly wait for their hire.”139
“The constitutions of Rome and Athens were excellent. The decrees of
the senate had the force of laws for the space of a year, but did not become
perpetual till they were ratified by the consent of the people.”140
The definition Montesquieu gives of freedom seems also coherent with the
republican tradition that associates liberty with the absence of fear that comes with the
assurance that the government is ordered in such a way that interference of the will of
another is unlikely to happen, or at least not with impunity141. However, as I have said,
Montesquieu is also seen by many as one of the first fathers of liberalism142. It has
been argued, for example, that his theory of climates leads to a particularistic vision of
liberty, that is coherent with liberalism’s emphasis on value pluralism

143

.

Montesquieu’s ambiguous position in the political spectrum is an important reminder
that the political debates of the time should not always be reduced to the dichotomy
between liberals and republicans that exists today144.

2. Rousseau: Autonomy and Civic Freedom
The rule of law finds a specific kind of expression in the Social Contract, where
Rousseau describes civic laws as social unity generator and as the condition of positive
civic freedom – as opposed to negative natural freedom which does not rely on laws.
He hierarchically classifies these types of freedom and clearly argues that autonomy –
defined as the capacity to obey to one’s own law – is a superior type of freedom, and
can only derive from socially-constructed laws. But Rousseau proposes a distinctive
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conception of the rule of law, as intertwined with the general will. People’s true
freedom is therefore only reachable through reciprocal participation in legislative
activities, which must not only follow but also promote the further emergence of the
general will. Rousseau seems to differ from the typical republican view in that the rule
of law does not rely on a mixed constitution but on the integration of the general will.
It is however important to mention that Rousseau’s work has been the object
of numerous accusations, largely coming from the liberal tradition – Hegel being the
non-liberal exception. From Benjamin Constant to Isaiah Berlin, most accuse him of
totalitarian tendencies, and of absorbing the individual will into the general will with
no consideration for personal freedom. Pettit, while recognizing the importance of
Rousseau for the republican theory, also warns us about the risk of interpreting him in
a populist way145. The ambiguity one sees in Rousseau depends greatly on the reading
that is made and it requires a deep understanding of the concepts he uses, put in context
with the philosophy of his time, to dispense with the totalitarian tone. If one does this
careful reading, Rousseau may appear as one of the most deeply concerned theorists
of personal liberty, though it is a liberty of a specific kind. Pettit directly argues that
Rousseau, following the republican theory, advocates for freedom as non-domination,
though differs in that, for him, this kind of freedom is not reached though a mixed
constitution, but only though a monistic law-making entity –the sovereign citizenbody.
“Under this conception (positive freedom), your social or political
freedom dos not just rely on law (…) for its realization. It consists in being the
enfranchised member of a self-determining collectivity such that its will is a
will in which you partake (…). (…) This positive conception was the form that
the republican conception took in the wake of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s
reconstrual of republican ideas. Rousseau himself adopted the conception of
freedom as nondomination (…) in line with the Italian-Atlantic tradition of
republican thought (…). But he rejected the traditional republican belief that
only a mixed, contestatory constitution could further the cause of such freedom.
Instead, he followed Bodin and Hobbes in arguing that the state had to be rules
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by a unified sovereign and so, in the republic, by a unified assembly of
citizens.”146
Pettit is right to attribute a positive definition of freedom to Rousseau, for it
seems clear that he is one of its strongest proponents. But it would be misplaced to
attribute to Rousseau solely democratic intentions. In fact, the ideal system described
in the Social Contract is composed of several separated entities. In that, Rousseau is
following Montesquieu’s idea of the separation of powers: the people only possess the
power of law-making, which constitutes sovereignty. However, laws are not picked
according to the will of the majority, but are unanimously chosen according to the
general will, assuming the people has an adequate understanding of it – which may
require the help of a third party. This idea comes from the belief that when entering
society, the individual signs a contract with herself, as well as with the body-politic of
which she is a part147. This idea is crucial to understand Rousseau’s specific definition
of freedom and autonomy. Although the people is sovereign, a government composed
of a selected number of rulers is however necessary in order to insure executive power.
Rousseau is known for the apparently paradoxical idea that one can be forced
to be free, which is clearly articulated in the Social Contract. However, it is important
to understand this idea as not only the guarantee of civic concord – Rousseau does not
place it above individual freedom, but as the only way to prevent tyranny, which he
identifies as dependence.
“(…) This is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country,
secures him against all personal dependence, i.e. secures him against being
taken by anyone or anything else. This is the key to the working of the political
machine; it alone legitimates civil commitments which would otherwise be
absurd, tyrannical, and liable to frightful abuses.”148
The full adherence of the individual to the body-politic legitimates institutions
and guarantees that self-interest and common good no longer conflict. Obedience to
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laws is then an act of freedom, and at the same time is a freedom-generating
instrument: it is not an act of submission to an arbitrary will, but obedience to our own
will as part of the citizen-body. This allows Pettit to explain that Rousseau embodies
a definition of freedom as non-domination.
“The line that we are defending here has connections with the
republicanism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The main component in freedom,
according to Rousseau, is the enjoyment of non-vulnerability to the will of
others; the enjoyment, as he tends to put it, of non-dependency. But nonvulnerability can only be guaranteed for each under a law that is internalized
by others as a legitimate and welcome form of constraint, not as a forceful
imposition that will be systematically resisted and strategically avoided.”149
He answers the question of how to make sure the law does not become a
coercive power, by saying that “Rousseau’s solution is to require that the law satisfies
his version of the democratic constraint: that it be identified, under conditions of full
participation, as a matter of the general will” 150 . This specific conception of
republican freedom is due to Rousseau’s definition of autonomy, which he defines by
“obedience to a law we prescribe to ourselves”, as opposite to “the drive of sheer
appetite”151. The state of slavery is therefore any state under which the individual acts
as individual and not as citizen: non-domination is therefore not only a matter of
independence from the will of another, but also from one’s own private interests and
passions. Both aspects lead to the loss of civil liberty, which is the only definition of
freedom Rousseau is willing to give substance to. We see that Rousseau remains
faithful to the republican tradition by placing the rule of law as necessary constitutive
element of civic freedom. But it is a specific kind of rule of law, which does not rely
on the same republican principles, such as the mixed constitution. This leads Pettit to
argue that Rousseau’s view can be interpreted as another Hobbesian account, which
places the emphasis on the importance of reciprocal agreement rather than on the
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constitutional structure of public power152. Pettit accuses Rousseau of betraying the
republican tradition by rejecting the mixed constitution, and endorsing Hobbes and
Bodin’s idea that sovereignty must be in the hands of a single entity.
“Rousseau rejects the idea of a mixed constitution under the lead of
absolutists like Jean Bodin (…) and Thomas Hobbes (…). He accepted their
argument that every state has to have a single, absolute sovereign, individual
or corporate, and that no such agency can operate, as envisages in the mixed
constitution, on the basis of coordination between different, mutually checking
centres of power.”153
Pettit argues that Rousseau is nonetheless able to remain faithful to the
republican ideal of freedom; people under such regime remain “independent as private
persons” 154 . But this form of independence relies on the submission of all to the
sovereign entity and the general will, which, according to Pettit, is at odds with
traditional republican values. The rule of law is nonetheless of great importance in
Rousseau’s theory, for the integration of a non-constraining law is what guarantees
non-vulnerability and therefore avoids the risk of domination155. But the emergence of
such rule relies on conditions that, according to neo-republicans, go against the
Roman-Italian values they wish to endorse.
It can be said, however, that Rousseau’s conception of autonomy is a precious
tool for two reasons: first, it provides a way to reduce the possibility of an antitotalitarian reading – at the very least, it may help temper concerns raised by Pettit
regarding absolutism. Rousseau’s primary concern is in fact individual freedom, which
finds its true meaning through civil liberty rather than natural liberty; submission to
the laws only serve this purpose. The second reason is that it provides a unique
conception of autonomy as only a post-political ideal distinguished from natural
freedom. This takes us even further away from a liberal reading: autonomy for
Rousseau is not part of a theory of rights – though liberty is, and it is also not an
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intrinsic component of people – as opposed to what Kant will later on declare.
Rousseau’s definition of personal autonomy as strictly political can also be seen as a
specific aspect of classic republican freedom: it follows the traditional idea that the
laws are creator of liberty, but it incorporates a new condition, which is the integration
of the individual to the general will, to the point that they become indistinguishable.

VI.
1.

Anglo-Saxon Republicanism and Modern Concerns
Republicanism of the English Commonwealth

The ideas of classic republicanism are not restricted to the Mediterranean world.
These values travelled to find expression in a number of writings from English
philosophers from the XVIIth century, whose political thoughts were significantly
influenced by Roman and Italian republicanism. The English Civil War has had an
important impact on these writers at the time, and has highlighted the importance of
reflections on the nature of freedom, and the need for a Commonwealth – at the time
synonym with republic. Neo-republicans have expressed their alignment with the ideas
of the “commonwealthmen”, who later on would theorise the ideas that led to the
American Revolution. Pettit argues that these writers were committed to the ideal of
freedom as non-domination, that they conceived as escape from the arbitrary 156 .
Although their thought was largely influenced by the Roman Republic, what seems to
mark a distinction is, as Pettit mentions, a growing worry that domination, though
contained by the state and the constitution, may also come from state officials
themselves. This produces the need for the population to remain vigilant, keep an eye
on public affairs, and “to strive to ‘keep the bastards honest’”157.158 I believe that this
constitutes the first step towards a more negative definition of republican freedom.
Roman and Italian thinkers had a major influence on these writers and their
conception of freedom, often characterised, as in the Ancient times, as a state of non156
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slavery. However, their definition of liberty may be slightly more negative than that
of the Greeks, Romans and Italians from the Renaissance. Skinner argues that James
Harrington’s Commonwealth of Oceana offers “the most systemic reworking of the
Machiavellian line of argument”
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. Pettit explains that Harrington follows

Machiavelli in the defence of more democratic control, though he does not see in
Harrington the promotion of as much political participation160. For him, liberty is the
attribute of one who does not live according to the arbitrary will of another, it is the
position of non-dependence and non-vulnerability. The opposition between freedom
and slavery is commonly used by Harrington and by theorists of the commonwealth in
general. However, Skinner argues that for theorists of the commonwealth, one of the
best ways to reach such level of freedom is active citizenship: it is a way to avoid
corruption, and to make sure institutions and officials are under appropriate
surveillance161. Most of them endorse the idea that the freedom of states and their
citizens is threatened when people lack political involvement in government activities.
For Machiavelli, such political involvement is the sign of a virtuous citizen, and keeps
corruption at bay. Harrington follows this idea, and therefore advocates for the
implementation of democratic devices aiming at the preservation of involvement in
political affairs. Liberty is for Harrington a natural right of people, but requires that
people are the guardians of this right: this implies that they engage in proper
deliberation, approve of legislation, but also that they keep a distance with their
passions through rational evaluations162. Harrington follows what he considers to be
the tradition of Aristotle and Machiavelli, the idea that just like a free man is governed
by reason as opposed to passions, a free commonwealth is governed by laws, as
opposed to the rule of the tyrant163.
The preservation of liberty also requires specific constitutional arrangements. This
marks a difference with Machiavelli’s fear of corruption as the main cause of
unfreedom. For Harrington, though corruption is a concern, it is mostly avoided
through constitutional means and a balanced sharing of political responsibilities.
Harrington advocates for a system of powers divided between the people, the senate
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and the magistracy, which amounts to a mixture of systems – aristocratic, democratic,
monarchic. Liberty for him, is the result of the commonwealth, which consists in “the
senate proposing, the people resolving, and the magistracy executing”164 . We see
through these ideas the direct influence of the Roman system of mixed constitution.
Harrington’s addition, is the idea that, although there can be different types of
commonwealths, they all must satisfy the condition that, the head of the magistrate is
the executive power only, and therefore must be answerable to the people and the law.
Skinner explains that Algernon Sidney expresses a concern similar to Harrington;
the commonwealth depends on the freedom of people and their willingness to serve
the common good, which are consequences of civic virtue, and the avoidance of
corruption165. He also advocates for a system of mixed constitution. Sellers says that
Sidney “endorsed Rome’s republican constitution of senate, magistrates, and popular
assembly as the best and only nurse of virtue and free government”166. Tyranny for
him, is a system governed by the caprices of private will, and liberty only emerges
from a government subjected to the power of the law. Like Harrington, Sidney follows
the Roman and Machiavellian tradition that places importance on the cultivation of
civic virtue, conceived as public involvement for the pursue of the common good.
Liberty, for Sidney, is a natural right and attribute of men, but must be properly
restrained by just laws, such that “due liberty” may be enjoyed167. His conception of
freedom closely follows that of Harrington, and mostly consists in independence from
another man’s will.
John Milton follows a similar, but more radical path. His defence of the
commonwealth is followed by an argument justifying regicide, in favour of the
freedom of citizens and states. His conception of freedom is similarly linked to the
absence of dependence to the will of another, which is the definition of servitude.
Consent is the only justification for people to legitimately live under the rules of
government, and their motive can only be public safety, or the belief that common
good would be better served under such regiment 168 . As Skinner says, the bound
between people and their ruler must be a conditional one: “there cannot be a political
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covenant specifying that we hand over power absolutely to a ruler who is thereby
rendered unaccountable”. The allegiance we owe to our representatives must
therefore be dispensed with if the terms of the contract are not respected169. Failure to
respect these terms would result in the violation of the natural law according to which
every man is born free, and Skinner explains that it would therefore be a moral
impossibility, or a treason against the dignity of mankind170. An interesting point about
Milton is the affirmation that freedom is not only a matter of actual restriction but also
of possible constraint – idea that will later on be largely endorsed by neo-republicans.
Living at the mercy of a tyrant is already enough to deprive you of your natural and
fundamental liberty. Because tyrants violate such right and break the legitimate bound
that should link people to their rulers, their elimination and the establishment of a
commonwealth are for Milton amply justified. Another particularity of Milton is his
account of what Skinner calls “the social consequences of living in servitude”.
Courage and virtues can only be expected from free men, greatness is the attribute of
those who do not live under the will of a tyrant, and no glory can result from a state of
oppression.
It is easy to see the appeal of neo-republicans for English theorists of the
commonwealth. Their theories remain faithful to Roman republicanism or to the
values of Italian Renaissance, while they also fit with a more negative definition, that
neo-republicans are more willing to embrace, and with the affirmation of liberty as
natural right and attribute of men. The ideals of a balanced constitution, of a
fundamental right to freedom, and the desire for political reformation, will later on
find expression among theorists of the American Revolution.
2. Republicanism of the American Revolution
It may seem like an odd idea to equate the aspirations of America’s founding
fathers with the classic tradition of republicanism. Indeed, the ideological origins of
the American Revolution are typically linked to liberal values. However, marking a
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clear distinction between republicanism and liberalism, in the Anglo-Saxon world in
the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, may also be completely anachronical. Political
discussions at the time and in these circles, were mostly focused on the defence of
liberty against monarchical tyranny, and the philosophical label under which theories
fall only became relevant later in history. Although the distinction between
republicanism and liberalism at the time is blurry and possibly irrelevant, I would
argue that a republican reading on the American Revolution ideology is possible.
The goal is not to argue that the Founding Fathers were republicans, as opposed to
liberals, but that the republican ideas have had an influence in this sphere, mostly due
their propagation by the commonwealthmen. It is also to explain the interest neorepublicans have expressed for this part of history. In fact, Pettit considers the
American Revolution to be the point of “most conspicuous success” of the republican
notion of freedom, but that at that time, the notion of freedom as non-interference
started to emerge, and finally took over 171 . He believes that this new version of
freedom was not defended by the actors of the Revolution, but by those who opposed
them in favour of the British crown172. Those who welcomed the Revolution, he says,
defended a conception that was aligned with the ideal of non-domination transported
by the commonwealthmen. The ideal of non-interference would however eventually
replace it. This means that the American Revolution, if we believe Pettit, constitutes
the best expression but also the fall of the republican ideal in the Anglo-Saxon world
– until the ideal is revived at the end of the XXth century.
Actors of the American Revolution shape their ideas around the belief that
monarchy, if unchecked, can lead to an overuse of power and the violation of the kind
of liberty they cherish. A constitutional monarchy was for them a potential solution
for the problem of balance and division of power. They had read the French authors of
the Enlightenment, and although they may have been inspired by some of their ideas,
they also mark a clear distinction. Sellers explains that John Adams strongly rejected
Rousseau’s unicameralism, but also Montesquieu’s theory of climate influence on
political institutions173. Adams argues in favour of a mixed and balance legislature,
shaped around the public interests of all citizens. He feared that Rousseau’s wish for
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political and institutional uniformity would lead to tyranny or military dictatorship174,
but still believed in popular sovereignty, on which the republic is based. But Sellers
explains that the property of individuals as well as their freedom is linked to their
individual right to property – as part of the property of all. These two goods can only
be secured under a system of balanced power.
James Madison feared that pure democracy would lead to the tyranny of the
majority, and believed the American Constitution to be a way to keep the influence of
private interests at bay, while maintaining a form of popular sovereignty. The
Constitution expresses the need of the people while avoiding the chaos and instability
of direct democracies175. Madison puts a strong emphasis on representation, as a way
to remedy the problems caused by the large size of the United States, where it becomes
more challenging to stay aligned with the various needs of the people. Pettit explains
how this tradition follows the traditional republican analogy between slavery and
unfreedom, and observe that, just like for any other republican theory, liberty need not
be threatened by any sort of coercion, but is only at risk when domination is about:
“In that tradition (that lead to the American Revolution), (…) there is little or no
suggestion that law necessarily reduces the liberty of those who live under it; on the
contrary, the right sort of law is seen as the source of liberty”176. Laws don’t threaten
liberty but constitute proper and desirable interference; it guarantees that balance and
separation of powers is maintained. We also see the influence and resurgence of
Roman ideals in the American Revolution’s actors through the establishment of the
senate. Sellers says that “Madison and the Federalists reinstituted the old republican
constitution of liberty in their balanced mixture of senate, chief magistrate, and
popular assembly” 177 , with the importance of representation as their innovative
addition.
Anglo-Saxon classic republicanism remains largely faithful to Roman ideals, but
distinguishes itself through a shift of focus regarding the source of domination. The
focus is more emphatically placed on governments and rulers as the potential cause of
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servitude et oppression. Freedom, gradually, becomes the absence of such power
abuse, and slides towards a more negative definition, which blurs the line between
republicanism of this area and time and emerging liberal ideals.
3. Is Classic Republican Freedom Positive or Negative?
Neo-republicans typically hold two claims regarding where freedom must stand:
that the republican conception of freedom is not a positive one, and that it is an
alternative to the dichotomy between positive and negative freedom. Given the
constant reference to the classic theorists of republicanism, it seems important to verify
whether these claims apply to the classic theory of republican freedom as well, or if
they are a modern addition. Pettit’s central recurrent claim is that freedom conceived
as non-domination is the heart of republicanism, and that this has been the case all
through history. It would incorporate both positive and negative elements, and
therefore constitute a third type of liberty. But the question of whether republican
liberty is negative, positive, or simply of a third type, is not as easy to answer as it may
seem. I have two goals in this section: first, identify elements that would help us
understand whether classic republican freedom leans more towards positive or
negative liberty, or if it does indeed constitute a third type. My second goal is to
analyse whether Pettit is right when he argues that republicanism’s central feature has
always been freedom as non-domination.
The liberal negative definition of freedom as non-interference goes back to
Hobbes, though as Philip Pettit notices 178 , Hobbes refers to freedom both as the
absence of commitment, and the absence of obstruction or frustration. The loss of
freedom happens when we make a promise of a decision after deliberating. It also
occurs when animate or inanimate beings are being physically obstructed.
“Promises therefore, upon consideration of reciprocal benefit, are covenants
and signs of the will, or act of deliberation, whereby the liberty of performing, or
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not performing, is taken away, and consequently are obligatory. For when liberty
ceaseth, there beginneth obligation.”179
“Liberty, or freedom, signifieth properly the absence of opposition (by
opposition I mean external impediments of motion); and may be applied no less to
irrational and inanimate creatures than to rational. For whatsoever is so tied, or
environed, as it cannot move but within a certain space, which space is determined
by the opposition of some external body, we say it hath not liberty to go further.”180
Classic republican freedom seems quite far from this description. In the
Aristotelian tradition, liberty is construed in much more positive terms. First, as we
have seen, it is directly linked to public participation, as one of its two components.
But thinking that the role and purpose of democracy is to preserve freedom would be
to misinterpret both concepts. Freedom is simply constitutive of democracy, as its
necessary but non-sufficient condition. But freedom is not a value placed above
popular participation, and democracy’s aim. Freedom, in the Aristotelian tradition, is
in fact produced by political participation. Citizens can only be free if they participate
in the public life, and citizenship is what distinguishes freemen from slaves. Aristotle
defines freedom by the capacity “to rule and be ruled”, and warns us against an extreme
democratic interpretation of it:
“And in democracies of the more extreme type there has arisen a false idea of
freedom which is contradictory to the true interests of the state. (…). Men think
(…) that freedom means the doing what a man likes. In such democracies, everyone
lives as he pleases, or in the words of Euridipes, ‘according to his fancy’. But this
is all wrong: men should not think it slavery to live according to the rule of the
constitution; for it is their salvation.”
The rule of law is not simply a way to protect citizens against excessive freedom,
is it the only way to reach it. As we have previously seen, freedom for Aristotle is
linked to virtue: being free means possessing certain character traits that will allow the
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individual to follow moral principles, and these traits come from education. Gregory
Johnson clearly says that:
“Aristotle’s emphasis on compulsory moral education put him in the ‘positive’
libertarian camp. For Aristotle, a free man is not merely any man who lives in a free
society. A free man possesses certain traits of character that allow him to govern
himself responsibly and attain happiness.”
Aristotle believes in the necessity for men to be free from their own instincts
or bad impulses, and that the law plays an essential role in this liberation. This allows
Johnson to draw a relevant comparison with Rousseau, and to say that “because
Aristotle thinks that freedom from the internal compulsion of the passions is more
important than freedom from the external compulsion of force and that force can quell
the passions and establish virtue’s empire over them, Aristotle believes as much as
Rousseau that we can be forced to be free”181. Johnson does however notice that there
is an aspect of Aristotelian freedom that can be considered negative, and that it is
mostly expressed in terms of protection of the population in the case of war, but also
in the defence of private property. But these elements are minimal in Aristotle’s theory,
and most of his ideas of freedom contribute to the elaboration of a positive definition.
The Romans have a history of liberty that according to Pettit, coincides with
non-domination. For Pettit, republican freedom follows the Roman idea that liberty
requires independence from the will of another, and the specific system of law, or the
mixed constitutional system are means to guarantee the non-domination of Roman
citizens182. Roman liberty has positive as well as negative aspects, or more precisely,
they take the two aspects as co-dependent. As Buttle writes, “the negative and positive
dimensions of freedom, therefore, cohere for republicans in that negative liberty
cannot be secure without positive liberty” 183 . The best way to be protected from
domination is to enjoy the status of citizen and benefit from the capacities it provides.
Cicero’s definition of freedom can seem quite negative at first glance: Sellers explains
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that he “defines libertas in his discours de re publica as life without a master”184. The
quality of a liber, or freeman, is to enjoy life free of interference of the will of another.
This is why a truly monarchic government is incompatible with freedom. However,
freedom also requires positive elements such as popular participation and the
implementation of civic virtue. Sellers mentions that this is also why aristocracies
cannot be free regimes either, because they do not allow for necessary public
deliberation about the common good185. As we know, the Romans are also suspicious
of the Greek form of democracy, which puts citizens at risk of excessive freedom, and
would not lead to libertas. A mixed constitution is the only way to allow for the
positive aspects of freedom while at the same time protecting citizens from the
dependence or domination of one’s will. Liberty is not a concept that can be separated
from the other aspects of the civic life: it is directly linked to virtue, the rule of law,
and a specific constitutional system, such that there’s no possibility for Cicero to think
of liberty outside the frame of the republic. Sellers reminds us that libertas implies a
form of self-government, and therefore is quite a positive concept. Self-government is
expressed when the individual is free from his own impulses: “Cicero’s conception of
republican liberty meant freedom from passion and domination through obedience to
law, when law reflects the sincere deliberation of a mature republican community”186.
Should we conclude from all this that Roman liberty is much less negative than
neo-republicans may have thought? We may also wonder whether Pettit is right to
affirm that the heart of Roman freedom is in fact freedom as non-domination. Geoff
Kennedy contests that it is, and mentions that though Cicero expresses a certain idea
of freedom that is akin to non-domination, it is not the central element of Roman
republicanism. He mentions that the concept of concordia (or civil concord) is more
emblematic of his republicanism than libertas is.
“Libertas, in other words, is still a form of ‘non-domination’ that is
intrinsically identified with the Roman republic, albeit a form of liberty that is
different from that enjoyed by the Greeks. Yet, when we look at his analysis of
the historical development of the Roman republic and his defence of its
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principles, we see that concordia or concentus, not libertas, is the predominant
characteristic of his republicanism.”187
According to him, the neo-republican tendency to interpret history this way,
and to see non-domination as a central aspect of Roman republicanism is misleading.
The aspects of republicanism that are forgotten in this process, are aspects that
contribute to a much more positive definition of freedom than libertas alone is. Does
this mean that neo-republicans are culpable of anachronism when they interpret history
the way they do? Could it be that non-domination is in fact a purely neo-republican
concept, and that it needs to be understood only as an opposition to freedom as noninterference? This seems too big of a claim to be defended here, however, the analysis
of Cicero reveals that Roman liberty, even if it contains aspects of non-domination,
also requires much more positive elements, and cannot be separated from civic virtue,
civic concord, the rule of law, or the nature of the mixed constitution. The question of
Roman republican freedom being negative or positive is therefore not easy to answer:
maybe this type of freedom does indeed go beyond the duality, not because it is mostly
non-domination, but because all aspects of it are co-dependent.
Machiavelli surely follows the example of Rome, and connects freedom to the
pursuit of the common good, made possible by the rule of law and a properly balanced
constitution. One of the biggest enemies of freedom for Machiavelli is corruption, and
he emphasizes the importance of implementing virtue, so as to minimize the risk of
people’s selfish impulses to rise above the common good. This process can only
generate more freedom for people, who are unfree when they mistake private selfish
interests for virtue. A balanced constitution is a means to avoid the risk of corruption
and guarantee freedom for the population, which, just like for Cicero, should not
become excessive either.
“Machiavelli believed that tyranny beings when the balance of the
constitution tips too much in any one direction, including towards an excessive
desire for ‘freedom” in the populace. Men are so easily corrupted and human
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appetites so insatiable that tyrants have often succeeded in replacing free
governments with the pursuit of their own private interest.”188
Citizens cannot be free if their leader is not virtuous: liberty depends upon the
quality of institutions and the correct moral disposition of the law-makers. Sellers also
mentions that for Machiavelli, liberty means self-government for the well-being of the
community, and that a republic is the only place where this ideal can be obtained.
Freedom as self-government clearly seems to lead towards a positive definition, as
well as the political and moral conditions required to obtain it. The necessity of the
law in the pursuit of liberty goes against the intuition a proponent of negative freedom
may have. But for Machiavelli, the coercive nature of the law is not an affront to
individual freedom: ““for a neo-Roman theorist like Machiavelli, by contrast, the law
is in part justified because it serves to ensure a degree of personal freedom which, in
its absence, would all together collapse”189. The law is needed to preserve individuals
from their easily corrupted nature, which quickly turns into an incapacity to enjoy
freedom. Once again, liberty for Machiavelli seems largely positive: it requires
external and political conditions, a virtuous disposition, and it means being selfgoverned in the pursuit of the common good. If there is a negative aspect, it mostly is
about the necessity to avoid corruption. But avoiding corruption means being free from
an internal impediment – being free from the disposition that leads to be corrupted –
when negative freedom is typically defined as freedom from an external constraint.
Rousseau’s conception is in the same line of thought. His definition of freedom
is probably the most evidently positive, and is often used as an example of the danger
and paradoxes of this type of liberty. Isaiah Berlin, along with Benjamin Constant and
many more, saw him as a real enemy of freedom.
“Rousseau does not mean by liberty the ‘negative’ freedom of the
individual not to be interfered with within a defined area, but the possession
by all, and not merely by some, of the truly qualified members of a society of a
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share in the public power which is entitled to interfere with every aspect if
every citizen’s life.”190
We could add some nuance to this interpretation, but it is certainly true that
Rousseau is not quite concerned with negative freedom; in fact, for him, negative
freedom may be closer to un-freedom, or at least to a liberty of a much lesser degree.
He nonetheless remains a strong republican figure, even if Pettit warns us about the
possibility of interpreting his work in a populist way191. Pettit claims that Rousseau’s
theory of freedom is a theory of non-domination; more specifically, that freedom is
the possibility to enjoy non-vulnerability to the will of others. This means the
individual’s will has to be integrated to the general will, which can only be possible
when the law is internalized. Rousseau follows a tradition that distinguishes natural
liberty from civil liberty, and only gives weight to the latter; true liberty, he says, is to
obey the lay we prescribe to ourselves, which is also defined as autonomy – though
never mentioned as such in the text. Society frees people from the slavery of their own
passions and instincts, and from those of others; Rousseau shares with Machiavelli the
belief that people must be freed from their own selfish tendencies by the force of the
law, and the implementation of civic virtue – in particular, the promotion of a civil
religion. He uses the example of Sparta as the perfect example of civic freedom,
because the city embodied the values of patriotism and civic virtue necessary for the
sustainability of the state.
Rousseau differs from Machiavelli about the type of government he thinks best
suited for liberty: he does not advocate for a mixed constitution like the Romans did,
but it would be a mistake to think he wishes to establish a total democracy either. He
is greatly influenced by the work of Montesquieu and the idea of separation of powers
as the only way to avoid tyranny of any kind: the people’s sovereignty – or legislative
power – guarantees their freedom. But Rousseau does not advocate for the rule of the
majority: in fact, if citizens really integrate the general will, political decisions will be
unanimous, and potential dissidents will be “forced to be free” by the rest of the
political body, which is in their best interest. One aspect that is often forgotten about
Rousseau is that he also follows Montesquieu in his climate theory: liberty is not
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possible to obtain under any circumstances, and the geographic elements are of great
importance: “Liberty isn’t a fruit of every climate, so it isn’t within the reach of every
people. The more you think about this principle that Montesquieu laid down, the more
evidence you find in its favour.”192 Tyranny is more likely to be implemented in hot
climates, but there are also economic conditions to be considered. As Sellers says
“Rousseau’s ideal republic would be a small city-state in the temperate zone with a
moderate surplus of product over labor. There alone could citizens be free”193.
It seems clear that Rousseau’s republican freedom is highly positive: it requires
self-government, but true autonomy can only be found within the limits of the rule of
law and must be in accordance with the general will. One can be forced to be free and
to align with the common good, which can only generate more freedom: Rousseau
draws a parallel between the interest everyone has in being free, and the interest
everyone has in the integration of their private will to the common good. Liberty also
has conditions that can only be met in the right type of state, with the proper size,
climate, and economic possibilities. Rousseau is a good example of the way freedom
as non-domination can be interpreted positively.
Finally, the Anglo-Saxon tradition – and to some extent Montesquieu’s ideas
which were greatly influenced by the British constitutional regime – leans towards a
more negative definition and seems to mark a distinction. If labelling it as simply
negative would be missing the complexity of the concept, it seems to however embody
the cautions and worries of thinkers of the time: fear of government power abuse.
Although this concern has always been manifested, its dominance in political theory
is relatively new. Republicans of the commonwealth and later on the American
Revolution carry this worry and therefore, it is expressed through their definition of
freedom. There is room to argue that neo-republicans may be more inspired by this
trend of thought than by others, and this may be the reason republicanism and
liberalism can sometimes seem to be interpreted as two sides of the same coin.
However, I believe than rather than placing concepts into categories, we should
understand through this review that republican freedom is rich and complex; it
harbours a multitude of nuanced notions.
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Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to highlight the major characteristics found in some
of the most prominent traditions of classic republicanism, in order to improve our
understanding of current debates inside and outside the republican movement. It also
was to show that a common thread can be found through the importance each school
of thought gives to the rule of law, which highlights the positive aspect of republican
liberty. Though the main characteristic of republicanism today is without a doubt the
concept of freedom as non-domination introduced by Pettit, it seems clear that this
concept was not the only focus of classic authors within the tradition. The emphasis
on civic virtue, on the rule of law, and on a proper constitutional system – though
different for each tradition, are as if not more important concepts. More specifically,
liberty cannot be seen as separate from all these other elements: as co-dependent
concepts, each of them plays a role in the promotion of freedom and none can be said
to be above another. If we want to analyse classic republican freedom in light of current
debates, it seems overall largely positive, at the exception of the English and American
thought. Neo-republicans seem to have brought a much more negative aspect to the
theory, which may be a way to more adequately respond to modern concerns about
government power abuse. In general, freedom as non-domination seems to be a fairly
new concept, and may even be much less central in classic republicanism than Pettit
says it is. This does not mean it should be dispensed with, or that its importance should
be undermined. It could be also argued that the various emphasis republicans place on
values, greatly rely on historical and political context: the definition of liberty each
tradition endorses may simply be the representation of the concerns of their time.
Similarly, for neo-republicans, freedom as non-domination may be the reflexion of
current affairs, and may serve specifically contemporary purposes. This does not
mean, however, that the concept is perfectly adequate as it is, or that it is nonperfectible. The goal of this chapter was simply to give an idea of the substantial
richness of republican freedom through history. Now that these main characteristics
are established, we may look at the neo-republican project and see how it may answer
the questions left open by liberalism.

99

CHAPTER III
Freedom as Non-Domination:
Definition, Advantages, Limitations

Introduction
Neo-republicanism is the modern heir of the long and rich tradition of thought
described in the previous chapter. But neo-republicans also differ from the classic
theory in many ways. The first of them being that their attention is mostly dedicated
to the definition of freedom and the opposition to the liberal view on this matter. The
introduction by Pettit of freedom as non-domination, as an alternative to the largely
unquestioned freedom as non-interference, is the cornerstone of modern republicanism
and the focus of the majority of discussions about freedom. Neo-republicans like Pettit
claim that this definition remains faithful to the classic republican tradition: the virtue
of the modern trend is to reintroduce the concept as a universal ideal, when classic
theorists mostly imagined it as the condition of an elite – mostly males of a certain
high status 194 . The modern theory also has the advantage of providing a detailed
definition of the concept and proposes solutions to the specific problems modern
societies face today. But the greatest advantage of the neo-republican theory may be
that it provides an alternative to another long tradition of thought that had vastly been
accepted in Western political theory as the standard position. The recognition that
liberalism and freedom as non-interference leave numerous gaps open, comes as a
necessary reminder that other perspectives are possible. For the remaining of this
thesis, I will speak from a republican standpoint, for I believe it adequately points out
to the limitations of the liberal thought, and offers the possibility of promising
solutions.
But the definition of freedom as non-domination, as promising as it is, also faces
numerous difficulties that require our attention. The general idea I want to defend is
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that although the neo-republican project is worthy of admiration and provides
significant key-elements to understand the complex question of freedom, it does not
go as far as it could, and remains incomplete in various ways. This incompleteness
should be rectified, assuming the goal is to provide a robust alternative to the liberal
thought. The main blind spot I have identified is that the neo-republican theory is
generally indifferent to the question of autonomy and self-mastery; I believe that a
closer look at this question could solve most of the problems the current definition of
freedom as non-domination may face. This chapter will be dedicated to the
presentation of the neo-republican thought, the advantages of freedom as nondomination, as well as its inconsistencies. In the first part, I will go over the definition
and requirements of non-domination, conceived as an adequate and necessary
replacement of non-interference. In the second part, I will present the advantages of
this definition: I will argue that not only does it adequately provides an alternative to
the liberal approach, it also avoids the defaults and paradoxes presented in the first
chapter, and in consequence, is a better candidate for a definition of autonomous
behaviour than its rival. In the third part, I will go over the various limitations of the
current definition. I will conclude that despite its promising characteristics, freedom
as non-domination is incomplete, essentially because it remains too negative, and
excludes self-government and the exercise of public power as components.
I.

Neo-Republican Freedom: Definition

This section will be dedicated to the definition of the neo-republican concept as a
way to highlight the inadequacy of freedom as non-interference, and eventually to
replace it. I start with a brief historical picture of freedom as non-interference, and
describe the two main lines of the theory – the strict Hobbesian line and the moderate
Berlinian version. I show what while the latter was introduced as a way to fix the
problems of the former, they both fail. Freedom as non-domination comes as a
valuable candidate for replacement, with the significant addition that freedom is not
only a matter of actual interference, but also of possible interference. In the second
section, I explain what the requirements of this kind of freedom are, especially the
condition of arbitrariness, crucial to discriminate between non-dominating and
dominating interferences. Finally, I show that for the proponents of this theory,
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freedom as non-domination does not only come as a way to replace freedom as noninterference but also constitute a third type of freedom that breaks the tradition
dichotomy between positive and negative liberty.
1. Limitations of Freedom as Non-Interference
I have presented in the first chapter the broad reasons that motivate neorepublicans to reject the liberal view on freedom. The general problem is that freedom
as non-interference is too broad and too narrow at the same time. Pettit introduces the
idea of non-domination as a way to rectify the various issues we encounter when we
choose a definition of freedom as non-interference, and his definition comes mostly as
a response to the Berlinian view – which is itself a response to the Hobbesian view.
Before we go over what non-domination entails, it is important that we understand
what non-interference means.
Pettit describes two main views of freedom as non-interference, a Hobbesian strict
line, and a more moderate line defended by Berlin – which comes as a way to rectify
the inconsistencies of the first. Although he defends Berlin in his objection to Hobbes,
Pettit ends up rejecting both versions. According to the Hobbesian view, freedom
consists in not being externally hindered from a choice one has the will to make195.
This is also referred to as freedom as non-frustration. This view implies that freedom
is only lost if the option that is taken away from the agent is the agent’s preferred
option. By consequence, to be free is to avoid such hindrances. Pettit argues against
this strict line of freedom as non-interference by saying that it brings us to two counterintuitive conclusions. First, if we embrace this line, we need to accept that choices that
are made under the threat of external force count as free as long as the choice that you
are forced to make was anyway the preferred option196. To this, Berlin objects that it
would lead to the seemingly absurd idea that one can maintain freedom by simply
adjusting her desires to the choices that are available197. Pettit uses the example of a
prisoner, being forcefully imprisoned, whose preference goes toward being set free.
According to the Hobbesian view, such prisoner would simply need to modify his
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preference such that he would prefer to remain imprisoned. If that were the case, his
freedom of choice would be preserved; he would not be frustrated in his decision.
Berlin rejects the strict non-frustration line, and endorses a moderate non-interference
view. He explains that for a choice to be free, both options need to be open: the free
agent needs to avoid expected interferences, not only over the preferred option but
over all options. The problem that arises with this perspective is illustrated by Pettit
by the thought experiment of the ill-willed agent: We can imagine an ill-willed agent,
who wished to interfere with my all my options. In this case, I would lose freedom,
whether the agent interferes with my preferred option, or with my less preferred option.
But if we follow Berlin, I would maintain freedom, should this agent choose not to
interfere with any of my options, even though she would still have the power to do so.
This means that i for freedom to be secure, it is sufficient that no interference actually
occurs, despite the possibility that it may. Pettit concludes that in this case, I could
make myself free by manipulating this powerful agent, and lead her not to interfere
with my choices. He also worries that an agent may try to get the favours of the
interferer, or modify her behaviour in order not to show too much freedom, such that
it is not taken away by the ill-willed agent. Such behaviours may produce the desired
outcome, but at the price of playing around with freedom and trying to minimize
unfreedom. This possibility is not substantially much different from adapting one’s
preferences to available options: in both cases, there is a need for an adaptation on the
side of the chooser, whether it is adapting to an option, or manipulating another such
that my options remain available. This idea seems to lead to the very conclusion Berlin
was seeking to avoid when he rejected Hobbes’ version. It also seems to go against an
intuitive idea: that when there is a need for adaptation, freedom is likely threatened, or
at least incomplete. We are therefore faced again with the absurd claim that one can
make oneself free by this kind of accommodation. This problem leads Pettit to the
conclusion that non-interference is simply not enough for freedom.
Pettit’s definition also comes as a response to the limitations that and problems
that come from Berlin’s definitions of both negative and positive liberty. We have seen
what the problems with negative liberty may be. Berlin’s view of positive freedom
leads to an interference-based view; the idea that to be free, one must be the subject to
an interference of the right kind. The negative view, by contrast, is concerned with the
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avoidance of such interference. Pettit’s attempt is directed towards creating a bridge
between these two ideas.
To conclude, freedom as non-interference suffers the objections of being too
narrow and too broad at the same time. It is too narrow because it considers that one
is unfree if and only if one is the subject of interference. But it is too broad when it
considers that all occurrences of interference constitute obstacles to freedom. A slave
may have a benevolent master who never interferes with her life, while having the
power to do so. According to neo-republicans, although the slave may never
experience frustration or interference, she is unfree because her desires remain at the
mercy of her master’s will. Knowing whether the master will ever interfere or not is
irrelevant, that she has the possibility to do so is enough to produce unfreedom. The
absence of domination is therefore what is needed to qualify as a free agent, also
described as “the absence of interference arbitrary power, not just in the actual world,
but in the range of possible worlds”198. On the other hand, Pettit also mentions that not
all acts of interference are acts that deprive a subject of her freedom.
2. Freedom as Non-Domination: the Non-Arbitrariness Condition
The rejection of freedom as non-interference leads Pettit to adopt a definition of
freedom as the absence of domination. Domination is described by Pettit as the actual
or potential interference of one’s arbitrary will over an agent’s desires. He writes that
to be non-dominated is to “enjoy the absence of interference by arbitrary power, not
just in the actual world, but in the range of possible worlds”199. One of Pettit’s main
points is that insofar as one has the ability to interfere with me, I cannot be said to
enjoy free choice. Freedom is therefore not only the absence of actual interference but
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also the absence of potential interference. That is why the concept of domination is
useful to understand the various ways one can be unfree. Pettit writes that “to the
extent that I have a power of interfering without cost in your choice, I count as
dominating you; I am in a position associated iconically with a master or dominus”200.
But Pettit also questions whether interference is necessarily a threat to freedom. In
fact, he argues that it need not be, which contrasts greatly with the strict Hobbesian
line or even Berlin’s moderate view. We can in fact imagine a situation in which one
interferes with my wishes, and in which this interference only promotes my interest
and freedom in the future. This situation requires that the reasons the agent has to
interfere are non-arbitrary.
“Domination can occur without interference, because it requires only that
someone have the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in your affairs; no one need
actually interfere. Interference can occur without domination, because
interference need not involve the exercise of a capacity for arbitrary interference,
only the exercise of a much more constrained ability.”201
Freedom as non-interference’s advocates could probably agree with the idea that
there can be interference without domination; the difference being that they would
argue that this scenario necessarily implies a loss of freedom. This claim simply
depends on the value one attributes to domination with regard to freedom. If the focus
is avoiding interference, that you’re faced with it without being dominated won’t
matter: you’re still in a position of non-freedom. Pettit, therefore, has to prove that
mere interference is not only insufficient to establish non-freedom, but also that it is
not necessary. Similarly, he needs to show that not only domination is a sufficient
condition for a loss of freedom but that it is also a necessary one. What makes
domination a stronger impediment to freedom than mere interference? What gives
weight to the claim that you remain free if there is interference but no domination?
Pettit answers these questions with the help of the non-arbitrariness condition. The
difference between an interference that inhibits freedom – an instance of domination,
and one that does not, has to do with its arbitrary nature. This is what truly
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distinguishes restrictions that do not count as freedom impediments from those that
do.
“Being unfree does not consist in being restrained; on the contrary, the
restraint of a fair system of law – a non-arbitrary regime – does not make you
unfree. Being unfree consists rather in being subject to arbitrary sways: being
subject to the potentially capricious will or the potentially idiosyncratic judgement
of another.”202
But what then counts as arbitrary for Pettit? Typically, “arbitrary” refers to the will
of an individual based on a personal interest, rather than for example, a neutral system
of law. For an interference to be non-arbitrary, it usually needs to be based on
something that is independent from the desires of the agent who performs the
interfering action. This is probably what Pettit describes as capricious will or
idiosyncratic judgement. Furthermore, Pettit defines arbitrary as any choice that is
made by the dominating agent on the basis of her own will, when this will goes against
the will of the dominated subjects: he says, using the example of the slave/master
relationship, that “the dominating party can interfere on an arbitrary basis with the
choices of the dominated: can interfere, in particular, on the basis of an interest or an
opinion that need not be shared by the person affected” 203 . Not only the pursued
interests need to be shared by both parties, but the interests of the person affected also
need to be identified and tracked, prior to the action.
“When we say that an act of interference is perpetrated on an arbitrary basis,
then, we imply that like any arbitrary act it is chosen or not chosen at the agent’s
pleasure. And in particular, since interference with others is involved, we imply
that it is chosen or rejected without reference to the interests, or the opinions, of
those affected. The choice is not forced to track what the interests of those others
require according to their own judgements.”204
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This explains how some acts of interference, which do not count as domination,
can be freedom-preserving. Parents, for example, interfere with their children’s wishes
all the time: in an ideal situation and assuming they do so on the basis of genuine care,
their will is not arbitrary because their motivation for interfering is the well-being of
the subjects who are interfered with. Here, it’s not only that the interferer and the
interferee share the same interests, but rather than the interferee’s interests are being
placed above anything else: it is being prioritized205.
3. A Third Type of Liberty
Another feature of neo-republican freedom is that it is generally conceived as a
third type of liberty, a type that goes beyond the negative positive dichotomy. The goal
is then to provide an alternative to the Berlinian view on liberty, to provide a definition
that is satisfying with respect to the limitations of both negative freedom as noninterference, and positive freedom as collective self-government. Pettit claims that this
feature should make freedom as non-domination more attractive to both republicans
and what he calls populists, or advocates of a more specifically democratic definition
of freedom, closer to a positive view.
“The republican conception of liberty should appeal to liberals, in so far as it
focuses on people’s individual power of choice and thus has much in common with
the negative notion of freedom as non-interference. And it should appeal to
populists in so far as it requires, as I argue, that non-dominating government has
to track the interests and ideas of ordinary people; this is the idea that lies behind
the positive, populist notion of freedom as democratic self-mastery.”206
He argues that non-domination, understood as a third concept, fills up the space
left unoccupied between positive and negative freedom. Freedom as non-domination
seems to embody positive and negative aspects of freedom at the same time, but Pettit
also says that it cannot fit on any side207. Skinner’s argument is slightly different. He
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also defends republican freedom as a third concept of liberty, but does so while at the
same time agreeing, with Berlin, that there are two concepts of liberty, one positive
and one negative. The distinction is that negative freedom need not be, like Berlin
believes, referred to as the absence of interference only.
“A better way of summarising my position would be to say that, while I agree
with Berlin that there are two concepts of liberty, one positive and the other
negative, I do not agree with his further assumption that, whenever we speak about
negative liberty, we must be speaking about absence of interference.”208
According to Skinner, there are in fact two opposite views of negative freedom,
but one has been dominating the other for centuries. This means that freedom as nondomination, for Skinner, is an alternative way of understanding negative freedom, it is
a second type of negative liberty, and not exactly a third type.
Neo-republicans’ attempt to provide answers to the questions left open by freedom
as non-interference is a praiseworthy endeavour. These responses come in the form of
an alternative way of understanding what freedom implies and what it does not; but
also, to reconstruct the traditional dichotomy. Interestingly, their definition is at the
same time more demanding and more flexible than freedom as non-interference. It is
more demanding because domination involves not only actual but also potential acts
of inappropriate interference. But it is more flexible in some ways, because it does not
equate mere interference with loss of freedom, and leaves room for the possibility of
fair laws and restrictions209. Pettit manages to find this balance by introducing the
concept of arbitrariness as a criterion to evaluate the nature of the power that affects
an agent. Furthermore, he has the merit of establishing the idea that freedom or nonfreedom has something to do with one’s interests and benefits, and not merely about
one’s desires, which is a crucial nuance.
Finally, freedom as non-domination allows us to look past the traditional
dichotomy between positive and negative freedom, whether it is because it provides
another way of thinking of negative freedom, or because it carries aspects of each
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notion – or simply none of them. The republican re-discovery of freedom as nondomination is of great importance, as it provides a substantial alternative to a
conception of freedom that had since then not been majorly challenged. I will now list
what these advantages are in more details, and focus on how they related to autonomy
in a satisfying manner than its rival non-interference. The question that we must now
address, is whether Pettit and neo-republicans are successful: have they effectively
built a bridge between the two notions, and is this supplementation satisfying for our
republican purposes?

II.

A Promising Definition:

We have seen in chapter one that liberalism fails to adequately describe autonomy
on various accounts, but also that its non-interference-based view is limiting; if we
reject the liberal definition of freedom, we should also question the validity of their
claims about autonomy.
In this section, I argue that first, Pettit’s attempt to create an alternative view was
successful in that it forces us to think of freedom in more substantial terms, and in
consequence, it avoids some of the problems posed by the procedural nature of
liberalism. Second, I argue that as a result, it opens the door to the possibility of a
satisfying definition of liberty as self-government, or autonomy – although as I will
subsequently explain, neo-republicans are not concerned with this idea.
What makes freedom as non-domination a better alternative? Part of the answer
has to do with its demanding nature: freedom as non-domination discriminates
freedom-limiting instances from others on a broader scale – including instances when
arbitrary interference is not only actual but possible. In consequence, more cases are
included in the list of freedom-threatening situations, and more aspects are considered.
It also places an important emphasis on one’s internal disposition – focusing also on
the risk of manipulation, adaptation, anxiety, etc. Because freedom as non-interference
is only concerned with external obstacles to our freedom, it is blind to the
psychologically complex processes that may go on in a person and limit her capacity
for action. I will argue that all these elements allow us to construe freedom as nondomination as a more positive sort of freedom; at least, it shows a capacity for
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harbouring more positive concepts. Freedom as non-domination also does not lead to
the paradox presented in the first chapter: it does not rely on the respect for autonomy,
nor is it built on the rejection of substantial claims the way liberalism is. Therefore, it
avoids the inconsistencies that this position entails. I start by arguing that freedom as
non-domination intrinsically carries more substantive terms, and that this is the source
of its robustness and possible sustainability. This substantiveness allows republicans
to avoid ethical minimalism, as well as a necessary commitment to state neutrality,
and the problems that it entails. I then attempt to show that the supplementation of
freedom as non-interference by freedom as non-domination has positive moral,
personal and political consequences.
1. Substantiveness of Freedom as Non-Domination
In this section, I argue that Pettit’s definition is successful in that it helps
thinking of freedom in more substantive terms. It therefore comes as a good way to
respond to the limitations of negative freedom as defined by Berlin. Because freedom
as non-domination does not rely on the absence of moral claims, nor does it require
complete state neutrality, it is potentially less reticent to positive reinforcements of
freedom, and the promotion of self-mastery – it also avoids the liberal paradox on
neutrality. First, I will show that Pettit’s definition adequately addresses some of the
limitations of Berlin’s negative liberty by supplementing it with liberty against
structural domination. Then, I will argue that as a result, freedom as non-domination
is much less vulnerable to the problem of neutrality, and ethical minimalism.
Petttit reminds us that Berlin defines freedom as the opportunity to choose
between certain options – irrespective of your preferences – but his definition does not
require the capacity to do so210. Similarly, he says, Rawls distinguishes between liberty
strictly speaking and what it requires if it is to be valuable 211 . Pettit’s attempt,
therefore, is to establish a connection between these two elements, to reconcile
opportunity freedom and exercise freedom. The strength of freedom as nondomination is that it identifies that Berlin’s non-interference view is vulnerable to the
objection that freedom-hindering may take many forms.
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“If interference is to restrict your choice between X, Y and Z, then it
has to affect your use of the otherwise accessible objective or cognitive
resources in virtue of which we say that you have the unvitiated capacity to do
X or Y or Z.”212
Pettit says that such restriction of choice can come in three ways: “by removing
options, by replacing options or by misrepresenting options” 213 . Berlin’s negative
view is therefore inadequate, for it leaves the door open to these types of interference.
Negative freedom so defined is also of little value without the exercise concept – as
Berlin himself admits214. The republican definition is praiseworthy in that it does not
distinguish between the features of freedom strictly speaking, and the conditions of its
use.
The consequence of this, I argue, are that more attention is paid on the
conditions one need to meet to exercise freedom: it follows that neutrality, and in
particular state neutrality, is not as important for republicans as it is for liberals. The
requirement of non-arbitrariness is an indication of this. For a group or individual to
have non-arbitrary power over another group, it needs to track the benefits and
interests of said group. In consequence, in order to establish that an interference is nondominating, a substantial approach is needed regarding people’s interests and benefits.
This includes some specific moral claims regarding what people need, and potentially
about what they don’t need, which seems incompatible with a strict form of state
neutrality.
Non-domination also includes the possibility of compensations and state
protection. As Pettit explains, being free to choose between options requires first that
“we would have to resource or facilitate the choice in the sense of ensuring that any
of the resources you happen to lack are made available to you”, but also that “we
would have to protect you in the exercise of that choice (…), we would have to guard
against your being subject to the will of another in how you exercise it”215. When state
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neutrality implies protection of the individuals from the possible interference of the
state, protection in the republican sense means that the state is responsible for
protecting citizens from any dominating force, whatever the source of this force is.
Pettit goes even further and argues that failure to provide compensation for a lack of
resources can be as harmful to freedom as a direct obstruction: “In some circumstances
omission or failure of the kind envisaged may be as morally, politically or even legally
culpable as invasion”216.
However, republicans can at times be ambiguous regarding state neutrality and
the importance to respect value pluralism. Imposing a specific view of human good to
citizens would be an act of domination from the government. Freedom as nondomination is precisely meant to protect individuals from such invasion. Neorepublicans are also deeply attached to the value of diversity, that non-domination
should not only protect but also promote. Assuming that autonomy and diversity are
two valuable goods, we are faced with the necessity to satisfy them both. This includes
the possibility to satisfy individuals who for cultural reasons, may not place autonomy
as a valuable good217. Pettit is clear that the state needs to play a significant role in the
establishment of non-domination: “I cannot escape domination without the presence
of protective institutions that testify to my non-domination”218.
“The political pursuit of freedom as non-domination should be
attractive, not just for small homogeneous polities but also in the modern,
pluralistic state. The natural way to cast freedom as non-domination is in the
role of a value that the state should try to promote, not in the role of a constraint
it has to honour.”219
Does it mean that neo-republicans argue for minimal state neutrality? The
answer to this question lies in the way one describes one’s own republican views in
the first place – for example whether one identifies as a neo-Roman or a neo-Athenian.
Neo-Romans like Pettit would probably include a dose of necessary state neutrality
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regarding the values people in a republican state choose to pursue, as long as
domination is avoided, whereas neo-Athenians like Sandel may have a more
substantial reading of values, and will highlight the perceived dangers of liberal
societies’ value-neutrality. They may argue that some values are intrinsically
incompatible with freedom as non-domination, especially if we understand it as not
only a structural concept but also a concept that entails various obligations. If being
free in the republican sense for example, is to participate in shared self-government,
then the content of our actions matters insofar as they permit this participation.
Governments, in this case, by promoting this kind of freedom, necessarily lead citizens
towards a course of action rather than another. Sandel links freedom to virtue, which
requires the formation of citizen’s characters, and seems deeply at odds with state
neutrality: “If liberty cannot survive without virtue, and if virtue tends always to
corruption, then the challenge for republican politics is to form or reform the moral
character of citizens, to strengthen their attachment to the common good”220.
I have also argued that one of the inabilities for liberalism to define autonomy
sustainably is due to the inherent ethical minimalism of the theory, illustrated by the
Rawlsian original position. More generally, the liberal emphasis on justice shows a
preference for an ethically minimalist conception of autonomy, which is coherent with
freedom as non-interference. The two seem to go hand in hand, as Wenner says, “in
contemporary discussions, respect for autonomy is often couched in terms of freedom
as non-interference: we are free to the extent that no one interferes with our pursuit of
our preferences and desires”221. But as we have seen, autonomy may be impaired by
much more than interference, or may not be impaired by interference at all. In fact, the
ways to know whether or not the autonomy of a person is intact is to have a substantial
idea of what the content of her desires are, and if they are coherent with her conception
of the good. But with such a minimalist conception, it is hard to know how this
knowledge can be obtained. I argue that the republican view succeeds in that it does
not make this task impossible.
Because freedom as non-domination is a more substantive concept, it allows
for a more substantive approach: republicans are generally less reticent to base their
220
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theories on some specific moral claims about people, and about the role government
should play. At the very least, institutions should aim the promotion of freedom as
non-domination, which implies not only the absence of interference of arbitrary power,
but also that citizens are capable of satisfying their own will222. For republicans like
Sandel, the problem with liberal minimalism is that it cannot answer the question of
what motivates our desires to cooperate with each other, or why the desire for social
cooperation is stronger than any substantive view on the good.
“The minimalist case for liberalism depends on the plausibility of separating
politics from philosophy, of bracketing moral and religious questions where politics
is concerned. But this raises the question why the practical interest in securing social
cooperation and mutual respect is always so compelling as to defeat any competing
moral interest that could arise from within a substantive moral or religious view.”223
According to him, the neutralization of the political debate takes away the
resources we need for self-government, and therefore, is incompatible with autonomy.
He also raises the question of what should motivate such position. The liberal focus
on structuralism rather than self-government may be an obstacle to freedom. For him,
to view citizens only as “objects of treatment, however fair, rather than as agents of
self-rule is to concede from the start a certain disempowerment, or loss of agency”224.
The idea is that to adopt ethical neutralism is to ignore the importance of people to
realize their political identity, from which liberty can emerge. Following a more
traditional version of republicanism, Sandel also mentions civic virtue as an essential
component of freedom as self-government. The question he raises is then whether civic
virtue and political participation are intrinsic to freedom, or if they are tools to get to
freedom. As he says, the answer to this question depends on the level of strength one
wants to give to the link between freedom and self-government. Sandel seems to
embrace a more Aristotelian conception, according to which, people conceived as
political beings can only realize their own liberty as long as they are part of the political
sphere, assuming the society in which they do so is itself free.
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Sandel addresses the problem of ethical minimalism as well as state neutralism
and argues that they lead to an impasse: a political system that is only concerned with
procedural justice and disregards the importance of people’s identity is inconsistent
with self-agency. Republicans, in order to avoid such risks, may endorse a definition
of freedom that is not only concerned with what people are prevented from doing, but
also what they can do; non-domination seems able to fit on both sides.
The republican view on state neutrality varies in degrees, but that generally,
the theory does not seem to rely on minimalism to sustain. As long as institutions
follow the ideal of non-domination, state involvement or commitment to values are
permissible. Irrespective to the degree of interference we are willing to permit, the
definition opens the door to such possibility. It also comes as a valuable way to answer
the questions left unanswered by Berlin’s non-interference view.
2. Moral, Personal and Political Consequences of the Supplementation
This supplementation requires not only that we change the way we think of
freedom but that we also modify our view of agents accordingly. I have previously
argued that the liberal definition of persons is also problematically indicative of a lack
of commitment, and that it is not robust enough to justify the theory itself. Liberals
have been accused to provide a minimalist description of the self that does not take
into account the various relational links that determine our preferences and the process
with which we choose225.
I will argue here that the result of supplementing the Berlinian negative view with
freedom as non-domination, allows us to be more inclined towards the psychological
impacts of non-freedom. Because it implies the identification of interests, we are able
to avoid the above accusations. Consequently, committing to this definition requires
that we evaluate the quality of people’s choices, in terms of their compatibility with
autonomy. Because the non-arbitrary condition of non-domination requires the
identification and pursuit of people’s interests, it requires that agents are capable of
such identification. This requires in itself that internal processes also meet the
appropriate conditions, and implies that freedom is not a matter of external obstacles
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only. Following Sandel’s objection that the liberal self is prior to its ends, in contrast,
non-domination implies that the ends of a person be identified as a condition of her
freedom. Generally, non-domination is more concerned with psychological aspects of
freedom or unfreedom than non-interference. Hence, the consideration placed on
situations that could generate fear, anxiety, self-doubt, inability to stand for one-self
in the face of oppression, etc. Neo-republicans are also attentive to situations of
manipulation or adaptability, which could make the agent wrongly believe she has
obtained a degree of freedom. All these aspects show us that psychological
mechanisms matter in the republican quest for freedom, when the liberal definition is
limited to external elements. Even if republicanism isn’t a theory of identity, its
definition of freedom requires that aspects of our identify are unveiled, to the extent
that they allow interests-identification and tracking. This uncovering is the first
required step to autonomous behaviour.
Danielle Wenner argues that non-domination helps solving the puzzle between
liberalism and various theories of relation autonomy – which I will describe in a
following chapter226. She argues that, the republican definition of people is historically
more interrelational than the liberal definition. Freedom as non-domination need not
rely on an independent rational self to be sustainable, the way freedom as noninterference seems to. But it can also help us discriminate between our preferences: as
Wenner says, “promoting freedom as non-domination does not require us to
distinguish between those preferences that are problematic and those that are not, but
rather to intervene on the conditions of oppression that are likely to lead to such
worrisome preferences in the first place”.
Because freedom as non-domination requires the tracking of people’s interests,
it also requires acknowledgement of the various relational links from which these
interests have emerged. It need not commit, as liberalism do, to an independent picture
of the self, but leaves room for the social embeddedness of people and the way it
informs their autonomy. But it also does not need to evaluate the content of people’s
choices from a perfectionist perspective, it simply is concerned with the structural
system of domination under which these choices have been made.
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Freedom as non-domination does not only open the door to a more positive
view in the moral and psychological domain, but also in the political one. The
definition concerns agents at the individual level but also the community they live in
and of which they are essential components. Here I will briefly argue that although
this is not what Pettit has claimed to endorse, the definition opens the door to a more
positive view that makes the idea of collective self-government possible. This
definition goes beyond the mere psychological and moral claims about what makes an
agent free; it pays attention to the socio-political conditions that are required at the
same time. Pettit’s theory is valuable in that he has tried to establish a link between an
atomistic view of freedom – with the individual at its centre – and one that sees civic
virtue or public participation as means to reach and maintain freedom. His theory is
successful in that it creates a path in that direction; although as I will argue in the next
section, the path hasn’t gone far enough.
Neo-republicans have been successful in that first, while not rejecting negative
liberty, they have pointed out that a narrow commitment to its strict application leads
to a political impasse. As Alan Patten reminds us, for liberals; “there is no special
connection between negative liberty and public service”, in consequence, there is no
necessity to preserve one’s freedom to add the requirements of public participation and
civic virtue227 . Republicans, he continues, “are often read as recommending other
important ideals as well, such as civic friendship, shared understandings, selfgovernment and participation with others in the political affairs of one’s
community”228. For Patten, republicans see these goods as instrumental, meaning that
they need not be valued in themselves but because they are the necessary conditions
to the preservation of a free society, which is also a necessary condition to individual
freedom229. Their definition is successful in bringing the two concepts together in a
relation of cause and consequence: it is because of the exercise of public power that
negative liberty is realized and maintained. Although it could be argued that the
instrumental view of these goods also has its limits, and that we should instead favour
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a conception of republican values as intrinsic goods, this view has the advantage of
bringing them on the table as they serve a significant purpose.
Pettit is successful in his endeavour to supplement the Berlinian negative view
with freedom as non-domination, because it introduces the idea that legislative
activities can go from being an obstacle to freedom, to one of its necessary conditions.
Freedom is now accessible through the participation to public services, the making of
laws, and the elaboration of public power. Social institutions must therefore be the
reflection of the common public power that has been exercised in through a citizenbased rule of law. Christian List defends the idea that republican freedom has a “builtin-law” requirement meant to protect its robustness, which, he argues, republicans tend
to prioritize over scope230. He also argues that this is what characterize the distinction
between liberal and republican freedom.
“I argue that liberal freedom, at least as characterized by Pettit,
captures the freedom an agent contingently enjoys in the actual world, whereas
republican freedom captures the freedom an agent robustly enjoys by law, i.e.
across a range of legally permissible and socially possible worlds.”231
“For an agent to enjoy robust freedom by law, a rule-of-law
requirement must be met.”232
These claims highlight the relation between republican freedom and the rule of
law, from which its obtainability and robustness derive. That republicans are
concerned with robustness means that they are concerned with maximal expansion of
the range of worlds where ideal freedom would occur. The conditions of this expansion
are political and social in nature; republicans are committed to the elaboration of social
rules that prevent situation of structural and systemic unfreedom. Citizens obtain their
own freedom by publicly participating in this process.
List argues, however, that this commitment to robustness expressed by the ruleof-law requirement leads to a paradox: the fact that republicans may have to face a
trade-off between robustness and scope, where the latter may need to be sacrificed in
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order for the former to be ideally obtained. List uses the example of two systems of
welfare; one is based on redistributive taxation, the other on minimal state intervention
and private acts of charity among citizens. What he explains is that the scope of the
second is potentially broader: people may in fact be more free to decide what kind of
charitable behaviour they want to adopt. But the first system is more robust, as it
guarantees maximal redistribution by law. List concludes that the second system
provides a larger set of rights, but the second provide robust – as law-dependent –
capability to exercise whatever rights are granted.
To conclude, freedom as non-domination presents the advantage of being more
demanding than its rival, both with respect to individual conditions for freedom and
political ones. We know that republican freedom requires the tracking of interests, for
its condition of non-arbitrariness to be met. Not only is this true for the individual, but
also for society at large. Interests must be identified, expressed, and heard by the
people in possession of power, such that the probability of arbitrary use of power is
reduced. Ideally, the rule of law serves this purpose as the tool through which the
interests of citizens are formulated and institutionalized.
Pettit’s attempt to build a bridge between two apparently opposed concepts of
liberty is successful in that it does give to his definition a more positive aspect, which
is promising for our purpose with respect to autonomy and self-government, both for
the individual and in the political sphere. However, as I will show in the next section,
Pettit’s definition doesn’t go far enough regarding these precise issues. It also carries
a few difficulties that must now be addressed.

III.

Limits of the Theory

Although the introduction of freedom as non-domination is a significant step in
our understanding of freedom, the concept also shows a level of incompleteness. My
goal is not to reject the neo-republican project, but to define it with better precision.
To use the traditional example, the slave is unfree, not only because the benevolent
master has the possibility to interfere, by also because his status as a slave does not
allow him the possibility of forms of expression that are required to exercise his
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freedom. Should the slave be freed tomorrow, he would cease to suffer the actual or
potential interference of his master, therefore he would technically cease to be
dominated. But he may not be capable of acting in a way that makes him the master of
himself, and this way may require time and a form of education; in other words, it is
far from evident that the technical liberation from domination makes him free. But the
newly freed slave must also, to be free in a republican sense, live in a society where
he has the possibility to exercise public power through the making of law – which
guarantees non-domination. Without the requirements presented above, the possibility
that he will be able to participate in an informed manner seems small. It seems that in
order to be a sustainable political ideal, republicanism must account for these aspects.
This is only possible if we endorse a more positive account. In this section, I present
my objections to freedom as non-domination as currently described. I argue that
because of the current definition, a large number of intuitively freedom-limiting
experiences stay under the republican radar.
1. Robust Non-Arbitrariness and Structural Systemic Domination
The non-arbitrariness condition is crucial to discriminate between interferences
that count as freedom-limiting and those that don’t. Arbitrariness may be defined
substantially or procedurally. In this section, I will present my concerns about both
views, and show that Pettit’s definition does not seem to provide a way to discriminate
that is robust enough. The vagueness of what counts as arbitrary creates a situation
where we are forced to accept problematic actions as freedom-allowing, because they
meet the conditions Pettit has given. In other words, just an action may be nonarbitrary, it does not follow that it cannot be freedom-threatening – or that it will be
freedom-enhancing. This broadness weakens the robustness that republicans seem to
be looking for. I argue that a better way to answer this question is to adopt a substantive
view, shaped around respect for the autonomy of the persons involved.
According to Pettit, an interference is not arbitrary, when it “is controlled by the
interests and opinions of those affected, being required to serve those interests in a
way that conforms with those opinions”233. Arbitrariness, in contrast, is the quality of
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an action that is based on the actor’s will only, and disregards the interests of those
who are impacted by said action. There are two ways to define arbitrariness: We can
say that a power is arbitrary in virtue of the lack of procedural rules constraining that
power, which is Lovett’s procedural view, but we can also say that a power is arbitrary
because it does not track the interests of the group subjected to that power – which is
Pettit’s substantive view234. The first problem of the substantive view is that it depends
on a conception of human good: for a power to be non-arbitrary, it needs to track the
interests of the subject, according to what is objectively good for her, which can lead
to perfectionism. Lovett argues that for republicanism to be attractive, it needs to reject
any specific moral claim, and be inclusive of various conceptions of human good235.
For the substantive view of arbitrariness to function, interests need to be normatively
justifiable, but according to Lovett, this is a step that republicans should avoid taking.
One way to go around this problem is to adopt a deliberative view on substantive
arbitrariness:
“On the deliberative account of substantive arbitrariness, we are supposed to
understand the ideas and interests of a person or group subject to social power to
mean their ideas about their interests as expressed through an appropriate
deliberative process”.
For a power to be non-arbitrary, it must track the interests of a person or group
expressed after a properly performed deliberation. This view has the benefit of
highlighting the compatibility of non-domination and democracy, conceived as the
most suitable way to deliberate about interests. But Lovett also says that “it runs the
risk of folding the republican conception of freedom from domination into a positive
or participatory conception of political liberty”. Another problem is the difficulty, in
some cases, for members of dominated groups to deliberate adequately: they may
disagree on their interests, or agree, but according non-suitable conditions: misleading
information, lack of knowledge, or any other impediment to deliberation. Lovett
argues that the best option is then to turn to a procedural account of arbitrariness. On
that account, arbitrariness is reduced “whenever we introduce effective and reliable
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constraints on the exercise of social power”. But these constraints need not force the
interfering group to track the benefits and interests of the subordinate group. Lovett
argues that this view has the advantage of allowing people to make plans: because they
are aware of the constraints that bind the power they may be subjected to, they know
where they stand, and can make choices accordingly. It also allows for a higher degree
of value pluralism, since a specific conception of the good does not matter in this case.
Lovett admits that this view raises the problem of fairness: just because arbitrariness
is procedurally avoided, and so is domination, doesn’t make the situation fair. He bites
the bullet and agrees that this view may lead to unequal or unjust policies, but rejects
the idea that the power would be arbitrary, and is clearly mentions that “not everything
that is unfair must also constitute domination”236. Lovett may be right to say that nondomination does not necessarily equate fairness, but his view is problematically
unambitious. The purpose of avoiding domination should in fact to reach a place of
fairness. If arbitrariness is only defined procedurally, we run the risk of having
people’s interests and desires frustrated; the frustration may be exacerbated if we are
able to legitimate it on the basis that the legislation in question is not arbitrary. In other
words, the legitimacy of institutions cannot be defended on the basis of their
procedural non-arbitrariness only: they must also respond to a public demand for
fairness. It is an error to think that the structure of legislations is all that matters in the
evaluation of social rules: their content must also be evaluated based on the normative
conditions of what the needs of the subjects are. I believe that these reasons are enough
for us to safely say that Lovett’s strict procedural view should be ruled out.
However, Pettit’s substantive view, though preferable, also requires clarification;
it raises other concerns than the ones expressed by Lovett. My first worry about the
interest-tracking requirement, is that a dominated subject can develop a distorted
vision of her own interests, and believe that the acts of domination she is the victim of
are in fact consistent with her wishes. For example, a person’s autonomy may be
impaired by factors that have nothing to do with external factors such as arbitrary
interference. For a variety of reasons, this person can interpret an arbitrary interference
as an act that aims at the development of her own good. She may even look for this
kind of interference, mistaking it for some genuine act of care. Others may choose to
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place themselves under such domination, knowing that in doing so they impair their
own freedom, but being convinced that such impediment is in fact in their interest. We
can think of someone who willingly chooses to submit to an authoritative religious
figure for reasons that have nothing to do with external pressure to do so, only with an
internal conviction that this is in one’s best interest. If we base our judgement on
Pettit’s definition, it would be debatable whether the actions of the religious figure are
acts of domination or not.
The second concern I have is that a dominating agent may have the dominated
subject’s best interests at heart, but be mistaken. In other words, there can be a gap
between best intentions and actual interests. This gap does not necessarily create
domination, and it does not make the action necessarily arbitrary. The condition that
interferers never make any error of judgement regarding the interferee’s interests
would be too demanding. But it permits some interferences to count as compatible
with freedom, when this compatibility seems intuitively difficult to accept.
For example, parents who truly believe vaccines cause harm, and refuse to
vaccinate their children, interfere with their children’s lives in a way that could go
against their well-being. But they do so on the belief that the interference goes in the
direction of their children’s interests; belief that may even be shared by the children in
the future. They don’t seem to act on the basis of their own interest or pleasure – they
may even accept to face difficult consequences for their choices – but on the conviction
that they are acting for their children’s good. The problem here is that this situation
does not seem to be arbitrary, but it does not seem to go towards more freedom for the
children either, or to promote their good. We are then left with the obligation to accept
this situation as compatible with freedom as non-domination – because it does meet
the interest-tracking requirement, however correct this tracking is. But the children
may nonetheless be negatively impacted and their freedom as well – they may catch a
disease, give it to others, their opportunities to go to a certain school, to obtain a visa
to travel may be reduced, etc. This example is meant to show that the fact that an action
is non-arbitrary according to our given definition, does not make it an action that goes
in the direction of freedom. It highlights that the condition of non-arbitrariness is nonsufficient. Unfortunately, given the importance of this condition for non-domination,
this vagueness threatens the robustness of republican freedom.
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We seem to be in a bind: we must find a condition that allows for a robust way to
discriminate between freedom-limiting and permissible interferences. But we also
must not be too strict regarding the fact that the interferer’s best intentions must always
coincide with the interferee’s best interest, for it would be unrealistically demanding.
We could consider a few solutions; for example, the genuineness of the intention
may need to be evaluated – to check whether it truly is focused on the interferee’s
good. But we would then run into problems of intrusiveness, perfectionism, or it may
simply be impossible to know. But also, how genuine an intention is, does not make
up for the result of that intention, if harm has been caused. For example, children who
were not vaccinated may not care whether their parents had genuine good intentions,
if they end up catching a life-threatening disease for which there was a vaccine. Some
may say that we could adopt a consequentialist approach, where what matters would
be whether the result of the interference did produce more freedom for the interferee.
But it means that we have no early way to discriminate before the interference occurs
and produces results, and in many cases the damage would already be done. I believe
that a good way to avoid this problem is to stop focusing only on the subject’s interests,
but also to consider whether her autonomy is being promoted in the long run.
Finally, I have concerns regarding this definition’s ability to successfully account
for structural and systemic unfreedom. This is due to Pettit’s idea that arbitrariness and
therefore domination does not apply to non-intentional limitations on freedom. For an
action to be arbitrary, it needs to be performed by a willing agent who is able to form
a conscious desire to interfere237. But Pettit seems blind to the fact that people may
face numerous limitations, independently of the interference of an intentional will, and
that these factors may impact their freedom as much as the kind of domination he
describes. He may believe these situations open the door to domination, while not
being dominating themselves. I however believe that there is room to argue that in the
case of non-intentional limitations of a systemic nature, unfreedom is not only likely
to happen but it is already happening.
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For example, if I happen to live in a “food desert” in a rural region of the United
States238, with no access to a car or public transportation, my access to fresh nutritious
food will be limited – my options may be reduced to highly processed but accessible
and affordable foods. I may consider that my circumstances, although they are not the
result of an intention to dominate me, deprive me of the freedom to access basic goods
or be in optimal health, with all the limiting consequences that it may imply in future
– diabetes, heart disease, obesity, and so on. We may be hesitant to identify this as a
situation of domination; however, it seems reasonable to argue that it is an instance of
freedom limitation. We are then faced with two possibilities: first, if freedom is nondomination only, and if this situation is not a case of domination, then it is not a case
of freedom-limitation. But this idea seems counter-intuitive. Second, we could
renounce to the claim that freedom is non-domination only, and admit that we can be
unfree in other ways. But this goes against the republican claim that freedom is the
absence of domination, period.
Pettit might say that although these cases are not cases of domination, they may
easily lead to domination. They create vulnerability, and so they place individuals or
groups in a risky situation, where they may not be able to resist domination should it
arise. I however believe that this is not seeing far enough. In consequence, because we
do not see these cases as directly freedom-limiting, but only as creating vulnerability
to unfreedom, we can’t successfully attend to them. I believe we need to see these
instances for what they are: instances of unfreedom – I explain in further details the
implications of this claim in the next chapter. Cases of systemic oppression for
example, are left outside of the spectrum. Pettit’s mention of intentionality as a
condition for domination is understandable, for example, when we try to distinguish
actual acts of oppression from accidents. But it seems to omit that many ways of losing
freedom don’t involve the interference of an agent at all. The absence of republican
consideration for this matter is an oddity that I believe needs rectification. Here,
Pettit’s supplementation is unsuccessful as it remains too narrow.
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I think the best way to go around this idea is to admit that domination is larger than
Pettit has described, and that it should include some forms non-intentional systemic
interferences, alongside a more precisely defined definition of arbitrariness – one that
includes the promotion of subject’s autonomy and is not merely based on interesttracking.
The arbitrariness condition should therefore remain substantive – as the procedural
approach is too unambitious and unsatisfying – to ensure that interests are properly
identified and met. I believe it should also remain somewhat weak, meaning that the
interests expressed by the agents should not be evaluated on a strong normative basis,
and we should in most cases assume that agents are competent enough to make such
evaluation themselves. I do not mean that the condition of arbitrariness should in itself
be weak, as we should always look to avoid it as much as possible. What I mean here,
is that it is not necessary that our evaluation of one’s interests relies on a strong
perfectionist conception of those interests. The weakness I say we should preserve is
meant to protect agents from being the subject of moral conceptions that would be
imposed upon them. By this condition, I look to avoid situations where agents are
being denied the possibility to call out arbitrary interferences, on the basis that these
interferences work in favour of an objective good, irrespective of their own feeling of
mistreatment. Furthermore, if the condition of non-arbitrariness is shaped around
respect for their autonomy, we avoid much of the risk of moral perfectionism feared
by so many: in this case, actions and situations that impair or diminish the autonomy
of the agents in any way may qualify as arbitrary, dominating and freedom limiting,
whether the situation was caused by an intention or not. But I will go over this idea in
fuller details in the next chapter.
2. Paradox of Power
I will quickly address a concern expressed by Thomas W. Simpson, who notices
an interesting paradox that seems intrinsic to freedom as non-domination, and that has
to do with the capacity to resist arbitrary power 239 . His observation leads him to
conclude that freedom as non-domination is purely impossible. I will briefly present
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his argument, and why I think we should be concerned by this paradox. But I will also
try to moderate the concern by arguing that resistance may not be the one and only
way to avoid domination, but also that power to resist does not equate power to
dominate. However, the power to resist or assist another in resistance is a matter that
republicans should keep an eye on.
His argument goes as such: “For the people to be able to be free from domination
by the government, they must have the power to resist it. But if they have this power,
they must have the power to dominate any individual”240. At first glance, this looks
like it could be a major concern, and from the definition of non-domination we have
been given, the worry seems legitimate. Indeed, non-domination is also the absence
the possibility to dominate. If one has the power to do so, but chooses not to, this still
counts as domination. We can also imagine, for example, other parties interfering and
rescuing a person from domination, by using their power against the dominating party.
This means they have the power to do so, and could in future turn this power against
the person rescued. At least, this is a possibility. But the simple fact that it is, is enough
to be in a situation of domination241. Simpson assumes from these observations that
freedom as non-domination is impossible: its very definition leads to a paradox.
However, there are a few ways to get out of this situation. Simpson imagines some
of the responses Pettit could give, one of them being the rejection of the argument’s
premises. We could simply deny that non-domination is avoided by the power to resist
it, and affirm that it is the responsibility of the dominating part to avoid it, but that the
dominated part has neither obligation nor resources to do so. We could also say that it
is the responsibility of the state and institutions to guarantee that people have enough
resources to resist domination without the use of power. Finally, Pettit would probably
respond that non-domination will simply be avoided before one has the opportunity to
dominate, at the condition that the structure of society be based upon this concept. This
leads to the idea that resistance to domination may not be the only nor the most
efficient way to avoid domination. We should probably prioritize a system that does
not allow domination to arise in the first place: this guarantees that people don’t suffer
it, should they be in a position of weakness. But the most efficient way to avoid
domination is probably not for the dominated subject to have the power resist it, but
240
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for the potentially dominating agent to refuse to use arbitrary force. One could argue
that once an agent has this possibility, it is already too late, and to have the power to
resist it would only be like treating a broken arm with a plaster.
Another way to solve this problem would be agree with the premise of the
argument, but to reject the idea that because one has the power to resist domination,
one has the power to dominate. These two may simply not be the same kind of power;
mostly because one is coercive and the other need not be. More often than not, such
ways of resisting dominations have a legal basis: the subject who resists often does so
when and because the law is on her side – which brings us back to the necessity of
having such domination-avoiding laws. Let us take the example of an employee who
is at the mercy of a tyrannical boss who dominates her by making her work longer
hours without appropriate pay, and regularly threatens to dismiss her, should she
complain. For her to decide to inform the authorities of the situation, or to simply quit
her job, would be an act of resistance to domination. However, it does not
automatically make the employee capable of coercing other employees, or of putting
on her boss the same pressure that was put on herself. She may still lack the capacity
to dominate, simply because domination requires the use of arbitrary force, which is
different from simply resisting such force.
Nonetheless, the value of this critique is that is highlights the incompleteness of
the current definition of freedom, but it also shows that endorsing a more positive
concept is helpful both for the identification of interests and for the ability to properly
resist. We should be concerned with a definition that leaves these significant questions
open, and such paradox possible. This problem calls for a clarification of the concept
of non-domination, with the intuition is that non-domination may be a richer concept
than Pettit himself thought it would be.
3. Autonomy and Self-Government: Missing Concepts
Neo-republicans’ emphatic insistence that freedom as non-domination is to be
separated from self-government242, and their general lack of care for the concept of
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autonomy broadly construed, is what I find the most problematic. I believe both these
claims show a form of myopia, and as I will explain, they mainly rely on wishfulthinking arguments. My conclusion is that Pettit’s supplementation of negative
freedom with non-domination fails to provide a satisfying alternative way, and remains
a negative definition that is still both too individualistic and too narrow. First, I will
present the current state of affairs. Then, I will argue that the lack of republican
concern for self-government and autonomy relies on assumptions that need further
evidence to be convincing, and that it highlights the limitations of the theory.
Before we go into the details of Pettit’s standpoint, we may remind ourselves that
not all neo-republicans are alike, and that there is a debate between neo-republicans,
and established by Pettit himself, between neo-Romans and neo-Athenians, regarding
self-government. Michael Sandel is, for example, a vocal advocate of this concept243.
However, his view is quite distinct from the neo-Roman mainstream, and the majority
of neo-republicans. As Pettit describes it, the distinction between neo-Athenians and
neo-Romans is similar to the distinction drawn by Benjamin Constant between
proponents of the liberty of the ancients and liberty of the moderns – or between
positive and negative freedom. According to Pettit, Sandel follows a tradition of
republicanism that sees liberty as self-government, linked to the necessity for the state
to implement a sense of civic virtue within citizens – ideas that according to Pettit,
should be rejected244. What Charles Larmore explains is that “Pettit distances himself
emphatically from the republican strand that he calls ‘neo-Athenian’”, mainly
because “they elevate political activity, the public discussion and implementation of a
society’s common purposes, to the rank of the supreme end in the constitution of the
human good”245. As a neo-Roman, Pettit places the emphasis on liberty conceived as
non-domination as the basis of the state’s legitimacy, and remains committed to a
fairly negative view. Civic virtue is not as important as it is for neo-Athenians, because
a state that would implement freedom as non-domination would necessarily have to
adopt a certain neutrality regarding people’s values, and therefore this is incompatible
with the promotion of normative moral principles.
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Pettit strongly affirms that republican liberty is distinct from self-government and
self-mastery, and in fact, clearly says that he chooses to compare freedom as nondomination with the negative freedom as non-interference, not with the positive selfmastery246. Instead, he thinks of non-domination as the absence of mastery from others
– which is still distinct from the absence of mere interference. Non-domination, he
says, is not equivalent to self-mastery, for the simple reason that avoiding mastery
from others does not lead to clear instructions regarding what it means to be one’s own
master. Here we begin to hit the difficulty of determining what makes the difference
between the Berlinian view and Pettit’s view a profound one. If distinguishing nondomination from positive freedom is easy for Pettit, he also admits that distinguishing
it from negative freedom is not as evident247.
“There is no problem in seeing how non-domination by others is distinct
from the positive ideal of self-mastery, since the absence of mastery by others
clearly does not guarantee the achievement of self-mastery. But there may be a
problem in seeing how it is distinguished from the negative ideal of noninterference by others, for it may not be obvious that mastery or domination really
is different from interference.”248
Not only is freedom as non-domination distinct from self-mastery, but Pettit also
shows a lack of concern for the concept of autonomy in general. In fact, the concept is
largely absent from the neo-republican thought – an oddity given that the vast majority
of republicans’ attention is dedicated to the question of freedom. Hypothetically,
republicans may consider that the concept of autonomy belongs to liberals, and that
wishing to distance themselves from their ideas, they may as well dismiss all the
concepts liberals endorse. Republicans may be reticent to talk about autonomy, or may
simply not see the need for it, since the values for which autonomy is used by liberals
– state neutrality for example – are not the values republicans are particularly eager to
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defend. But if we let hypothesis aside, the fact that autonomy is absent from the neorepublican theory is clearly presented by Pettit, who admits not being concerned with
the question at all. This is not too surprising given the intensity with which he defends
his theory of freedom as distinct from self-mastery. For him, autonomy will simply be
a consequence of freedom as non-domination:
“We need not discuss the value of freedom as self-mastery or autonomy, since
a state which is oriented to non-domination – assuming that it is enough to
orientate the state in that way – will also facilitate the achievement of
autonomy.”249
Pettit is not concerned with autonomy as an independent concept, because he
believes that it will automatically be generated in a society that functions under the
norms of freedom as non-domination. That does not mean that he does not value
autonomy; Pettit recognizes self-mastery as a rich ideal, possibly richer than freedom
as non-domination itself. Autonomy is probably a very valuable intrinsic good, but it
simply isn’t what republicans should be concerned about when they define freedom.
To put it simply, republican freedom is not autonomy, but chances are autonomy is a
valuable good, worth pursuing in a society where freedom as non-domination has been
established first.
“Freedom as personal autonomy may be a very attractive value, perhaps
even an intrinsic good (…). Freedom as personal self-mastery, however, is a richer
ideal than that of freedom as non-domination; there can certainly be nondomination without personal self-mastery, but there can hardly be any meaningful
form of self-mastery without non-domination. Moreover, freedom as personal selfmastery ought to be facilitated, if not actively promoted, under a state that assures
freedom as non-domination; it is bound to be easier for people to achieve
autonomy once they are assured of not being dominated by others.”250
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Is autonomy a necessary consequence of non-domination? Or is it what the aim of
freedom as non-domination should be? Pettit seems to say that it is none of these. As
he said, there can be non-domination without autonomy, so there is no causal necessity
here. But he also clearly says that, though self-mastery is an attractive ideal, promoting
personal autonomy is not the responsibility of the republican state. His idea is that the
kind of system he defends will facilitate the realization of autonomy, but he is not
willing to commit to the normative claim that the republican state ought to promote it.
However, he himself admits that there is no better way to respond to the normative
argument, than to simply put his system in place; his opponents on the matter can see
how freedom as non-domination will generate personal autonomy, without even
trying. Pettit concludes by simply saying the following:
“There is a difference, of course, between the republican viewpoint that I
defend and the position of someone who thinks that the state should explicitly
embrace the richer ideal of promoting people’s personal autonomy. Such an
opponent will argue that the sort of state required for the promotion of nondomination is too austere an agency to be attractive or compelling, and that we
need to ascribe the richer ideal to the state if we are to justify the political
expectations that we are entitled to entertain. But it is not possible at this stage to
respond to that argument. I can only hope that once opponents of this kind see the
full profile of the republican state that I defend, and once they perceive that that
state will facilitate the realization of the autonomy that they treasure, they may be
persuaded that there is no need to give the state explicit responsibility for
promoting people’s personal self-mastery. They may be persuaded that people can
be trusted to look after their own autonomy, given that they live under a
dispensation where they are protected from domination by others.”251
There are several problems with this claim, and with Pettit’s general position. Pettit
believes that autonomy is very likely to emerge in a society that is based on the
principles of freedom as non-domination. A separate study on the question of
autonomy is therefore unnecessary. This, however, sounds a lot like wishful thinking.
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We have in fact no guarantee that his prediction will turn out to be true, and no
information regarding how likely it can be. But most importantly, I will show in the
following chapter, that the idea that autonomy emerges from the absence of
domination, is far from self-evident – even if we accept that non-domination is a
necessarily cause. His response to potential opponents is simply that time and
observation will show that there is no need for the state to be responsible for the
promotion of people’s autonomy, assuming freedom as non-domination is in place.
The weakness of this argument is disconcerting, and should dissatisfy anyone who
places value in the concept of self-mastery. This does not mean that time will prove
Pettit wrong; but to simply say that the only thing we can do is establish freedom as
non-domination and see, sounds like admitting that we have indeed no other way to
know. If that’s the case, employing our energy in gaining more certainty, seems like a
worthwhile endeavour.
Let us now look more closely at the claims that non-domination and selfgovernment ought to be distinct. Pettit’s first idea may be right: one can successfully
avoid mastery from others but fail to identify how to govern oneself. There is no
necessary causal link between the two. This goes in both directions; that one is
competent in any one of them, does not make her competent in the other. However, it
seems that there are at least two requirements we can immediately think of, in order to
access non-domination, and both have to do with self-government. First, to avoid
domination, one must be able to identify one’s own interests. Identifying one’s own
desires is the first step towards self-government; one can only reach self-mastery with
a certain degree of self-knowledge. The two concepts may not be necessary linked, but
they certainly are not foreign: to avoid or escape from domination, one needs a at least
this first degree of self-mastery and self-knowledge.
Second, one must play an active role in the protection of its own non-domination,
without relying on another’s assistance. This is the idea expressed by Simpson; that if
an agent A relies on an agent B’s power to assist her in her liberation from domination,
she still runs the risk of being dominated by agent B in the future. Because agent B
had the capacity to help agent A resist, agent B also has the capacity to dominate agent
A. If an agent must be free from the mastery of others to be considered non-dominated,
it necessarily means that she will need her own self-mastery.
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Both these self-mastery requirements are necessary for non-domination to be
obtained, but also to be secured. But domination or non-domination is not a matter of
external obstacles only – we know this because it may be expressed through a fear to
act for example. More largely, there are many ways an agent can be dominated, and
they need not involve a force that influences the agent’s capacity to perform actions.
It is sufficient for an agent to be internally constricted, to be dominated. In other words,
a loss of capacity for self-government is already a sign of domination, even if it is not
followed by a loss of capacity to perform actions.
Let us take the example of a woman who’s been suffering years of physical abuse
by a violent husband, who would control her actions, and to whom she was terrified.
Let us imagine that the husband has died, and that the woman is now living alone, in
a safe environment, where she is free to act any way she pleases. She is no longer
suffering the domination of her husband, as there is no possibility of arbitrary
interference over her actions. But she may still find it difficult to perform certain
actions, due to the internal impediments that she may still suffer from, as a result of
years of abuse. She may have a lack of confidence, anxiety, panic attacks, and all kinds
of psychological barriers that inhibit her freedom, even though she no longer suffers
domination. I don’t think Pettit would disagree with the recognition that domination
can cause trauma, from which victims may still suffer, even after domination has
ceased. But recognizing this, means admitting that the victims’ freedom is inhibited,
not by actual or potential arbitrary interference, but by their incapacity, because of past
domination, to be self-governed. The victims may still be considered as dominated
long after the possibility of interference has ceased. But their lack of freedom would
then be due to an incapacity to act according to their true desires, or to be free of
internal obstacles. This is why being free from domination is not only to be free for
the domination of another, or the possibility of it; it should also include the capacity
to be free from the internal obstacles that prohibit an agent from reaching autonomy,
or simply the capacity to internally recover from domination. Saying that freedom as
non-domination has nothing to do with self-government is misunderstanding the
complex nature of domination, and that there are various was a subject can suffer from
it.
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Because he remains too focused on the negative aspects of freedom as nondomination, Pettit is unable to provide a theory that is truly satisfying with respect to
these issues, and fails to bring the two theories together as he claimed he would. In
fact, Pettit seems to completely rule out the concept of autonomy, or positive freedom
that Berlin describes. This has consequences for Pettit’s theory’s ability to soothe our
concerns about individual internal capacities, but maybe more problematically, about
the possibility to obtain these capacities politically. I will conclude this chapter by an
explanation of how freedom as non-domination fails to provide people with tools to
exercise freedom in the context of their political community.
4. Political Narrowness of Freedom as Non-Domination
Our observations, again, should not remain centred only around what the
individuals can or cannot do, but also around what they can do as members of the
political sphere. We have seen that republican freedom cannot be separated from the
rule of law, and the exercise of public power that comes with its making. In this
context, self-government in the republican context can and should be seen as an
instrumental good directed at the realization of democratic participation, which I
believe, is a value that most neo-republicans are attached to. But we have seen that
Pettit’s supplementation of negative freedom with freedom as non-domination does
not seem to be successful when it comes to the robustness of the non-arbitrary
condition. I start by arguing that the concept as it is remains too narrow and
individualistic to be able to attend to structural and systemic domination; largely
because Pettit’s definition neglects the political aspect of self-government. The
consequence of this is a difficulty in construing a positive definition of democratic
activities.
Because Pettit’s definition of freedom is largely focused on interpersonal
relationships, it tends to omit the global picture. This is the claim defended by Michael
Thompson, who argues that neo-republican freedom is centred around the prevention
of an “old-school” type of domination, one that was mostly predominant in the XVIIth
or XVIIIth centuries252. He explains that the slave to master relationship is no longer

252

Thompson, 2013

135

a proper example to illustrate the ways domination can occur in the modern context: it
surely is useful to show how relations of power between people can affect their
freedom, but does not show us the bigger structural picture. In this sense, he argues
that freedom as non-domination still mostly applies to a pre-liberal world, where
servitude was mostly a result of feudal, monarchical, patriarchal domination, and so
on. It does not apply to our modern world, where unfreedom mostly comes from
systemic patterns that are not interpersonal. We may also suspect that the interpersonal
servitude neo-republicans focus on, may be the result of these bigger matters: the rootcause of domination between people may often be that a larger system of structural
domination is in place, which not only allows but also legitimates and encourages these
relationships.
I have already started to show, when it comes to arbitrariness, that Pettit’s
condition draws a line between intentional and non-intentional sources of arbitrary
power, and that this distinction is too sharp: it excludes too drastically from the realm
of domination all interferences that don’t result from a willing agent. This claim can
be extended: because domination is for Pettit, only a matter of interpersonal relations
between agents, it fails to grasp the structural aspect of these relations, or that there
can be situations of unfreedom, with no interpersonal relation at all.
As Thompson reminds us, Pettit is very clear that domination can only come from
an agent, or a collective agent, but never a system253 . This is where, according to
Thompson, neo-republicanism shows its limitation and fails to provide a true
alternative to liberalism.
“This is a gross misunderstanding of not only the way that social domination
actually operates in modern societies, but it misses the point of what makes the
republican tradition unique and, to be sure, superior to that of liberalism: namely
that it is able to see individuals as ‘embedded’ in certain social processes, habits,
or other forms of routinized activities and institutions which transcend the wills of
individual agents.”254
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The claim that unfreedom can only be the result of a willing agent, simply seems
to go against intuition: again, someone who lives in a “food desert” will have the scope
and the robustness of her freedom reduced. She will not be effectively capable of
choosing among a broad variety of food, and her capability set will not be guaranteed
by law. But this reduction of her freedom is not caused by an intentional agent. More
importantly, this claim draws an unnecessary line between what neo-republicans may
attend to – domination as they describe it – and what they will have to leave aside. The
expectation about neo-republicanism is not only that they provide a more accurate
definition of freedom – which we have already described as necessary – but also that
they are able to attend to a larger number of situations of unfreedom. The scope
remains too narrow if we keep focusing on individual relationships, and ignore the
systemic and structural nature of alienation.
Because of this, neo-republicans are unable to see that freedom also comes from
the positive capacity to take part in the constitution of social rules, such that this type
of alienation may be reduced. Because they remained focused on the individualistic
negative definition of freedom, they can only give us instructions on how to avoid this
type of interference. But they can’t explain how to avoid the alienation that comes
from the bigger picture. I will argue in the following chapter that the best way to
prevent citizens from this kind of unfreedom is to clearly take a stand in favour of a
positive definition of freedom as collective self-government, where structural
domination is avoided through the exercise of public power.
For now, I will simply show that the current definition has problematic
consequences for the democratic aspirations of neo-republicans, first because it
neglects autonomy for the individuals, and also because it does not pay enough
attention on collective self-government as a protective tool against structural
domination. I will argue that Pettit’s definition weakens our ability to participate in
democratic procedures, and therefore weakens the theory as a whole – as it largely
relies on a democratic definition of citizenship.
Most neo-republicans, including Pettit, would deny that freedom as nondomination is in fact democratic participation. But Pettit defends the idea that public
domination is avoided only if there is a democratic control over the legitimacy of
institutions. He puts forward the idea that political legitimacy relies on the people
sharing in democratic control over institutions: this is the only way, he argues, to allow
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state coercion255. As he says, “freedom as non-domination is bound to put a certain
premium on the value of legitimacy and on the democratic control that it requires” 256.
He adds that this form of democratic control is “the only guarantee against the doubly
disabling effect of public domination”. If people must exercise sovereignty in such
way, it means that they need the ability to deliberate, to have access to relevant
information, such that they can make informed political decisions. But the question is,
can citizens really make informed political decisions, as democratic republicanism
requires, without a strong sense of self-knowledge and self-mastery? Also, if
democratic control comes first, and guarantees non-domination, which comes second,
how can we know with certainty that the democratic process is made by people who
are truly free? There is a strong intuition that for people to adequately use their
democratic power, they need to be aware of their own needs, but also able to make
decisions independently of the influence of an external party. These requirements are
needed such that the political decisions can be made under no domination, and will
continue to promote it in the future. This is why a level of self-mastery is needed for
democratic participation, which itself guarantees the perpetuation of non-domination.
The individualistic negative view of non-domination is also detrimental for the
democratic abilities of society as a whole. If domination is only conceived in terms of
interpersonal relationships, as we have said, it will fail to acknowledge the various
ways freedom can be threatened. In consequence, we as republicans may fall short
when it comes to prevent citizens from these threats. Democratic procedures should
be directed towards protecting members of the community against all forms of
unfreedom, interpersonal or structural. But proper identification of these forms need
to happen beforehand; which brings us back to the necessity for the people to be
informed enough to be capable of such identification.
The objection can be made that democratic participation is valuable in and of itself,
regardless of how informed citizens are. It would mean that the very fact that demands
are being made, and voices are being heard, is enough to guarantee democratic
legitimacy. It can also be said that when people come together as a group, they tend to
make more informed decisions than individuals, and that the democratic process
generally generates some form of common sense, making majority evaluations usually
255
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reliable257. My response to the first objection is that indeed, democratic procedures
may be an intrinsic good, but it would not be sufficient by itself to guarantee optimal
democratic behaviour, and it would certainly not guarantee freedom as nondomination. Uninformed democratic decisions are still democratic, but that they are
does not mean they go in the direction of freedom. This partly responds to the second
objection, to which I will also say that a quick look at history should be enough to
remind us that, although there is room to argue that majority-based decisions may be
more rational than individual ones, they certainly are not always right. But this is a
broad and complex debate that I will not tackle here.
Finally, I believe the only way to solve these issues is to commit to a much stronger
definition of freedom as non-domination, that is directed towards the promotion of
self-government amongst citizens as individuals, but also as members of the political
community within which they create and exercise public power. This would help us
drawing a clearer line between liberalism and republicanism; if we as republicans want
to provide a true alternative, we must be ambitious about what to expect from citizens.
Not only should we protect them against all forms of unfreedom, but we also need to
give them tools to autonomously ensure this protection: through active participation in
the making of laws.
Conclusion
My goal in this section was to highlight some of the gaps of the current definition
of freedom as non-domination, as a way to identify ways to solve the various problems
caused by its incompleteness. The general idea I am defending is that the real value of
being free from domination is to be able to act as a non-dominated being, that is, to
reach a level of self-government. But our capacity to act as non-dominated beings can
be obstructed by more than arbitrary power. Unfortunately, the current definition of
non-domination does not tell us how to avoid these obstacles, despite the fact that the
theory holds incredibly promising elements to do so. In the following chapters, I will
explore ways to remedy this issue, such that neo-republicanism may reach its full
potential. As republicans, I believe that the only way to provide a promising alternative
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is to take a firmer stand in favour of a positive definition of freedom, and to renounce
to the perpetuation of an exclusively individualistic and negative view.
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CHAPTER IV
Extending of Freedom as Non-Domination

Introduction
I this chapter, I present my argument for the extension of freedom as nondomination, and defend the claim that it needs to include autonomy to be fully
satisfying; I believe that in consequence, the concept would be more demanding but
also more robust. It would solve the problem of discrimination between arbitrary and
non-arbitrary interferences, but also allow us to distinguish mere effect of chance from
acts of oppression, which need not be the product of an intention to dominate. My
argument has two sides: first, I defend the idea that the reasons that led us to adopt
freedom as non-domination instead of freedom as non-interference, should also lead
us to choose a stronger version of republican freedom: with autonomy as a condition.
I call this claim the “parallel” argument: the same way freedom as non-interference
left too many gaps open, and was too narrow regarding what makes us unfree, freedom
as non-domination also misses to cover significant aspect of what inhibits our freedom.
These aspects that have to do with people’s capacity to identify their own interests and
govern themselves, but also with the political capacities that are required in order to
fully participate in the exercise of public power. The second point is normative and
concerns the reasons republicans ought to value autonomy and include it in their theory
of freedom. The main idea I defend is that the validity of freedom as non-domination
depends on the capacities presented above. In other words, the real value of being nondominated depends on one’s ability to reach and exercise non-domination. I start this
chapter with the development of the first argument: it includes the proposition that
republican freedom may not be reducible to non-domination in the negative sense. I
argue that a closer look at the tradition may help us realise that this concept is more
positive than neo-republicans are currently willing to admit. In the second section, I
present the normative argument that we ought to extend freedom as non-domination
because it is the best way to reach optimal freedom: it implies that the value of nondomination is to maximize possibilities to reach the status of an autonomous agent and
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maintain it in the future, but also go gain political freedom. I am aware that my
position may face objections from proponents of strict negative freedom. I will briefly
address these objections, and try to soothe potential worries, at the end of this section.
I.

Incompleteness of Freedom as Non-Domination: the “Parallel”
Argument

1. Freedom as Non-Domination: Is It All There Is?
The idea I wish to defend here is that by focusing on non-domination as the only
essential component of republican freedom, neo-republicans have overlooked many
other aspects of the traditional republican political theory. I start by rejecting Pettit’s
claim that the only component of republicanism is in fact freedom as non-domination.
I finally identify self-government as a key concept of republicanism that goes hand in
hand with non-domination. Before I start, I need to make it clear that I do not
necessarily believe that classic republicans are figures of authority on every matter, or
that their ideas should be followed to the letter – they vary themselves in the way their
construe their theories. However, there seems to be observable historical patterns,
which seem valuable to consider. My reference to history is mostly due to the
declaration by neo-republicans themselves that their theory is a continuation of classic
republicanism. The idea I am defending is simply that, if this is true, then we need to
take a closer look at the tradition in general, and not only when it helps us argue for
freedom as non-domination. There are aspects of the theory that neo-republicans have
not covered, but for which we can find answers in the tradition – the question of
positive freedom being one of them. But my extensive look at these matters mostly
relies on the self-identification of neo-republicans as heirs of this long tradition258.
In a debate with Skinner, Pettit affirms that “republican freedom means nondomination, period”259. This affirmation contrasts with Skinner’s idea that republican
freedom is non-domination but also non-interference 260 . This shows that for neo-
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republicans, non-domination remains the main focus, focus that as they argue, is
observable all through republicanism’s history: “The republican tradition is
unanimous in casting freedom as the opposite to slavery, and in seeing the exposure
to the arbitrary will of another, or living at the mercy of another, as the great evil”261.
Pettit also says that “freedom in a choice requires just the absence of domination; it is
equivalent to the freedom that was hailed as an ideal in the long tradition of republican
thought”262. Two conclusions come out of these claims: first, the quest for freedom is
the essential feature of republicanism, and second, the nature of republican freedom is
the avoidance of actual or potential arbitrary interference only. Non-domination is
therefore the common theme that has guided republicans through history, and the only
component that we should be concerned with. I however wish to explore the possibility
that non-domination may not be the only component of republican freedom on one
hand, and of republicanism on the other. A few reasons motivate my claim.
First, we should probably be cautious of the will to reduce an entire tradition to a
single element; if we want to adequately follow the line of the republican theory, we
ought to properly represent it in the broadest sense possible – while keeping in mind
that like any long tradition of thought, it is highly dependent on historical and
ideological context. Secondly, omitting the various aspects of republican freedom by
focusing on what has recently been identified as its core idea, undermines neorepublicanism’s ability to develop a true alternative to liberalism – assuming this is the
shared goal of neo-republicans. I believe that most of liberalism inadequacy is due to
its minimalism; therefore, a sustainable alternative would benefit from being less
minimal. Thirdly, by adopting this reduced version, we may simply miss essential
aspects of what constitutes republican freedom.
Neo-Romans like Pettit claim to follow the tradition that places libertas at the
centre of the republican theory263, and add that this form of liberty is equivalent to nondomination: “non-domination is the status associated with the civil role of the
liber”264. Without going into details regarding how to best interpret Roman libertas, it
is safe to say that it is not merely a negative concept. Even though it is defined as
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opposed to slavery, libertas is not simply definable as the absence of arbitrary
interference – possible or actual. This is the claim that Geoff Kennedy holds; he
accuses neo-republicans of interpreting Cicero’s libertas in light of their own theory,
and says that by doing so, they have failed to grasp what constitutes the true nature of
Roman republicanism.
“In terms of the republican tradition, there seems to be a potential danger here
of expecting to find in Cicero’s oratory a conception of libertas that is said to be
representative of the conceptions of liberty that are thought to be constitutive of
the neo-Roman tradition being articulated in the early modern period. The point
here is not to suggest that Cicero could not have meant to reference a form of
liberty that is understood to be a form of non-domination, but rather that,
considered in the context of his systematic political treatises, such a notion of
liberty was not the cornerstone of his republicanism.”265
This claim contrasts with Pettit’s affirmation that his theory of non-domination is
simply a continuation of a long tradition of thought that finds roots in Cicero’s
writings 266 . Kenney actually claims that Cicero’s definition of freedom is more
ambiguous than neo-republicans may think. He explains that his definition is at times
simply opposed to slavery, but that some other times, he defines the free res publica
in opposition to Greek democracies267. Libertas, therefore, is a form of liberty that is
only enjoyed in the Roman free state, whereas democracies enjoy another type of
freedom, based on equality and participation. The freedom of the republican Roman
state is, according to Kennedy, based on two concepts that are of equal if not greater
importance than non-domination: concordia and equity 268 . Concordia represents a
form of civil concord, and equity a recognition of a certain kind of equality, based on
the recognition of differences of status amongst citizens
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is in fact only one form of Roman liberty270 - although debates about Roman freedom
as largely retrospective. This claim highlights the fact that libertas is a complex and
multi-faceted concept.
Freedom, for the Romans, is also intrinsically linked to civitas, or people’s status
as citizens, which is expressed and exercised through political participation – though
the structure of popular sovereignty is different than in Greek democracies. Valentina
Arena explains that even though this form of popular expression was constrained by
various factors, it was nonetheless the “conditio sine qua non for the preservation of
the citizens’ liberty”271. These elements are quite distinct from strict non-domination,
and represent a positive aspect of Roman liberty that is not often emphasized. In fact,
Pettit recognizes the link between libertas and civitas in Roman thought, but does not
place political participation as a requirement for freedom in his own theory – although
he argues for the value of democracy and as the best way to maximize and equalize
freedom as non-domination272. Interestingly, Arena identifies three types of Roman
freedom, two of which can be clearly linked to non-domination, while one is closer to
a definition of self-mastery – a definition that can also be found in Rousseau. She
explains that there is a way of interpreting Roman liberty as freedom from passions
and irrational impulses: “an individual was free when not dependent on one’s own
passions or irrational desires in order to pursue rational actions aimed at the
preservation and flourishing of the commonwealth”273. She continues by saying that
for Cicero, liberty can be seen as not only the absence of constraints from the self, “but
also the capacity or power to pursue and enjoy something that, first of all, was worth
enjoying, and second, was worth doing or enjoying in common with others”274. There
is therefore a relation of proportionality between one’s freedom and the degree with
which they are able to form authentic desires that are directed towards common good.
This is coherent with Rousseau’s idea that one is truly free only when one is
liberated from one’s natural instinct. The condition of this freedom is the relation of
reciprocity that binds people together in the civil state, along with the rights that come
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with it275. We see a similar claim in Seller’s interpretation, when he says that “Cicero’s
conception of republican liberty meant freedom from passion and domination through
obedience to law, when law reflects the sincere deliberation of a mature republican
community”276. This leads to the conclusion that self-government may in fact be a
crucial constitutive element of republican freedom. But it is made possible through the
absence of domination, which also requires an appropriate political state of affairs277.
My intention is not to give an exhaustive list of what constitutes Roman or classic
republican freedom, nor to undermine the importance of non-domination in the theory,
but simply to highlight that is one of many republican concepts. One can argue that all
these aspects ultimately go in the direction of freedom, and more specifically, of
freedom as non-domination. But this would be undermining the importance that each
of these aspects specifically has, in and of itself. It would also sound like reinterpreting history according to our current concerns and interests. None of what I
have presented in this section is meant to argue that classic republicanism has superior
authority: my purpose was only to show that Pettit’s claim that republican freedom is
the absence of domination only, is not evidently observable in the tradition he declares
to follow. This tradition of thought is too rich and complex to be reduced to this single
idea. I believe that its richness can provide answers to our current questions, in
particular the questions we may have about autonomy: commitments to forms of
positive liberty can be found in classic republicanism, whereas the modern theory
tends to reject any such association.
One could object that, if it is true that republican freedom is context-dependent,
then the modern definition may simply be the reflexion of modern day’s concerns and
values – for example the wish for neutrality – the same way the classic definition was
a picture of the specific values of the time – civil concord, harmony, etc. This is in fact
an interesting idea, probably worth exploring on its own. Without denying the validity
of this claim, I will simply say that participants of a philosophical school of thought
should be cautious about the possibility that the dependence on context drive them too
far from the tradition they claim to follow. This section was only a way to remind
ourselves of this possibility, but leaves the door open to further discussions.
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2. Freedom as Non-domination: Necessary Condition for Autonomy
Irrespective of the limits presented in the previous chapter, and of the fact that
domination is most likely broader than what Pettit has described, freedom as nondomination remains essential and is not to be dispensed with. In this section, I go over
the reasons I have to believe that non-domination is not only a better candidate for a
definition of autonomy but that it is also one of its necessary condition.
The ways a subject’s autonomy can be obstructed by domination can be put in two
categories. The first category concerns external obstacles: domination can impact the
ways an agent can perform actions that are coherent with her own desires. The second
category concern internal obstacles: domination affects the ways a person identifies
her desires, her values, and her interests. Such identification is necessary for
autonomy, and for distinguishing the motives that come from oneself from those that
don’t. The idea behind this is that for an agent to be autonomous, she needs to feel
safe. Domination greatly diminishes the possibility of security, both internally and
externally.
When an agent is dominated, she is in a position of vulnerability: this vulnerability
can be external, internal or both. Most often than not, if a person experiences
vulnerability externally, this will result in internal vulnerability. The repetitive
interference of the arbitrary will of another has consequences that go beyond the
simple impossibility to act as one pleases. It also affects the capacities one has to
identify her own wishes. The slave’s freedom is not merely impaired because his
options are limited; because he suffers such limitation, it makes it unlikely that he will
have a representation of what his options could be. This results in the incapacity to
form desires with full knowledge of what could be available to him. Pettit describes
what is likely to happen when one is aware to be under the surveillance of another,
who has the power to interfere with her options.
“In that case, you are likely to suffer intimidation and well as invigilation,
recognizing your dependency and vulnerability. The intimidation will boost the
effects of the invigilation, giving you an incentive to be cautious and deferential,
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in the same way that recognizing that I will penalize a particular option will boost
the effect of the penalty, giving you an incentive to avoid it.”278
This situation, Pettit says, will create a motivation to act according to the
interferer’s preferred options, assuming they can be identified by the subject. This
creates a situation where there is a need for adaptation to another’s preferences, which,
as we have previously seen, is incompatible with freedom.
It is all the more incompatible with autonomy: as the dominated subject may adapt
her preferences to the choices that are available to her, being motivated by fear, she
may end up confusing them for her true preferences. When a person is not in a position
of safety, she does not have the resources to identify what she may truly want, and this
undermines the possibility for her to act with autonomy. The vulnerability that comes
with domination also affects people’s self-image and self-confidence, such that they
may be unable to formulate a desire or value, even if such options were provided. John
Maynor goes over three advantages that freedom as non-domination has over freedom
as non-interference, some already expressed by Pettit 279 , which lead to the
improvement of people’s self-image280. This process of empowerment is necessary for
autonomy: for people to identify their desires and act on them, they must first find
them legitimate and valuable.
Anxiety may also come from apprehension that interference strikes at any time and
prohibits me from pursuing my goal, even if I find it valuable and legitimate. Freedom
as non-domination has the merit to address both possibilities. The first advantage is
that under non-domination, people are free of the anxiety that comes with not knowing
when and how arbitrary interference could occur. Uncertainty is reduced, because as
Maynor says, “the opinions and interests of non-dominated agents have been
consulted and tracked, and any interference that they experience is not something that
is unexpected”281.
The second advantage of non-domination is that it reduces the degree to which
people have to be prepared to face arbitrary interference, and potentially to defend
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themselves. Such situation would also be a factor of anxiety and uncertainty, in which
people prioritize their response to interference over the identification of their desires.
Because they do not need to be in such a situation, their range of available options is
not reduced. They do not have to elaborate strategies to avoid arbitrary interference or
lessen the impact it will have on them.
The third advantage is that as the possibility of arbitrary decreases, self-confidence
increases. Freedom as non-domination diminishes people’s vulnerability and
maximizes their capacity to act according to a self-image that have been improved.
This will only increase the mutual trust thy experience with other agents, to whom they
reciprocally value and respect the desires. Their self-image improves, and so does their
status as equal citizens: “because it becomes common knowledge that they, along with
others, stand on an equal footing, secure in their freedom”282.
One may argue against the claim that non-domination is necessary for autonomy,
and object that in rare cases, people can be dominated and autonomous at the same
time. This possibility, however, seems unlikely; it seems reasonable to affirm that
domination impacts people’s autonomy in a way that is politically significant enough
to deserve our attention. Regardless of the way it is imposed on people, domination
creates an environment of anxiety, uncertainty and vulnerability that is not conducive
to the empowerment of people, and the construction of a good self-image. These
elements of safety, confidence and self-development are essential features of a
capacity to form authentic desires and values. The autonomy of a person relies on the
knowledge that she will be safe in choosing any option that is available to her, and also
capable of formulating a demand for such option. We now need to determine whether
non-domination is a sufficient condition for autonomy.
Freedom as non-domination is not only a necessary condition for the moral
autonomy of persons, but also for autonomy conceived as collective self-government.
First, the safety that is felt on the personal level, is not to be separated from the freedom
people experience when taking part in public deliberation. For example, the abusive
husband of the beaten wife may leave her free to participate as she pleases in
democratic activities; it does not follow that she will have the capacity to adequately
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do so, as she may suffer from too many internal psychological blockages that will
affect her ability to deliberate with clarity. Similarly, it is easy to imagine one being
internally blocked after being obstructed on the political level: for example, activists
who face repetitive violent repercussions for their political actions may suffer forms
of post-traumatic stress that affect their personal life. Nothing here implies that these
links are necessary, but it is only leant to show that the two spheres are not completely
distinct, and that one may impact the other.
On a more strictly political level, non-domination is essential to the elaboration of
political rules, but that it is also the aim of these rules, because domination affects the
capability of people as law-makers. Domination necessarily affects the ability for
citizens to articulate political claims; at the very least, fear of repercussions would
make the expression of these claims more difficult. Amartya Sen defines capability as
the opportunity to “achieve valuable combinations of human functionings” 283 .
Opportunity is not to be understood in a negative Berlinian sense – or non-obstruction.
Sen argues that opportunity should be seen as capability instead. The shift of
perspective allows us to distinguish between “whether a person is actually able to do
something she would value doing, and whether she possesses the means or instruments
or permissions to pursue what she would like to do”284. Domination affects capability
in this way, because it affects the means and permissions people are given, personally
or as members of the political community. If we adopt a capability view on deliberative
and legislative procedures, we see that the problem with domination is not merely that
it comes as an obstacle, but also that it impacts the attribution of the positive means
requires to achieve political purposes.
3. Argument for a Stronger Version:
a) Moral and Personal Aspect
The first side of my argument consists in drawing a parallel between our motives
to reject freedom as non-interference, and those that should lead us to adopt a stronger
version of freedom as non-domination. Pettit has argued that the problem of freedom
as non-interference was to be at the same time too broad and too narrow – it fails to
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cover some aspects of freedom while it systematically equates interference with
unfreedom. Here, I defend the idea that our reasons to reject freedom as noninterference should lead us to be cautious of freedom as non-domination as it is today.
Just as there are other ways to be unfree than simply being the subject of interference,
there are other ways to be unfree than simply being dominated by an arbitrary will.
Freedom as non-domination is therefore too narrow as well –it fails to see some aspects
of unfreedom. Firstly, a person may be non-dominated as described by Pettit, but
unfree because incapable of self-mastery and self-governance. The reasons that
prohibit her freedom need not depend on the arbitrary will of another to dominate her,
they may also be the result of past domination – as we have seen in the case of the
abused wife. These reasons are diverse, and can be personal, psychological, historical,
and so on. That domination is absent or ceases to be imposed does not automatically
and naturally generate the capacity to exercise freedom. Secondly, a person may be
freedom-restricted by external circumstances of a systemic and oppressive nature,
without the interference of an arbitrary will to dominate – for example socio-economic
difficulties, environmental injustice, and so on. Just like freedom as non-interference
did not account for the fact that one may be unfree while left alone, freedom as nondomination as it is does not account for these two ways one may be limited in the
exercise of her freedom. We face two options in order to strengthen republican
freedom: we can either admit that one can be dominated by these non-intentional
forces – psychological, social, economic – or we can agree with Pettit that they do not
constitute domination. In this last case, we would have to admit that non-domination
fails to cover the various ways we can lose our freedom.
As I have said in the previous chapter, Pettit would probably agree that these
instances may simply lead to domination, while they don’t directly constitute
domination. There is however a problem with this idea: it seems safe to assume that
although they are not domination, Pettit would still want to reduce these instances as
much as possible – because they open one up to domination. However, we cannot
attend to them as situations of unfreedom: because it is not, according to Pettit, what
they are. Our scope of action is therefore limited. Another problem with this objection
would be that the situations I have described seem to effectively diminish the range of
one’s option – ex: living in a food desert, effectively diminishes your nutritive options.
We know that Pettit gives credit to the idea that all options must be available to a free
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agent, and not only the options he favours – assuming the limitations are not purely
accidental. That in the case of systemic oppression for example, options are reduced,
does not only make one more vulnerable to potential future domination, but already
constitutes a lack of freedom.
The reason Pettit seems to only be willing to admit that these situations lead to
domination without being domination themselves, is probably due to his problematic
insistence on the definition of unfreedom as represented by the slave to master
relationship. In other words, Pettit is too focused on freedom or unfreedom as matters
of interpersonal relationship rather than results of a system.
My response to this problem is in-between the two options presented above. It
seems possible to argue for the extension of domination such that it includes nonintentional forces, while distinguishing them from mere accidents. Pettit is reticent to
this idea; for him, the main benefit of freedom as non-domination as an instrumental
good is “the benefit of not having your choices blocked or inhibited by others, at least
not in an intentional or quasi-intentional manner”
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. His argument refers to

interference of natural forces, like natural catastrophes or accidents; if these were
included in the list of dominating powers, it would blur the line between effects of
chance and events provoked by people, which is what he is preoccupied with 286 .
Distinguishing between accidents and real freedom-limitations is something that needs
to be done, but we have seen that the condition of an arbitrary will does not seem to
be sufficient. I believe that the best way to untie this knot is to admit that domination
is larger than Pettit has described, and that it should be inclusive of some forms of
systemic interferences, that restrict the realm of people’s available choices, or diminish
their capacity to identify and act towards their goals.
We still need to distinguish non-intentional domination from effects of chance: I
believe that one way of doing so is to consider whether the autonomy, self-esteem, or
sense of self-worth of the person involved is affected. Another way would be to
consider the systemic and long-term effect nature of the obstacles created by such
interference. For example, being stopped from going to work because a tree has fallen
on my car is one thing, but the fact that my insurance refuses to pay for the damage,
causing me to go into debts in order to afford a new car, and therefore limiting my
285
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other options in life, is another. Both are restrictions, but only the latter seems to limit
my freedom in a way that is relevant to political discussions. Discrimination between
the two can be made on the idea that what we should ultimately be concerned with is
the capacity for self-government, and that everything that prohibits an agent from
being autonomous personally, morally or politically is in fact an instance of freedom
being taken away. If autonomy becomes the barometer of dominating and nondominating acts or situations, it becomes easy to distinguish true unfreedom from mere
external restrictions.
I think including this condition to freedom as non-domination is essential to
cover a larger number of freedom-limiting instances, whether they are the product of
an intention or not. If we extend the concept this way, the task will no longer be to
distinguish between forces that are intentional and those that are not, but to identify,
among those that are not, those that produce systemic domination with long-term
consequences, and those that are mere effects of chance, which agents can promptly
overcome. The theory currently fails cover all these aspects, but by proposing a more
positive account, the hope is to adequately identify all instances of freedom-restriction.
We need not be defensive and reticent about accepting to give the theory a more
positive tone. Maynor also develop this idea when he says that “Pettit fails to develop
thoroughly the idea that non-domination contains some elements of positive liberty
within it” 287 . Admitting that Pettit briefly mentions the possible intrinsic value of
autonomy, Maynor believes that the analysis should go further. I share with him the
idea that Pettit’s project is highly valuable but that it has not been going far enough. If
we extend republican liberty as I am suggesting we should, we can redefine it this way:
freedom is not the absence of actual or potential interference of an arbitrary will only,
but also the absence of any actual or potential obstacle to one’s capacity to adequately
govern oneself, mixed with the requirement that one can exercise this quality
unrestrictedly and appropriately.
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b) Political Aspect
Because we have seen that Pettit’s definition of freedom is too individualistic
and relies too much on interpersonal relationships – as the slave/master analogy shows
– we should also be cautious of providing a definition of republican autonomy that
would follow the same pattern. In this section, I argue that the extension I propose is
political in nature, and that it helps solving the problems of the interpersonal definition
of non-domination, precisely because it tackles structural and systemic domination,
and offers a positive perspective on freedom as political capability.
The extension I propose consists in adding the condition of autonomy to republican
freedom, and to define it in terms of collective self-government, which aims at, and is
exercised through the expression of public power. What makes republicanism a
specific political theory, and especially, with regard to liberalism, is that its concepts
are inherently politically-dependent. They come to life within the context of the
political community, or the state; whereas liberals tend to rely on universal concepts.
It is not to say that republicans reject the idea of a universal concept, but they can only
be reached and maintained within the right political framework. Defining republican
autonomy only in terms of personal capacities, independently of the political sphere
from which they emerge, would be missing what republicanism is about.
Our definition must also take a clear stand for a more positive aspect, such that we
both are able to provide an alternative view to liberalism, and to neo-Roman
republicanism as well – as we have seen, is still too negative, and not different enough
from the liberal theory they reject. This must be done with caution, and I will address
potential objections in the last section of this chapter. However, we can’t accuse Pettit
of too much narrowness, and follow the same ideological structure: one that construes
freedom essentially negatively.
Self-government, therefore, must not only be defined in terms of capability in
making one’s own choice, or follow one’s true desire. It must be thought in terms of
following one’s law, that is, the capacity to engage in the making of rules through
which freedom will be realised. This is why I believe that republican autonomy must
be a means and an end at the same time. It is necessary for the elaboration of laws that
will afterwards come as the condition for maintaining the autonomous status. This is
also why I believe that much of the quest for autonomy must be a process that needs
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practice, deliberation, and common expression of needs. Republican autonomy, is
therefore a true positive concept, because it is thought in terms of political capability
– as Sen describes the term – which requires that people possess the means,
instruments, and permissions to claim what they need.
We need to conceive republican individuals as authors of laws, and their
autonomy, as the result of the accordance between public laws and self-rule, that
requires a process of legitimation and internalization of public laws. The role of the
individual in this process should not be minimized, as it is truly because public law is
one’s own making that it qualifies as self-rule and serves as the condition for
autonomy. Republican autonomous individuals must therefore be active citizens in the
elaboration of the rule of law.
I believe that this view can help us solve the problems that came from an overly
individualistic and interpersonal view of domination: namely, the fact that it missed
the broader picture of what may constitute unfreedom. The extension I propose
provides a more comprehensive view of domination, conceived as anything that may
inhibit one’s ability to properly exercise one’s law-making abilities, or deprives her
from the socio-political means that are required for such activity. The extension of
freedom as non-domination in this sense, is to be seen as a continuation of
republicanism’s inherent political understanding of individuals. As Thompson says,
the socio-political shaping of one’s agency – whether this shaping constitutes
domination, or freedom from it – is what distinguishes republicanism from other
theories.
“(…) What republicanism can contribute to political theory is the idea that
individuals are produced by social systems which shape as well as constrain their
subjectivity and agency. In this sense, republican institutions must be organized
not simply to immunize individuals from the domination of others, they must be so
arranged, so structured and designed as to give individuals certain capacities and
social goods necessary for self-government.”288
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I believe that the inclusion of autonomy – whether it is on the personal level, or
collective self-government on the political level – is a good way to broaden our view,
and to secure the provision of these social goods. At the very least, it would mean that
the provision of means to self-government would be institutionalized. Because
domination is not only an interpersonal matter, but plays out in the structure of our
social systems, we must form citizens that are autonomously capable of identifying
and resisting such patterns. This implies that social institutions must not only prevent
domination in the narrow sense, but play a role in promoting the self-governing
abilities citizens need in order to truly be authors of laws. Expending our view this
way, also means that we are able to attend to the problem expressed by Thompson: the
idea that if domination becomes socially routinized, ingrained and internalized, it will
necessarily affect people’s moral autonomy without them realizing it289. This situation
would affect political autonomy and the exercised of public power by the same token.

II.

Value of Non-domination: Normative and Pragmatic Argument
We may now turn to the second part of my argument, which is to say that the

value of non-domination is not simply to reduce arbitrary interference, it is also for
people to be able to act as non-dominated beings, to protect themselves from
domination, and to recover from it, should they end up in this position. The required
tools are not acquired simply by the avoidance of arbitrary and intentional interference
– or its possibility, but on the personal level, by the cultivation of self-knowledge, the
improvement of one’s self-image and confidence, and the capacity to make authentic
choices. Politically, what is required is the ability to take part in the making of laws
and the exercise of public power. Firstly, I argue that the instrumental value of nondomination is in fact to reach the status of autonomous agent, and that this implies
being able to identify one’s own interests, and express them through active citizenship
– as a non-dominated author of laws. I then argue liberation and freedom as not the
same thing: this kind of autonomy, although it can serve as a tool for people’s
emancipation, is not a matter of individual liberation but must be conceived as political
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freedom. I then present autonomy as a regulative principle that may help resolve the
problem of value pluralism in society. Finally, I anticipate and address potential
objections regarding my stand for a positive view of republican freedom.
1. Value of Non-Domination
The second part of my argument about the extension of freedom as nondomination concerns the value and the use agents can make of it. The main idea I
would like to put forward is that the value of non-domination depends on the capacity
to act as a non-dominated agent, that is, to be autonomous. Richard Dagger writes that
“we want to be free from domination, in other words, so that we can exercise
autonomy”290. He also explains that the call for non-domination is in fact a call for the
respect of people’s right to self-government, more than it is a call for mere freedom291.
I would add that it also is a call for the promotion and protection of such right in the
long term. We have seen that one can be free as non-dominated but still face significant
obstacles that reduce their overall freedom. We now need to see that being free as nondominated is only desirable if freedom can be exercised, assuming our enterprise is to
determine how to reach optimal and ideal freedom.
Let us take the example of a subject whose interests have been adequately
tracked and who lives under social regulations that respect and promote them. For
example, this person is allowed to vote during fair elections, and such right is
encouraged while not being imposed. She can however lack the capacity to exercise
this right: she can lack political knowledge and be unaware of the propositions of
various parties, she can develop a form of voter apathy because she feels that political
decisions have never been made in her favour, she can simply lack the political
involvement that is required to register to vote, get informed about the purpose of the
election, and make a decision that would truly serve her interests. Here the person is
free to vote, but lacks the instruments to actually exercise and utilize this freedom as
much as she could.
On a more personal and psychological level, a child may be non-dominated by
her parents, who may have properly provided for her, were not abusive, and never
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arbitrarily interfered with her choices. But let us imagine that these parents have also
always been overly cold and distant, reticent to express affection, to the point that the
child did not grow up in an emotionally nourishing environment. As an adult, this
person may suffer internal restrictions and be unable to act in the world as freely and
with as confidence as another person who would have received appropriate love and
warmth as a child. This emotionally restricted adult may have always been free from
domination, but lacks the level of self-esteem to make authentic choices, to stand for
them and to resist domination from others. She may be more likely to make errors of
judgments regarding her own needs, and to make sure they are met.
These examples are meant to show that the value of non-domination is greatly
diminished of it is not followed by some positive capacity to act as a truly free
individual. Adding the condition of autonomy in our definition of liberty would enable
us to identify a larger number of freedom impediments and attend to them. Nondominated being must not only enjoy the absence of inappropriate interference, but
must also know how to properly utilise this good.
The value of non-domination for republican citizens is also to act in a nondominated manner as authors of laws, and to exercise the public power they are given
through the law-making process. These elements are positive components of freedom
that are not provided if we simply stick to Pettit’s negative idea. It is only valuable for
citizens to create laws that they know will be enforceable, that is, that they all have the
capacity to exercise – at least, that this capacity is obtainable in theory. Attention needs
to be paid, then, to the ways we can maximize the enforceability of the laws: in other
words, republican law-makers need to see how to provide tools so that people may
integrate the law and make it their own, and they need to find a non-coercive way to
do so.
Integration of the law such that it becomes self-rule may simply come from the
law-making process itself, as people realize what their interests are and articulate their
demands through the laws they create. But to identify their interests personally and
collectively, they need a level of self-knowledge and autonomy – position that I defend
in the following section. If republican society relies on people expressing their freedom
through the collective realization of self-rule, as I argue it should, people must be
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capable of such integration, first, and second, they must be capable of acting according
to the regulations in question.
Pettit puts forward the idea of popular control as source of political legitimacy:
“The idea of controlled interference provides us with the core element for a
republican theory of political legitimacy. It suggests that if the people governed by
a state control the interference practised by government – if they control the laws
imposed, the politics pursued, the taxes levied – then they may not suffer
domination at the hands of their rulers and may continue to enjoy their freedom in
relation to the state.”292
The idea is interesting in that it defines the conditions of legitimacy in terms of
active citizenship: legitimate laws are those that are subject to control by the people
and this kind of interference produced freedom in the republican sense293. Pettit uses
the classic example of Ulysses: Ulysses askes the sailors to bind him to the ship and
to leave him there even when he urges them to set him free. The interference of the
sailors is not dominating, neither is the act of not leaving Ulysses go. Pettit explains
that it is because the sailors are under Ulysses’ ultimate control, which makes the
interference permissible and non-freedom-limiting.
Interestingly, the example of Ulysses and the sirens is one that can be used to
described autonomy as opposed to mere freedom. Ulysses may be unfree to go as he
pleases but he ultimately follows the rules he has previously recognized as in
accordance with his ultimate interests. Though Pettit’s idea extended to popular
sovereignty is important, I believe that it’s not merely control that provides legitimacy
for laws, but people’s autonomy during the very action of creating them. The capacity
for control requires self-government – that is, without the capacity for selfidentification of interests, and their expression through collective law-making. In order
to control something, one needs a picture of what the ideal rules can be, or what rules
should not be. This picture is predicated on an idea of what individuals want, and what
the people want, as a collective entity. The legitimacy of laws and institutions comes
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from the autonomy people are able to display while making the laws, more than from
their mere capacity to control them. Agent A’s control over object P means that this
agent has the possibility to watch P, and to interfere with P should P become
problematic. This requires that A has a certain knowledge of P and of its consequences.
It also requires knowledge of A, coupled with the capacity to interfere such that P is
modified or stopped. All these elements are positive components of autonomy as selfgovernment, which control implies, but which must be prior to control.
It’s not the fact that Ulysses has control over the sailors that guarantees the noncoercive aspect of their interference – in fact, once he hears the sirens, control over the
sailors is momentarily gone. It is that the rule Ulysses established was in accordance
with his true interests and desires – which he had previously identified – and that he
was able to enforce this rule. Extended to popular sovereignty, it’s the autonomy of
law-makers – the people – that guarantees the legitimacy of legislations, and not
simply their ability to control.
2. Identification and Expression of Interests
Extending non-domination would also provide a better ground for the
identification of interests and their public expression. We know that the condition for
a non-arbitrary action is in part that interests of the subjects involved are adequately
tracked. This requires that they are previously identified by the subjects in question,
but also appropriately expressed. Adding the condition of respect for autonomy to our
definition of freedom has the advantage of clarifying the definition of arbitrariness as
well: to be adequately tracked, interests must have been articulated under the
appropriate conditions294. But identifying one’s interests is not an easy task: the ways
to identify them also vary and are often misleading. This self-tracking requirement
may be too demanding if it is not followed by instructions regarding how to identify
one’s own independent wishes and benefits. Identifying these personal goods requires
that the good conditions are met. For example, because of a lack of political
knowledge, the elector suffering from voter’s apathy may not be able to identify that
one candidate would actually serve her interests better than another. Because
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autonomy presupposes that one identifies her own wishes and good, if republican
freedom includes the need for its promotion, it will facilitate such identification, which
we know is already a requirement.
But interests may also be mistaken by the person who possesses power, who
may wrongly think they have identified the benefits of the subjects in question – see
the example of anti-vaccine parents. People’s interests are not always easily
identifiable without a strong sense of oneself and one’s own wishes – even on the side
of the interferer. The intention of the people in power may also be originally pure, but
still count as arbitrary in view of the effects that the decision has on the subject. One
can think they serve another’s interests, but be in fact serving their own, and be
unaware of this fact. It requires a high level of self-knowledge and consciousness to
identify one’s own motivations, as well as to be careful not to subtly influence
someone, in a way that it would impair their own capacity to make authentic choices.
In one word, avoiding arbitrariness in our relationships is a more difficult task than
simply avoiding coercing someone.
Including autonomy in non-domination is helpful because it allows us to
distinguish, when the frontier between arbitrary and non-arbitrary actions is blurry,
between actions that really impair people’s autonomy and those that don’t. The ones
that don’t impair freedom will require that the person in power shows a concern for
the subject’s capacity to make an informed authentic choice, and provides all that’s in
her capacity to facilitate this choice. If we accept this definition, it means that an
arbitrary will is not simply a will that doesn’t track the benefits of a subject, but it is
also a will that does not prioritize and facilitate the subject’s autonomy.
But identifying one’s own interests is not sufficiently satisfying if it is not
followed by a capacity to express them such that they result in an action. The value of
having autonomy of choice depends also on these pragmatic considerations. This
means that platforms must be put in place such that these interests can be exposed and
given appropriate weight. For example, a citizen may identify a need worthy of public
attention, but be unable to mention it to the authorities in power, because of a lack of
political dialogue, issues of visibility or accessibility. This can result in the feeling that
although interests are identified, they may never be actually heard. Republican
societies should therefore put some energy in making sure interests are not only
expressed by given appropriate consideration. This ensures that citizens remain
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motivated and involved in the sharing of their own needs, and therefore contribute to
the non-domination of society at large. It also reinforces the idea that republican
autonomy must be defined in terms of law-making abilities and exercise of public
power.
In my final chapter, I explain that democratic procedures and deliberations
should be seen as instrumental goods, because they create the most efficient platform
for the expression of people’s true interests, both individually and collectively. I
believe that the nature of republican autonomy can only be found in the link between
personal autonomy and collective self-rule, which is made possible through
deliberation. In other words, through political involvement and legislative activity,
people realize their own needs as individuals and are able to robustly protect them
through by rule of law.
3. Remaining Non-Dominated, Emancipation and Political Freedom
Republicans ought to be concerned with what makes us free today, but also
with how we can ensure freedom tomorrow. Extending freedom as non-domination
such that it includes autonomy seems to be a good way to ensure that people remain
non-dominated in the long run. Resisting domination at time T is one thing, but being
able to maintain such resistance is another. Because non-domination as it is today is
mostly a negative concept, it means that the agent can actually benefit from it even
with a certain degree of passivity. It is enough that no one dominates me, for me to be
non-dominated and therefore free. But nothing ensures that because I am nondominated today, I am immune to domination tomorrow. Nothing also ensures that I
know how to recognise domination, resist it, and act as a free agent once it’s avoided.
It is possible to be passively non-dominated – simply not suffering domination from
another – it is also possible to enjoy accidental non-domination – a situation where I
happen to be free because no one has the possibility to arbitrarily interfere. But if this
situation changes tomorrow, nothing guarantees that I am equipped to actively
maintain non-domination. We can question the value of a kind of freedom that can be
passively experienced without guarantee for the agent to enjoy it in the future.
If we include autonomy to our definition, the agent status will change: from
being able to be passively non-dominated, she will need to be actively securing her
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own freedom by constantly making sure she can resist alien arbitrary interference. If
autonomy becomes a requirement for freedom, it means that freedom is possibly
harder to reach, but better secured once it is. It also means that it becomes easier to
maintain in the future. If the person has been able to identify her interests, to
independently recognize what counts as arbitrary interference, and to secure herself
from it, chances are she will be able to cultivate and improve this ability in the future.
The value of autonomy is that it allows us to identify our authentic interests and
desires, but also that the more we do, the more secure our freedom will be. This is not
to say that once one has reached a level of autonomy, she is guaranteed to be free for
the rest of her life. Autonomy, just like domination, comes with degrees and needs to
be cultivated. Autonomy cultivation may come in various forms – civic education,
political involvement, self-inquiry, etc. But the more stable our self-knowledge is, the
more it will work as some kind of immunity to alien interferences. Extending freedom
as non-domination in this way therefore means that agents need to play a more active
role in their own freedom, which is too weak if it only is the product of the absence of
external arbitrary interference. The value of republican freedom, therefore, depends
on the use agents can make of it in the realization of their interests or aspirations, not
only at a specific time but during the course of their life; it depends on how selfgoverning agents can be.
We must also distinguish between emancipation or liberation, and freedom as
non-domination itself, which can be the consequence of the first two. Arendt clearly
explains that the distinction lies in the negative aspect of liberation:
“It may be a truism to say that liberation and freedom are not the same;
that liberation may be the condition of freedom but by no means leads
automatically to it; that the notion of liberty implied in liberation can only be
negative, and hence, that even the intention of liberating is not identical with
the desire for freedom.”295
The capacity for emancipation is a prerequisite for freedom as non-domination
– but also, the more freedom as non-domination is established, the more the capacity
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for emancipation is reinforced. The concepts are therefore linked but not similar. I
would however say that emancipation also requires a level of self-government; as I
have shown, the risk of relying on assistance for liberation could lead to domination
in the future. This means that freedom as non-domination, as the result of liberation,
requires a prior level of self-government as well. However, self-government in this
case is not simply the enjoyment of individual independence: this concept must rely
on its actualization in the political community. This is why freedom as non-domination
is not simply a matter of personal liberation: people’s emancipation must find an echo
in the public sphere, it must be validated by the political structure in which they live.
The kind of self-government that’s required for freedom as non-domination is
therefore political in nature and relies on public recognition of the equal status of
citizens. Republican autonomy is therefore a matter of political freedom: it is the
enjoyment and exercise of non-domination in a socio-political context that recognizes
agents as political actors.
From these considerations, we may conclude that although liberation is needed
for republican freedom, it should not remain the attribute of individuals only, for
people can only reach republican freedom in the context of the political community
they live in and the validation they get in the public sphere – as citizens who enjoy
equal status. Autonomy as we conceive it must meet this requirement as well: it cannot
be the attribute of particular individuals regardless of their status in the public sphere.
The extension I propose must include these elements such that it can adequately
supplement the current definition of republican freedom, and propose a viable
alternative to the neo-Roman view.
4. Autonomy as Regulative Principle
We must keep in mind that neo-republicans’ goal is to elaborate a conception
of freedom that is compatible with the pluralistic nature of modern societies. Freedom
as non-domination must permit but also promote value pluralism and diversity among
people regarding moral and political issues. Similarly, our definition of republican
autonomy must support this idea and be compatible with the various moral principles
people value – which includes the possibility that some may not value of autonomy in
164

and of itself296. We need a regulative principle through which justifications of various
claims can find agreement, and conflict resolution can happen without the need for
coercive power. I argue that autonomy as collective self-government and law-making
may be this regulative principle.
For neo-republicans, the dynamic nature of freedom as non-domination mixed
with democratic control, are enough to support and promote pluralism 297 . The
condition of non-arbitrariness ensures that group interests are constantly tracked and
respected, leading to a systematic readjustment of regulations. This is also coherent
with the idea of republican freedom as negative.
However, if we agree that a more positive definition of freedom is needed, the
need for a regulative principle becomes even greater. Indeed, if freedom requires a
certain way of action, that is aligned with republican principles, it needs to be coupled
with a measure principle that will guarantee that different claim justifications may find
a reasonable agreement, without coercion, and while respecting the interest-tracking
condition. This task is all the more difficult when the condition I have proposed we
add to republican freedom is autonomy: this concept always carries the possibility for
an inherent paradox if not handled carefully – the idea that the only way to be free is
for us to be forced to for our own sake. While this caricatural picture is not what I am
advocating for, I recognize that it is a possible interpretation of the concept I suggest
we promote, which makes the need for a regulative principle one that should not be
overlooked.
I argue that the kind of autonomy I support can serve as regulative principle
between different justifications for moral and political claims, and that in fact, taking
a step towards a fuller positive definition may bring us closer to finding a resolution
on the issue of value pluralism.
First, construing autonomy in the political sphere as active law-making,
coupled with the integration of laws as producing more personal and public freedom
– which is coherent with republican principles – is particularly helpful here. Autonomy
as active law-making can be thought as regulative by itself, because the process
through which people create laws requires deliberation and conflict resolution. It is at
the same time what gives them public power. The condition that people are authors of
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laws and that their legitimacy requires the integration of these laws on the personal
level, which means that no law can be legitimated from a republican perspective if it
has not gone through this process. Public deliberation amongst self-governing citizens
ensures that claims be articulated and evaluated through the lens of public good but
also of autonomy: according to this, agreement can only be found between two claims
on the basis of what supports an overall greater autonomy for groups and individuals.
Sen speaks of open and informed scrutiny as regulative principles between diverse
ethical claims. He argues that “the status that these ethical claims have must be
ultimately dependent on their survivability in unobstructed discussion” 298 . Claims
must therefore be able to survive and flourish when they are articulated through open
discussion, and analysed through informed scrutiny – assuming maximal information
is given to the parties involved. He believes that this scrutiny is essential as a
monitoring tool, which can be used to defend a claim as much as to dismiss one. The
advantage of endorsing autonomy as active law-making as I suggest we do, is that it
requires this kind of unobstructed deliberation and informed scrutiny amongst lawmakers. The condition that I would add, on top of survivability, is that claims must
justifiable according to the maximization of autonomy: claims must be able to not only
survive and flourish but also lead to more autonomy for the people involved in the
long run.
Another regulative principle can be found in the role of justification. Rainer
Forst, who endorses a Kantian view of republicanism says the following:
“Thus, it is freedom as autonomy, that is, freedom from unjustifiable
subjection or coercion and freedom as self-determining agent of (moral as well
as political) justification that matters in a republican account of
nondomination.”299
This idea goes with the claim that domination is “rule without justification”300.
This conception, while remaining negative, also brings significant positive aspects.
Forst’s idea is that republican freedom must understood as autonomy in the sense that
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it aims at finding justification for moral and political demands, which at the same time
provides protection from domination and substance for the making of moral and
political claims. We don’t have, however, to endorse a Kantian view of autonomy to
agree with the importance of justification as a regulative principle: justification can
simply be a way to make sure people maintain their autonomy while respecting that of
others, irrespective of the conception of autonomy we support. What makes the right
to justification regulative is the idea that for claims to be acceptable, agents must
provide a reasonable explanation for the non-dominating aspect of their claims. In
other words, according to our definition, they have to provide reasons for which their
claims support the autonomy of the parties involved.
“For control must, to ensure nondomination, be collectively
authorized, exercised and justified, and then public justification – or, rather,
the institutional force toward the better argument – is the medium of that kind
of control.”301
This view also leaves the door open for the possibility of contestation,
whenever it is based on a better argument principle, or on justifications that the
principle that is contested is no longer conducive to freedom and autonomy.
I would like to now address the problem brought up by Richard Dagger,
regarding the fact that in the same given society, people may value autonomy
differently, and some may not value it at all302. How can autonomy be a regulative
principle if people do not value it as a concept? I believe this problem can be fixed if
we consider whether the range of capability of the parties involved is reduced or
broadened.
Dagger presents two cases to illustrate this problem. First, an Amish dispute
with the State of Wisconsin in which the community – that wishes to live outside of
society – asked that their children be exempted from attending school until their
sixteen’s birthday as state law required. Second, a case where fundamental Christian
parents – who wish to be part of society – complained that the school curriculum
violated their religion rights by exposing children to a content that conflicted with their
301
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beliefs. In both cases, the issue that was raised had to do with the idea that education’s
purpose is to promote autonomy and civic virtue, even amongst communities that do
not value these concepts. Dagger responds by explaining that “we must be sensitive to
the desires of those who do not want their children to be educated for autonomy and
civic virtue but sensitive also to the possibilities that may be opened or closed to the
children themselves”303. In consequence, he says, the response must vary from case to
case, and we must be willing to accept that they can never be perfectly satisfactory.
I would however say against Dagger, that these cases may not quite be cases
where people don’t value autonomy or civic virtue, rather, they seem to be cases where
people reject autonomy of a certain kind. I am not going to discuss or evaluate the
conditions in which the parties are making their claims – whether they are competent
in doing so – but it can be argued that by rejecting the idea that schools are meant to
promote autonomy in a certain way, they are in fact exercising their own right to
autonomy. In this case, we may try to solve the problem with the justification principle,
as well as with open scrutiny and deliberation – because the discussion would take
place between two parties that value autonomy, though they do not locate it at the same
spot. Because the end goal is similar, we may have a better chance to find a satisfactory
solution for all parties.
But in the case that they in fact reject autonomy as a valuable good, we may
use Dagger’s idea according to which the possibilities, or capability of the people
involved should be evaluated. Law-makers may evaluate the extent to which the range
of possibilities is impacted for the subject, when the law in question is applied as
compared to when it is not. I agree with Dagger that a case to case approach will often
be necessary; I also believe that this range of possibilities should not be simply be
evaluated in numeric terms but also in terms of what kind of possibility has the most
intrinsic value for the agent. This is why education to autonomy and civic virtue is
helpful in the first place – so that they can identify their own values, but also cultivate
a sensitivity to autonomy. We may also say that maximizing the range of capabilities
for agents, irrespective of what they ultimately choose to do, is a better solution than
not doing so; it gives them the option to exercise autonomy should they choose to do
so, while not imposing this value on them, while on the other hand, not maximizing
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autonomy would mean taking options away. We can say, therefore, that providing
autonomy to an agent who does not want to use it, given that there is no moral
obligation for a person to be autonomous themselves, is a better bet, or a lesser evil,
than not providing it at all. It does provide this option to those who value autonomy,
and also guarantees our mutual moral obligation to treat others as autonomous beings,
even when we do not consider ourselves as such.
We should however be cautious about affirming that an agent does not care
about autonomy. As I have said, the simple fact that they are making a claim is a mark
of a certain desire for self-governing life, which they think is violate by the normative
rules of the state they live in. Their claim may seem opposed to the standard idea of
what autonomy is like – for example, they may not think it is the purpose of education,
or a capacity for critical thinking – but we should try not to disqualify agents on the
basis that their account does not fit our typical understanding. They may think that
autonomy is simply a state of harmony between one’s actions and one’s beliefs – and
like in the case of fundamental Christians, they may not want this harmony to be
spoiled: it is not that they don’t care about autonomy, but that they don’t see modern
secular societies as good vectors for it. I am not making a relativist claim, but simply
saying that this kind of disqualification can be misplaced. Regulating conflicting
claims about autonomy on the basis of autonomy is a difficult task, but we may see
advantages in the fact that each party attaches intrinsic value to the idea of the authentic
life – idea that in most cases they wish to extend to the public sphere304. I am hopeful
that in many cases, this attachment may allow deliberation and careful scrutiny such
that each claim’s viability may be evaluated.
5. Addressing Objections
Proponents of strict negative liberty may worry that adopting the view I
propose would lead to the endorsement of strict positive freedom, with all the risks
that such endorsement would represent. They may fear that our everyday actions
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would need to go under undue evaluation in order to determine whether they fit the
requirements of a free action. They may also fear the political and social consequences
of such supervision and normative judgement. Endorsing the idea that one is only free
under strict positive conditions would be denying the intrinsic nature of freedom as a
component of persons: the status of a free individual may therefore be only attributed
to those who comply with externally imposed conditions of freedom.
They may also worry that in order to evaluate the level of freedom of our
actions, they need to go under constant supervision, which is both problematically
intrusive and practically impossible. What happens then to the actions that don’t meet
the pre-established conditions? They may be banned or coercively corrected, even
when the action only involves the agent who fails to identify her own interests – for
example in the case of smoking. Should the state be in charge of avoiding such failure,
and responsible for behaviour modification?
Finally, they may also worry that autonomy as self-government in the context
of law-making is too much of a requirement for people, and that if autonomy requires
personal integration of the rule of law, then it may come at the expense of individuality.
I would answer that first, although my project is not to argue in favour of them,
“gentle” coercive tools aiming at the modification of behaviour, are already in place
in many of our societies today. Nudges, or behavioural-enhancement technologies are
already part of our lives, and seem to respond to a growing demand for more assistance
in our decision-making. When analysed through the lens of freedom and autonomy,
these tools may be evaluated differently. For example, wearing a smart watch that
reminds you to walk 10,000 steps daily, may be seen as an intrusive freedomthreatening device. But it may also be seen as an autonomy-promoting device, guiding
the person towards the most rational and beneficial decision. Thaler and Sunstein’s, in
their book on nudges, argue that these tools can enhance freedom; they define them as
instruments of what they call libertarian paternalism305. For them, nudges facilitate
people’s way to their own freedom, instead of leaving them burdened by their own
limitations. To adopt this view requires that we admit that people often fail to choose
their owned preferred option, when it conflicts with more immediate satisfaction. My
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project is not to give an answer to these questions or determine whether or not these
tools are freedom-limiting. It is simply to say that we already live with and use
“autonomy-enhancing” technologies, and that they may be appreciated in a variety of
ways – as freedom-threatening or not. This may lead us to re-evaluate our fear of such
positive reinforcement.
But in order to soothe the worries regarding the dangers of positive freedom, I
would simply say that my project is not to endorse a definition of freedom that requires
discriminative and highly-demanding conditions. Nor is it to necessarily exclude from
the realm of free-agency actions that are less than rational or less than beneficial for
the agent in question. My goal is mostly political: it is to identify matters about
freedom that are worthy of political attention, because they don’t simply concern the
acting agent but all the parties involved – this is why I am not arguing in favour of a
morally perfectionist definition of autonomy. From this starting point, I have simply
tried to show that there are more freedom-limiting experiences than what the current
definition of republican freedom is able to cover. These experiences seem to be worthy
of political attention. My answer is simply to say that adding the condition of
autonomy-preservation and promotion to the list of what constitutes a freedompreserving and promoting action, helps us cover a larger number of cases and account
for more freedom overall. Simply put, my goal is not to argue in favour of a stricter
kind of freedom, but to extend our realm of concern and say that we are unfree more
often than previously thought.
My goal is also to find a definition that meets the conditions of freedom as nondomination: it is not to replace it, but to improve it. The condition of non-domination
itself guarantees that a certain level of negative freedom is preserved, and leaves room
for value pluralism, state neutrality regarding private matters, and so on. The
promotion of autonomy I argue for must comply with these rules, and therefore,
“autonomy-promoting” interferences can never be arbitrary, nor oppressive.
I believe we also should reconsider the typical thought that integration of the
rule of law is necessarily at the expense of individuality and personal freedom, as if
these two things were intrinsically mutually exclusive. The concept I put forward is
that of autonomy as self-realization through the law-making process: self-realization
is not an accessory concept but the end goal, and it need not conflict with the rule of
law. I believe republicanism is a political theory that is ambitious and promising
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enough to reach this goal – but it may require that we adjust our anthropological beliefs
and accept people as inherently political creatures.
People can classify their own interests hierarchically. The ideal of republican
societies, is that people recognize that their higher interests are overall better served
through the rule of law, even when this law is in conflict with some of their personal
claims. They may see that public interest is in fact in their best interest, especially if
we adopt a conception of republican freedom that includes autonomy as active lawmaking. We may also consider the possibility that it is through this active political
involvement that people recognise their personal interest as intertwined with the
interests of the group. Rousseau has much to teach us about the flourishing of
individuality and freedom through the rule of law and the general will. It does not
mean that such things should be forced upon people – it is up to debate whether we
should interpret Rousseau’s idea literally306. But we should keep the hope that this sort
of informed integration happens authentically. It requires that first, we maintain our
democracy in good shape, and our legal system as acute as possible with regards to
interest tracking. Second, we must remain aware of the various ways people may be
deceived, manipulated, brainwashed, and so on, into thinking their interest is where it
is not. This only reinforces the need for a society that promotes freedom as nondomination as a barrier, but also autonomy and positive freedom as tools against such
manipulation.
Finally, I will admit that the question of the feasibility of the project is an
important one. The objection that this is too much to realistically ask of people is
understandable. But the fact that complete non-domination or complete autonomy may
be unreachable, should not lead us to abandon these ideals. Instead, we should aim at
the maximization of non-domination and autonomy, and allow for the possibility that
agents may display degrees of competence in the exercise of their own freedom. One
may also be dominated in one aspect of their life, and fully autonomous in others.
Aiming at the maximization of both instead of their full realization remains an
ambitious goal, compatible with a realistic and inclusive approach regarding what
agents are capable of.
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Conclusion
I have tried to show that not only non-domination would benefit from being
extended but that it also ought to be. Including autonomy in its definition gives the
adequate and necessary substance to make freedom as non-domination a true rival to
freedom as non-interference. It also implies that we take a stand regarding our position
in political theory: indeed, the inclusion of a form of positive freedom deepens the gap
between liberalism and republicanism, but also between neo-Romans and the
standpoint I propose: it further highlights how distinct these types of freedom can be.
It requires that we as republicans are willing to take that step and distance ourselves
from the liberal tradition, and from a neo-Roman view that still conceives of freedom
only in terms of interpersonal relationship. But taking such step need not be a source
of worry: just because positive freedom is more largely endorsed does not mean that
we are taking the risks Berlin was warning us about. It may be time for the recognition
that there are plenty of ways to preserve freedom, and that a strict negative approach
may not be the only nor the best.
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CHAPTER V
Freedom as Non-Domination and Autonomy:
Approaches, Compatibility, and Requirements

Introduction
Now that we have established the need for a republican form of autonomy, we
must define its contours. I start this section by presenting some of the pre-existing and
somewhat dominant theories of autonomy in the literature, in an attempt to identify
some key features that shape all of them and also serve our purposes. I start with the
hierarchical approach, present its main characteristics, and its limitations. I then
present the relational approaches as an alternative to the dominant rationalist theory,
as an “umbrella term”, under which a large variety of perspective can be placed.
Finally, I present an option proposed by Pettit himself as an alternative to standards
accounts, which he calls “orthonomy”, but I also mention the various challenges it
faces. In the second part, I look to evaluate those options in the light of what we should
care about as republicans – extended non-domination. I start by rejecting most of the
rationalist accounts for the reason that they seem unable to account for a whole variety
of actions and may at times be at odds with non-domination. Finally, I defend the idea
that republican autonomy is closer to relational approaches, but that we need not
commit to it fully. Indeed, republicanism possesses features of its own that may not fit
under the umbrella term, and that our definition of autonomy must take into account.
I quickly go over these features, to conclude that autonomy from a republican
perspective is in fact political in nature.
I.

Standard Accounts of Autonomy

I will start this section with an argument regarding the necessity for political
theorists not to think of autonomy as a separate matter. In doing so, I anticipate the
potential objection that autonomy is a personal concept that has to do with the how the
self is structured, when republicanism is concerned with the way society and
174

institutions are organised. My response to this objection is that they are co-dependent:
just like a theory of justice only makes sense if people are capable of identifying
fairness, a political theory of freedom relies on people’s ability to be free in all aspects
of their lives. This does not mean, that for example, the state must be in charge of
judging of the morality of its citizens’ private behaviour. As I have mentioned in the
previous chapter, the notion of non-domination serves as a guarantee that the quest for
autonomy remains non-coercive. Here, I briefly argue that our political definition of
freedom should not be separate from a definition of how people are capable of reaching
freedom personally; it should in fact rely on it. I then go over some of the main options
available in the literature, regardless of whether these theories are politically weighted,
in an attempt to identify features that could be useful to build a theory of autonomy
from a republican perspective.
1. Autonomy and Political Theory
Rawls seems to best express liberalism’s standpoint when he says that the tradition
he defends is “political, not metaphysical”307. The idea behind this is that political
concepts are best represented when they are independent from a moral or
psychological doctrine about people and their good308. According to him, liberalism
should only be concerned with finding the kind of political regulations and principles
that will allow for the full expression of people’s interests and desires. This is not to
say that Rawls thinks human beings are immune from internal impediments to freedom
as long as the political system is fair, but this is simply not what liberalism should be
concerned with. This allows liberalism to propose a neutral and therefore pluralistic
approach on morality. We have seen in the first chapter that this approach is
problematic because this position constitutes in itself a moral claim. However, the
concern is also that separating metaphysical considerations from political claims as
strictly as Rawls does may lead to difficulties regarding the way we choose which
political principles are adequate for people. To be able to make sense of any political
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theory, we need to have a clear picture of the conception of individuals this theory is
built upon. To be legitimate, laws and regulations need to serve a certain number of
purposes, in accordance with people’s interests: but to claim that a theory can only be
political, is to omit that its main function is to take “men as they are”, as a starting
point. If we take the example of state neutrality, the reason the state needs to remain
neutral is not self-evident without the reference to people’s autonomy. If state
neutrality is needed, it must be because certain non-political components of people
need to be protected. To claim that autonomy exists and ought to be respected, goes
far beyond the political discourse: it is a moral and psychological claim, however
minimal.
Similarly, republicanism needs to commit to a certain idea of people to build a
sustainable theory. Traditionally, this has been the case: historically, republicanism
has always been attached to elaborating regulations that take into account a substantial
conception of what the good life is. However, neo-republicanism leans towards a more
strictly political definition, it is also more conscientious of the fact that the good life
has various definitions. If determining the structure of political institutions in order to
make sure they do not alienate citizens is essential, it needs to be based on a theory of
how people can reach freedom in the first place. Whatever the definition we choose to
give to political freedom, it needs to be consistent with our moral and psychological
claims. If we separate the two, we face the risk of building an ideal political theory
that is not suited for people as they are, but on what we assume or hope they can be. I
also have emphasized the positive aspect of republican freedom, as the exercise of
public power through active law-making. Republican autonomy, as an aspect of
republican freedom, must also meet this condition: in other words, the republican
autonomous citizen must be an author of – public and individual – laws. Having
establish this, let us take a look at the various standard positions on autonomy in order
to check their compatibility with our specific political theory.
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2. Hierarchical Definition
One of the most prominent definitions of autonomy is Harry Frankfurt’s theory of
free will 309 . For him, the difference between a person and non-person lies in this
property: the possession and ability to use free will. Frankfurt argues that the main
distinction between a person and a non-person resides in the structure of one’s will.
Although a human being may fail to be a person, these qualities are assumed to be
human attributes only. Though humans are not the only species to form desires, they
are specific in that they form second-order desires.

Frankfurt defines these

characteristics as such: “Someone has a desire of the second order either when he
wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his
will”310. However, the distinction between a person and a non-person does not lie in
the capacity to form second-order desires, but second-order volitions. Persons are
identified not by their mere desire to have a certain desire, but by their capacity to
make a certain desire their will. Individuals without such capacity, irrespective of
whether they have second-order desires, are non-persons, or as Frankfurt calls them,
“wantons”. Wantons, as he explains, have no consideration or care for their own will,
and humans may be more or less wantons, more or less frequently. Frankfurt makes it
clear that what constitutes a person is not her rational capacities but the quality of her
will311: in doing so, he connects the capacity for autonomous thinking and freedom of
the will to the essence of personhood.
Frankfurt also mentions that mere freedom and freedom of the will are two distinct
concepts312, and says that it is “in securing the conformity of his will to his secondorder volitions, then, that a person exercises freedom of the will”313. Even if Frankfurt
never uses the term autonomy directly, but refers to freedom of the will, his definition
seems able to serve both accounts. Frankfurt’s theory is the foundation of the
procedural definition of autonomy: content of desires does not matter as long as the
process through which they are formed meets the conditions of what makes a will free.
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The origin or cause of the second order considerations on the first order desires are
also irrelevant in this case.
This neutral hierarchical position has been endorsed by Gerald Dworkin as well,
who made a few important additions. Dworkin started by presenting the conditions of
authenticity and identification as necessary for autonomy, while not sufficient314. This
requires that a person’s second-order identifications must be aligned with her firstorder motivations. However, Dworkin has later on modified his idea, and believes that
“it is not the identification or lack of identification that is crucial to being autonomous,
but the capacity to raise the question of whether I will identify with or reject the
reasons for which I now act”315. According to his new view, being autonomous does
not merely requires reflective or evaluative capacities, but must include an ability to
change one’s preferences and to act on them. Dworkin takes some distance regarding
the strict hierarchical view, and explains that second-order reflections are not sufficient
for autonomy, as they may be the result of other sources of influence than one’s own
desires – this is called a failure of procedural independence316 . To sum things up,
autonomy does not require that a person identifies with a first-order desire only, but
also that she is able to question whether she actually identifies with it.
Several objections have been addressed to the hierarchical procedural view. The
main arising problem is the question of what constitutes the legitimacy of the secondorder considerations over considerations of another order – first, third, fourth, etc. The
problem of infinite regress is first introduced by Watson for whom higher-order
volitions can also be qualified as simple desires, and that using them to discriminate
between free-will originated or alienated actions, is simply a matter of preference –
which itself needs to be constantly checked in light of an even higher-order desire317.
Dworkin himself explains what the objection to his view may be expressed through
this question: “What is particularly significant about the second level?”318. Indeed,
when the legitimacy of a desire is made according to a capacity to form second-order
volitions on it, we face the difficulty of determining where these second-order
evaluations come from, which leads to infinite regress. Frankfurt also admits the
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difficulty implied by his view; he appeals to common sense, or maybe a saving fatigue
to prevent people from falling into such obsessive regression319. Unfortunately, these
arguments seem too weak to be compelling. It is easy to see how my higher-order
reflections may themselves be influenced by various circumstances, on which the
agent may need to have even higher-order reflections, and so on. It is challenging to
identify where to locate autonomy, when the process seems to always require deeper
and deeper reflections. This constant checking of higher-order desires is pragmatically
problematic. On the other hand, if there are other ways to make sure that a desire is
autonomous, we would then have to admit that the theory is incomplete. We would
end up at our starting point, and would have to ask again the question of what
constitutes autonomy.
This problem is significant enough to conclude that the hierarchical account is
inadequate and cannot answer the question of what constitutes autonomy. That is not
to say that second-order desires are to be dispensed with all completely, but that they
are far from sufficient, and may not even be necessary. Because republicanism is
essentially a theory of freedom, and if we want to extend it to the question of
autonomy, we need a more robust definition of what constitutes both.
3. Relational Theories
Proponents of relational autonomy seem to have in common their rejection of the
hierarchical account, as well as their concern for a rationalist definition of free will, or
the idea that what makes a decision autonomous is the capacity for an agent to make
it according to a set of reasons only. This more Kantian definition, largely endorsed in
the tradition, represents a threat in so far as it eliminates from the realm of autonomous
choices all the decisions that are made on a non-rational basis – but based on for
example, attachment or care. The claim that relational theorists want to defend, is that
we live in a world of intertwined connexions with others, that these relationships
indubitably influence the way we make decisions, and that they should be taken into
account when we define autonomy. For them, the rationalist account necessarily
creates a picture of the perfect autonomous agent that is simply unreachable, because
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disconnected from the various relationships and sources of influence that constitute
her identity. It follows that the barometer must be modified: the legitimacy of our
choices cannot merely be about the things we have reasons to value, but it is
determined by the way we authentically identify to them. Christman defines relational
autonomy as “the label that has been given to the conception of what it means to be a
free, self-governing agent, who is also socially constituted and who possibly defines
her basic value commitments in terms of interpersonal relations and mutual
dependencies” 320 . This theory is more inclusive regarding the ways social and
economic environment can shape people’s choices and does not necessarily count
them as obstacles to autonomy. On the other hand, our autonomy may also be impacted
by a variety of mutual dependencies that liberalism, according to relational theorists,
fail to appreciate321. Anderson and Honneth deplore that standard accounts carry the
implicit idea that “individuals realize their autonomy by gaining independence from
their consociates” 322 . For relational theorists, this kind of independence is not a
necessary condition for autonomy, nor is it a desirable one. First, its feasibility is
questionable, but it also prevents us from appreciating important and constitutive
elements of our decision-making processes. It is also based on an idealized picture of
what individuals are capable of in terms of self-sufficiency323. Relational accounts, by
contrast, acknowledge the vulnerability of agents and therefore are able to attend to it
in a more realistic and reliable manner. This account pays greater attention to the way
resources are being made available to agents such that the realm of their actions can
be maximized – this includes, for example, the necessity to modify the structure of
public transportation in order to facilitate its use by people with disabilities. We see
with this example that self-sufficiency is not necessarily a matter of independence
from others or non-interference. On the contrary, the self-sufficiency of people with
disabilities is maximized by socio-politically made decisions. This is not to say that
relational theorists alone are concerned with this sort of maximization. One may be a
partisan of the hierarchical or even of a more individualistic view of autonomy, and
still wish public transportation could be available for a larger number of persons.
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However, these views do not require this kind of exercise-maximization: it is enough
for partisans of the hierarchical position that people with disabilities act according to
pre-formed second-order volitions, irrespective of whether these options are made
available by third parties. For a proponent of the idea that autonomy is necessarily
negatively defined, people with disabilities may be considered autonomous as long as
no external force interferes with their wishes, irrespective of whether such wishes are
realizable. Relational theories, therefore, differ from other accounts in that they add a
more positive requirement. But they are also more accepting of socio-economic,
political, or personal sources of influence, and may count actions that derive from them
as autonomous, as long as certain conditions are met – typically, conditions that have
to do with the level of self-esteem and self-trust an agent is displaying324. In other
words, one’s relationships and mutual dependencies are intertwined with the way they
make decisions: these decisions need not be free of such components to count as
autonomous.
This account may be helpful to understand choices that result from cultural
differences; for in these cases, second-order volition won’t always be relevant. Let us
take the example of Thomas, who belongs to a culture where living with your parents
and taking care of them as they grow older is the standard – as opposed to Emily, who
belongs to a culture where people tend to leave home as early as they are financially
able to. Let us say that Thomas’ choice to stay with his parents and provide for them
is motivated by a sense of care, mixed with the internalized and automatic desire to
conform to the norms of the culture he belongs to. He is simply acting this way because
this is how things are done. According to hierarchical theorists, Thomas is a wanton
because he has not paused and wondered whether he had a volition of a second-order:
Thomas may not even consider the possibility of doing otherwise. Should we
automatically assume that Thomas lacks autonomy? According to relational theorists,
this step would be a non-necessary and potentially limiting one. The autonomous
nature of an action, from this perspective, is less about the procedures through which
this action has been taken, than it is about the impact such action has on agents – both
regarding themselves, and regarding the way their interpersonal relationships are
affected. Anderson and Honneth speak of a sense of self-esteem, self-respect and self-

324

See again Anderson and Honneth (2005) for the list of requirements

181

trust: these feelings serve as barometer of the authenticity of an action with regards to
what the agent values and commits to325. They argue that these inner states are not a
“solo accomplishment”, but “are dependent on interpersonal relationships in which
one acquires and sustains the capacity to relate to this dynamic inner life”. According
to this view, an action that would not pass the hierarchy test, might count as
autonomous as long as it produces this sense of inner peace and confidence, both
within oneself, and in relation to others.
Interestingly, Emily’s choice to move out of her parent’s house may intuitively
seem more autonomous if looked at through a more Western lens, as she is in fact
gaining independence from something. But her decision, as we have said, has not
resulted from a second-order desire, but is simply the product of her cultural
conditioning. Nonetheless, she may, just like Thomas, pass the relational autonomy
test, if her decision meets the conditions of self-realization, and self-esteem presented
above. She would not, however, pass the hierarchical autonomy test.
These examples are meant to illustrate that the conditions of relational autonomy
are to be distinguished from those of more standard approach, and that the results in
autonomy-attribution may differ as well.
There are variations within the spectrum of relational theories. To remedy the
problem of infinite regress generated by the hierarchical theory, Christman proposes a
historical relational account. To him, it is generally accepted that an autonomous agent
must at least meet the two conditions of competency and authenticity. Competency
refers to the capacity to make rational choices that are free of psychological
pathologies, influence of mood-altering substances, and so on. A competent agent is
able to display self-control as well as an ability for rational evaluation. The role of
authenticity is then to ensure that the desires of the agent are truly her own. This
condition requires a capacity for self-knowledge and self-inquiry, as well as an ability
to identify alien influences326. Christman proposes to add a historical condition: the
need for such addition comes from the idea that a person may embrace current values
because of a system of manipulation or oppression that had happened in the past. She
may display competency and authenticity at time T, but her value endorsement may
325
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be the product of previous occurrences of incompetency and inauthenticity. This
intuition is that in this case, such person would lack freedom and autonomy. His theory
is historical and relational because it takes into account the social and historical
embeddedness of a person’s life: “Given that a person is embedded in, if not
constituted by, the flow of events that form her life, autonomy must be seen in relation
to that flow rather than as independent of it”327.
A possible condition for a historical account is that the autonomous person forms
a desire that was influenced and conditioned by factors that she approved of, or did
not resist, or would not have resisted if given the opportunity. But this view is
problematic because the way a person evaluates a desire is also influenced and
conditioned by her history. For example, a person may embrace her parent’s religious
beliefs and think that she would be able to independently reject those beliefs, but she
may lack the capacity to identify that her embracement is also conditioned. This
difficulty implies that there is a paradoxical possibility that third parties be better
judges of someone’s autonomy, rather than the person herself – which would be a
highly difficult claim to hold. However, Christman rightfully points out the danger of
focusing on a person’s present capacities only, and reminds us that people are
diachronic beings, with narratives that must be taken into account when we are to
evaluate their autonomy.
Relational theories of autonomy may also be seen from a feminist standpoint.
Many feminist theorists have expressed concerns about the fact that the ideal picture
of the autonomous self is often, if not always, shaped around masculine traits, and that
it is therefore intrinsically exclusive. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar write that
“the concept of autonomy is inherently masculinist, (…) inextricably bound with
masculine character ideals, with assumptions about selfhood and agency that are
metaphysically, epistemologically, and ethically problematic from a feminist
perspective, and with political traditions that historically have been hostile to women’s
interests and freedom” 328 . They argue for the replacement of this picture by a
relational view defined as an umbrella term, designed to account for a broader range
of situations and perspectives, and inclusive of various determining factors such as
327
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gender, race, or class. One of the main feminist relational claims is that pure
independence is an unreachable and undesirable ideal329. People are interconnected
through relations of mutual dependency, interest or care: these relations constitute who
we are and what the nature of our choices will be. From these observations, these
theorists claim that our standard conception of autonomy must be modified to fit the
requirements that go with a conception of the self as socially constituted330. Linda
Barclay argues that this conception does not entail the risk of social determinism,
which she says, is only a problem if we assume that genuine autonomy is necessarily
uncaused or undetermined. She says that on the contrary, the choices of an autonomous
person need not be uninfluenced: “Autonomous agency does not imply that one
mysteriously escapes altogether from social influence but rather that one is able to
fashion a certain response to it”331. Autonomy is, for relational feminist theorists,
shaped around these aspects, and cannot be the attribute of isolated individuals only –
assuming there can be such individuals. It is not the act of getting free from all relations
of dependence, it is the act of adequately responding to them while incorporating them
to our decision-making process in a way that fits the requirements of non-oppression.
However, there are debates regarding the origins of relations of mutual care or
dependency, which, just because they are a matter of fact, are not immune to
heteronomy. It is a thing to say that people live interconnected lives with each other,
and that this influences the way we make decisions, but it is another to distinguish
what amongst these relations is the result of past or systemic oppression. For example,
a woman’s care for her children may be natural and authentic, but also the result of a
masculinist tradition shaped around the idea that women must be caregivers. A lot of
debates in the recent years have emerged amongst feminists about the possibility for
women to autonomously commit to a form of radical Islam, when it places certain
restrictions on women’s actions332. From a certain perspective, women who accept
these restrictions – for example the obligation of wearing a niqab or burqa – may be
seen as submitted to the authority of male figures – father, husband, brother, etc. – or
329
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they may simply be alienated by a long tradition of women oppression, which they
would have internalized. But from another perspective, they may very well choose to
endorse their choices while recognizing that they may originate from a tradition of
oppression, but without submitting to this tradition. Such endorsement may qualify as
a full autonomous choice, if for example the person acknowledges that this tradition is
a part of her social and spiritual identity, and willingly accept its rules as a
demonstration of the values she cares about. It could simply be a way for this person
to stand for her belief in the face of society: the very act of committing, in this case,
may even be seen as an act of re-appropriation of her right to use her body as she
pleases333. In other words, identifying the first cause of the desires that determine our
choices is an impossible task. Feminist theories may need to bite the bullet and admit
that though certain relations may be the result of past oppression, endorsing them as
authentic in the present can be a means of empowerment from which autonomy can
emerge. But this is a broader issue that I will not tackle in detail here.
When put in relation with republicanism, these theories seem promising. Indeed,
because it is shaped around the avoidance of domination, republicanism is particularly
attentive to relations of oppression, dependence or influence – past, present or possible.
Because domination takes many forms, and need not be actual to deprive a person of
her freedom, attention needs to be paid on the subtle ways our relations can result in,
or be the result of arbitrary interference. Relational autonomy seems adequately
equipped to account for these subtleties, as it focuses on the various ways our decisions
may be socially and politically influenced by an alien source. But on the other hand,
relational autonomy also takes into account the fact that our relationships shape our
identity in an ineluctable way. If republicanism is to take men as they are, it would
benefit from a theory of autonomy that is inclusive of all aspects of what constitutes
human life. This is also coherent with the idea that some forms of interferences are in
fact permissible and possibly conducive of more freedom, the same way some relations
of mutual dependence are unavoidable, unproblematic, and maybe desirable.
However, more work needs to be done to allow us to distinguish between the
interferences or relations that result from, or perpetuate oppression and those that
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don’t. This is what participants in the debate between substantive and procedural
autonomy attempt to do.
4. Procedural and Substantive Autonomy
Whether they are advocates of hierarchical, relational or any other type of
autonomy, theorists usually provide a definition that is either procedural or
substantive. Proceduralists provide a definition of autonomy that is content-neutral.
The agent is a suitable candidate for autonomy as long as she checks the various
conditions that have been established as necessary, irrespective of the type of choices
she makes. The kind of actions and desires don’t matter as long as they are the result
of a process of critical reflection. This is the type of autonomy Frankfurt and Dworkin
endorse, illustrated by the example of the two drug addicts334: one is a free willedperson because capable to reflect on her first-order desire to take the drug, the other is
a wanton because unable to have such second-order capacity. We see here that the
criterion is not that the addict is choosing to engage in an alienating action, but that
she is able to reflect on it and endorse this wish as her own.
Christman advocates for a relational procedural account, recognising that
relational perspectives on autonomy are often associated with a substantive view.
Autonomy for him is obtained when the process through which an agent endorses a
desire or a value is “of the proper sort”, irrespective of the content of such value335.
In opposition, substantive theorists hold that only some particular values can be chosen
autonomously. They pay attention to the content of the desires or values, based on the
premise that some choices are intrinsically incompatible with autonomy. For example,
a person cannot decide autonomously to submit to an oppressive figure of authority:
the choice of doing so may be the result of past oppression, and this action cannot
possibly generate more autonomy in the future336. Only some actions and desires can
be part of the agent’s set of values if she wants to be qualify as autonomous. This is
Oshana’s view, who also endorses an externalist account. According to her, a person’s
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internal disposition may be affected by a whole range of psychological factors, which
may leave her autonomy intact, as long as the decisions the person is taking are
coherent with her independence. She writes that “actually being autonomous is at least
partly a function of social relationships, and states of affairs, that obtain independently
of these psychological properties”337. Not only should we pay attention to the type of
choices we make, but our autonomy is also determined by an appropriate social
structure that allows the required qualities to emerge.
Different concerns are being raised about both accounts. First, the substantive view
is often accused of moral perfectionism, because it distinguishes actions according to
a set of pre-established moral commitments. This is the nature of Christman’s critique,
who defines perfectionism as “the view that values and moral principles can be valid
for a person independent of her judgement of those values and principles”338. The risk
here is that this kind of discrimination may lead to a morally coercive definition of
autonomy, that dispenses with the internal process with which a person comes to a
decision339. But the procedural view is not immune to criticism. Mackenzie and Stoljar
argue that procedural accounts face the difficult need to “reconcile autonomous
agency with socialization, especially oppressive socialization”340. According to them,
even historical accounts fail to distinguish between oppressive and non-oppressive
processes of reflection. They also argue that procedural accounts focus on the negative
aspects of socialization but fail to recognize that autonomy is in fact globally shaped
by socialization. They argue for a substantive view as the only one capable of
identifying the systems of oppression that impairs autonomy in the past and present.
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5. Orthonomy: A Better Option?
Despite the fact that Pettit is not concerned in his political thought with a
republican conception of autonomy, he defends with Michael Smith, in separate work,
a theory of personal autonomy referred to as “orthonomy”. The need for such a theory
comes from the rejection of most standard accounts: according to Pettit and Smith,
orthonomy should replace the diverse internalist and psychological definitions of
autonomy341. The standard idea is that the autonomous person acts upon desires that
she endorses or identifies with. These accounts emphasize the conditions of
authenticity and competency: agents must act according to desires that are truly their
own, while going through an appropriate critical process. But these conditions can be
problematic for various reasons, mostly the difficulty to determine what constitutes a
person’s sense of true self, or true desires, from a strictly internalist viewpoint. This is
what Pettit and Michael Smith describe when they talk about the Sartrian challenge of
“reconstructing your every desire from scratch, giving power only to those which you
freely choose to be moved by”342. I would add to this problem the difficulty to be
assured of the competency condition as well. If competency equates being free from
the intervention of any external source of influence, then it is unclear how one could
ever reach such a level of independence. They also reject the hierarchical account, on
the basis that “it is not clear how autonomy can be fully achieve without a potentially
endless advance up the hierarchy of choice or desire: choice or desire at each level is
autonomous, it seems, only if it is endorsed a level up”343. The chase for the causa sui
of the autonomous desire could easily lead to insanity.
Pettit and Smith also consider desires to be a potential threat to autonomy,
when they are not informed by and aligned with the right principles; as they explain,
our desires tend to be in conflict with our values344. This is why Pettit and Smith choose
to adopt what they call a background view of desires.
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“Under this interpretation, a better name for the virtue might be
‘orthonomy’ rather than ‘autonomy’. It consists in forming your desires
according to the right kind of principles rather than the wrong. It means being
sensitive to the properties that count for you as values and not being disrupted
by pathologies of desires.”345
Orthonomy can be translated by the “straight, correct, or right rule”. According
to this view, agents are considered capable of free will, not to the extent that they are
self-determined, or that they act on desires that coincide with their sense of
authenticity, but only if they display a rational ability to respond to reasons to act. An
orthonomous act is the correct response to what the agent recognizes as a set of
normative requirements. The value of this concept lies in the objectiveness of the
reasons an agent had to act, and in the degree of responsiveness she is capable of. This
means that the alignment between reasons to act and desires – when desires come first
– cannot be the condition for determining if the agent is acting freely or not. Being
autonomous in this sense is, then, to be able to recognize and respond to the right rule,
in the right way.
Autonomy as orthonomy remains opposed to heteronomy; however,
heteronomy in this case is not following the rule that comes from another source than
the self. Being heteronomous, is then “being ruled by inappropriate laws: the laws,
precisely, of pathology”346, which often comes from our desires. To be orthonomous,
an agent needs to respond to normative requirements, this means that orthonomy,
unlike autonomy, does not require any form of internal harmonization. As Pettit and
Smith put it, “it will represent a way of coming into line with something outside the
realm of desire: with the reasons in favour of the relevant evaluative claims” 347 .
Orthonomy is not concerned with the different obstacles a person can encounter in the
pursuit of a desire, but it is concerned with her capacity to be in control of desires, as
well as to recognize and respond to normative requirements. The orthonomous person
is capable of acting on these requirements, not to the extent that she is not stopped, but
to the extent that she has a positive understanding of them, and of the alignment
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between them and her beliefs and values. Free will as orthonomy does not require the
absence of desires, even though they could be in conflict with normative reasons. It
simply requires that they don’t become predominant and override the sense of what
our values are. Orthonomy does not require the removal of desires, the way negative
liberty requires the removal of obstacles; it simply is not concerned with desires,
because they no longer are the barometer of an authentic choice.
6. Challenges of Orthonomy
Orthonomy can be qualified as an extreme rationalist and substantive account
of autonomy: this position leads to significant difficulties that may require that we rule
it out. Indeed, I will argue that the strictness of these two aspects may pose serious
problems of compatibility with freedom as non-domination. Before going to the
comparison, let us take a look at some of the general concerns we may have about the
concept.
One concern is that, rather than being an alternative, orthonomy seems at times
to be standing between standard autonomy and heteronomy. Since it is much less
concerned with the question of acting according to one’s own desires, accepting
orthonomy as a replacement for autonomy means arguing for a theory of free will for
which an agent’s desires are unnecessary, maybe even cumbersome. To be
distinguished from standard autonomy, the conditions of orthonomy must be highly
demanding and go beyond the mere identification with desires. As Tom O’Shea points
out, “orthonomy’s criteria of correctness for action and deliberation are too weak if
their content is determined by what we happen to value, desire, or take to be correct
(….). The more psychologistic our metanormative position (…) the less likely
orthonomy is to differ from mere psychological harmonisation”348. The reference to
values is also risky in the sense that it is not always clear how they differ from
preference: to judge of the validity of a desire according to our values, it seems that
we need to refer to some second-order evaluation, however, Smith and Pettit reject the
hierarchical view. If orthonomy does refer to values and preferences, it doesn’t seem
to differ greatly from mere autonomy, but if it requires to side-line them, we run into
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another difficulty: On the assumption that we are not the source of normativity, making
autonomy conditional upon orthonomy will mean that autonomous agents must be
receptive to reasons which are not of their making”349. Responsiveness to normative
reasons does not seem to leave much room for diversity of opinion, in fact, it is easy
to see how it could lead to some kind of moral monism. To sum things up, if orthonomy
consists in acting according to values, however rational these seem to be, and unless
we distinguish them with preferences, it is not clear how it is separate from standard
internalist accounts. If it consists in acting according to normative requirements, we
run the risk of acting according to external conditions only, which puts us close to
heteronomy.
The definition of a right principle is also unclear. Pettit and Smith define their
theory of autonomy as the capacity to form “your desires according to the right sort
of principle rather than the wrong”350. But it is unclear whether “right” in this context
refers to “rational” or to “morally good”351. On the one hand, orthonomy seems defined
as the capacity to respond adequately to the relevant reasons one has to do something,
but on the other hand, it can be difficult to identify such reasons without the moral
barometer of what makes an action justifiable. Now, morally good and rational
principles may be harmonious, but they also may conflict, and no account has been
given of what allows us to distinguish one from the other, or of why we should
prioritize one above the other. The tendency is however to think that orthonomy is a
type of strictly reason-based autonomy, in consequence, it has to face the kind of
charges that have been directed towards these rationalist accounts. Because human
beings are not driven by reason only, judging of someone’s autonomy on this basis
alone would be missing other constitutive elements. Relational theorists have rightly
point out that such picture fails to represent the reality of what agency is constituted
of. Diana Meyers also adds that a strict commitment to reason, though it is often
descried as a condition for autonomy in the literature, may in fact “leave the individual
inhibited, rigid, unspontaneous, and shallow – in a word, inhuman”352. Furthermore,
a person may have strong commitments to values that cannot be justified by
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compelling reasons, though they may feel that their autonomy would be impaired,
should they be stopped from acting on these values.
A striking example of this idea can be found in a documentary about the 2018
campaign of four female Democrats for American Congress. One of them, Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez, declared: “if I was a rational person, I would have dropped out of this
race a long time ago”353. She is referring to the difficulty of the race, but also to the
various obstacles that she has faced because of her background, and the socioeconomic type of obstructions she had to overcome in life. Indeed, Alexandria OcasioCortez comes from a first or second generation of immigrants from Puerto Rico, which
was far from wealthy, and she was still working as a waitress just before running for
Congress, and winning the election in 2018. Given the difficulty of the task and the
statistically low probability that she would succeed – being a woman of colour from
an unprivileged background – it could have seemed rational for her not to even start
the process. The reasons she had to drop out of the race for Congress were probably at
a higher number and more convincing than the reasons she had to continue. According
to the definition of orthonomy, she might have been heteronomous in persisting.
However, we have a strong intuition that she was in fact freer and more autonomous
choosing to pursue her political career than she would have been if she had followed
the call of reason.
We can think of many actions people perform without even consulting reason, but
that still seem like the right thing to do – saving a drowning child, running to a building
on fire, etc. These situations usually involve things people deeply care about, or they
appeal to parts of our beings that are disconnected from reason. But these actions don’t
usually count as alienating or heteronomous, in fact, people may be praised for
performing them, and deciding to go against what reason would have told them to do.
On the other hand, we can think of highly-rational actions, that is, actions that are
performed because of a list of reasons the agent is responding to, that don’t necessarily
result in any sense of freedom for the individual – for example, pursuing a personally
dissatisfying but successful and securing career. The intuition is that, if an action does
not bring at least some sense of flourishment for the agent, it is probably not a truly
free action. Autonomy, however we construe it, is a normative concept: to be
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autonomous is better than not to be, and a feeling of dissatisfaction is probably often
an indicator that the action performed has been chosen from another place. Orthonomy
seems too rigid and too demanding if it requires that we pick the action we have the
highest number of reasons to perform. Some reasons may also be more pressing than
other, and this degree or necessity may have more or less to do with rationality.
Orthonomy leaves an empty space: the window between mere pathological desires and
rational normative requirements – which is the space many if not most of our daily
decisions come from.
II.

Standard Accounts and Non-Domination: Compatibility Check

On which basis are we to choose between these existing theories of autonomy, and
which one, if any, is most able to fit the conditions of freedom as non-domination?
Now that we have explored what the standard accounts are, we should evaluate their
compatibility with the republican ideals. There are a few ways this could go. First, we
could pick a theory that seems desirable for a series of reasons, and see how to make
it suit our requirements, even if this means adopting a modified version. This could be
problematic because we would need to justify our choice on the basis of the things we
value, independently of their relation to non-domination. Our choice should instead be
based on republican ideals first. We could also reject all theories and create one from
scratch, shaping our conditions around non-domination only. But this seems
unnecessary, as the republican definition of autonomy need not differ dramatically
from existing theories. This section explores the links of compatibility between
republicanism and the various theories of autonomy presented above. I start by
rejecting most rationalist accounts, including orthonomy, for the reason that their
narrowness is exclusive of too many aspects of our decision-making. I explore the
possibility for republicans to embrace a relational view, but argue that although the
two theories share important aspirations, a total fusion is unnecessary. Finally, I will
introduce the idea, further explored in the next chapter, that the particularity of
republican autonomy may in fact be that it is an inherently political concept.
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1. Reason-Based Autonomy, Necessity and Non-Domination
This section explores the idea that freedom as non-domination can somehow be at
odds with rationalist accounts, including Pettit’s theory of orthonomy. I have briefly
explained why I think the hierarchical definition should be rejected, in particular due
to the problem of infinite regress that seems impossible to solve. Another bother with
this theory is that it requires a constant checking of desires to see if they are aligned
with rational reasons the agent has to have these desires, regardless of their content.
This approach leaves very little room for spontaneity, which should not necessarily be
excluded from the realm of autonomous choices. Some actions, because of their urgent
nature, or because they respond to natural or instinctive impulses may not go through
this process of rational evaluation, but may still qualify as free. Rooting both autonomy
and personhood in rational capacities is discriminatory against a large range of actions
that intuitively don’t seem to be produced by an alienated mind.
The condition of competency brings a similar concern. To be competent in making
a decision, the agent must display capacities for reflection, self-control, rationality, as
well as responsiveness to motivations that don’t come from impulses or delusion354.
This condition excludes capacities that are essential to our lives as interconnected
beings, such as care, love or empathy. Frankfurt himself admits that some actions may
be called autonomous even if they don’t meet the Kantian requirements of obedience
to the rational call of duty: for example, actions that are performed out of love355. Love
and other feelings may produce a sense of necessity to perform certain actions, and
these actions need not be heteronomous. As Frankfurt says, we are not free to choose
what to love, or what love requires of us. He goes further and says that “our essential
natures as individuals are constituted (…), by what we cannot help caring about”356,
which sounds dramatically different from his definition of personhood. Competency
in this context seems to be a difficult condition to obtain, if desirable at all. Because
the authority of feelings such as love or care is not to be confused with the authority
of the moral law357, the conditions are also distinct. Requirements of competency as
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they are usually described should not be applied to the kind of necessities generated
by such feelings, because they are entirely different in nature, without implying that
the agent is less free or autonomous. This means that the standard conditions for
autonomy are not enough: as they don’t apply to actions performed independently of
reflecting and rational capacities. Furthermore, one can wonder if full competency in
the standard sense is even reachable – whether complete self-control is obtainable for
example. There is room to argue that people are by nature limited in their rational
capacities, and that our decisions may be unavoidably influenced by all kinds of flawed
evaluations. Rather than forcing us to give up on the ideal of full autonomy, this
thought could instead lead us to expand our view on free will and induce more
inclusiveness.
The condition that a person must be able to do otherwise than the initial choice
loses relevance in this context358. The idea is that an autonomous being must be able
to choose a different path should such option be presented, and if the reasons are
sufficient enough. But modifying the course of an action isn’t possible nor is it
desirable in the case of love-induced necessity for example. Denying autonomy to a
parent who cannot help but take care of her child is utterly counter-intuitive. But love
isn’t the only cause of necessity that can be compatible with autonomous behaviour.
Dworkin writes that “it is only through an adequate understanding of notions such as
tradition, authority, commitment, and loyalty, and the forms of human community in
which these have their roots, that we shall be able to develop a conception of autonomy
free from paradox and worthy of admiration” 359 . But we should not seek
understanding simply in order to reject these notions: we should include them as parts
of our evaluative capacities, as the things we cannot do without. The idea here is that
autonomy does not require that the agent frees herself from these notions, but that she
has adequately integrated them. The compatibility of autonomy and necessity is well
illustrated through the case of Martin Luther, used by Frankfurt, Williams360, and later
on by Watson361. When Martin Luther says, about his religious beliefs, “I can do no
other”, he expresses both an incapacity and a necessity. But like Watson says, “it is at
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once a genuine incapacity and yet in no way compromises one’s agency or selfcontrol”362. The issue is to determine how one can be at the same time constrained but
still maintain autonomy. It seems here that “I can’t” is at the same time an incapacity
and a true act of will.
Let us see how these problems relate to republicanism and non-domination. Two
questions need to be asked: First, can the kind of necessity we are talking about limit
our freedom in the republican sense? For example, can Luther be considered to be
under some form of domination when declaring as such? Second, the opposite question
is: is there a possibility that the requirements of reason be limiting an individual’s
spontaneous choice in such way that it would be similar to domination?
The answer to the first question depends on the level of identification Luther has
with the statement: the necessity in this case derives from the identification of what is
most important for the agent, on the basis of pre-existing values. This is the same as
saying “I cannot do P if P means not doing S, and S is more important than P”. Another
way of solving this is to track the agent’s history: because Luther has already engaged
with a series of behaviours with which this statement is consistent, it can be evaluated
as autonomous363. However, this explanation is far from sufficient: the historicity of a
behaviour is not an indicator of its free nature – unlike what Christman says, history
only gives indications on that level in a limited way, as someone may have been
brainwashed or manipulated early and display consistent heteronomy her entire life.
But it seems important to trace history at least in some minor way; indeed, a sudden
change in one’s behaviour and a radical shift from habitual values may be suspicious.
Watson mentions a better way of understanding this problem, introducing the
notion of “unthinkability”, and using the example of Elizabeth Bennett in Pride and
Prejudice, who says, as she is being pursued by Mr. Collins, “I am very sensible of the
honour of your proposals, but it is impossible for me to do otherwise than decline
them”. Here we are in a case of deliberative necessity: we are in the incapacity to act
against the reasons that are most important to oneself – reasons that need not be strictly
rational. This identification is linked to a sense of oneself, necessary acquired through
self-scrutiny. Watson writes that “’I can’t’, in Luther case, is not merely a judgement
about normative priorities, as it seems to be on the normative interpretation, but a
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conclusion about oneself, a personal judgement”. He adds that while professing as
such, Luther was “taking a stand”, and expressing what values he was most committed
to.
However, how can we be sure of the moral legitimacy of our values and of the
things we care about? In the republican sense, these values must be coherent with nondomination, it is the barometer of the legitimacy of our decisions. Luther’s case can
be explained as such: the necessity he expresses is coherent with the values he had
already committed to, that he identifies as most important, and which are coherent with
non-domination – for Luther not to express such incapacity would be to bow down
before the domination of the ones asking him to act differently. The condition of
integrity to these values is also crucial to guarantee that the agent remains committed
to the value of non-domination in the long run. As Charles Taylor says, autonomy is
not a matter of individual internal disposition only, it also is a capacity to respond to
considerations that are external to the self, and on which we have qualitative
evaluations364.
Now, if we take the problem differently, we may wonder if the requirements of
strict responsiveness to reasons can in some ways be alienating. Let us see what
happens if we apply the conditions of orthonomy to the ideal of freedom as nondomination. It is easy to recognise that desires may inhibit our autonomy when they
are in the foreground of our deliberation process. The agent may always be in need to
check whether the action she is about to perform is aligned with the desire she has at
a specific time. Such a process seems to have little to do with making sure our actions
are consistent with the values with deeply and permanently hold. But similarly, we can
conceive that having desires in the background may threaten to undermine our
autonomy as well: it could become too austere and too distant from what we truly
value. Actions that are too far from desires, however compelling the reasons we may
have to perform them, may inhibit our sense of authenticity and result in a loss of
freedom.
Referring to orthonomy, Nomy Arpaly says that “There is something appealing
about Smith’s view that it is rational to want to do what one believes it to be rational
to do – or rather, to want to do what one believes that one would want to do if one
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were rational. (…). Does the mere fact that I believe a certain desire would be rational
for me to have make it rational for me to have it? What if my belief is false?”365. If I
am wrong in my perception of what the rational thing to do is, in the context of
orthonomy, I am at risk of heteronomy. But if I am not, and that rationality pushes me
to give up on other aspects of life that I value, aspects that may also be considered
coherent with my best judgement, I am suffering alienation from the normative
requirements of reason. Put in the political context, we can assume that if I am
alienated on a personal and psychological level, it seems unlikely that I will reach a
state of full non-domination on the political level. It can also be added, that if an agent
is alienated on a psychological level, this will have an impact on the kind of political
opinions she will have, and that she may be less inclined to make decision that will go
in the direction of freedom. Adopting this claim requires once again that we accept
that domination can be unintentional.
Let us take the example of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez one more time. A
decision to drop out of the race would be rational – as she herself admits – and may be
her best judgement, but not the action that makes her the freest. By dropping out, he
would either surrender to a form of social determinism, or to the difficulty of the task,
given the circumstances of her candidacy. For republicans, a loss of freedom is the
result of an act of domination: we can say that Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez would be
dominated by her circumstances if she had dropped out of the race for Congress. One
may argue that domination would only be metaphorical in this case, but I reject this
idea, because first, if we equate non-domination to freedom, then anytime there is
unfreedom, there is domination. Second, we have seen that domination can cover
larger aspects of life than we traditionally thought. It still needs to be proven that a
person who experiences the interference of an arbitrary will – or its possibility, suffers
more of a lack of freedom than a person who experiences a systemic unintentional
form of oppression. I am not sure that my freedom is better preserved in the situation
where I cannot enter the elite school I wish to study in, because I lack the socioeconomic resources to do so, than in the situation where someone is actively blocking
my way to class. As opposed to an accident, the former example is the result and
continuation of a system in place, that may not have an intentional will at its command.
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It is not an isolated event, and it is also not equally shared by everyone as a natural,
unavoidable fact – as for example, the restriction of not being able to breather under
water, which is not a case of freedom or autonomy-limitation. This situation is also
predictable: it is likely to repeat itself in similar ways, when the natural effects of
chance are not. The circumstances of Alexandria-Occasion Cortez would have
conditioned and compromised her freedom, if she had chosen to listen to reason. We
are now faced with a situation where the agent seems incapable to be orthonomous
and non-dominated at the same time.
Orthonomy is at odds with republican freedom if we want the latter to be more
inclusive and accept that domination may occur in non-intentional ways, or if we want
to consider the possibility that domination can also be psychological – created by a
zealous and strict commitment to the normative requirements of reason. But we should
be cautious of all strictly rationalist accounts of autonomy; for the reasons I have
presented, I think the condition of rationality as necessary and sufficient should be
rejected – this does not imply that reason has no role to play, only that this role is of
lesser importance than standardly believed. We now need to see if the inclusiveness of
relational theories helps providing a good alternative to think of autonomy in the
context of non-domination.
2. Relational Theory and Republicanism: Common Political Aspirations
Given that strict rationalist accounts pose a series of problems, it seems natural to
turn to relational theory for answers. Indeed, they provide a more complete and
inclusive picture of what plays a role in our free decision-making process. However,
theorists who are put under this label also provide various pictures of what autonomy
means – historical, feminist, substantial, procedural, etc. – the goal of this section is
not to go over each of them and check their compatibility with freedom as nondomination. Given the variety of definitions that are given in the literature, it seems
there are many ways we could go if we were to pick a single theory to meet our
demands. My goal in this section is therefore humble: instead of committing to a
specific theory of free will, I will defend the idea that republican autonomy is closer
to relational autonomy broadly construed, than it is to the standard rationalist accounts.
Does it mean that republicanism must commit to relational autonomy broadly
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construed? I don’t think such a strong move is necessary, nor that it is desirable.
Republicanism is a rich and complex theory in and of itself, with its own specific
features, and it should not be reduced to a single theory of free will. But this doesn’t
mean there cannot be affinities between the two. Here I will briefly present the reasons
I have to think relational autonomy broadly construed is more equipped to meet the
demands of republicanism. However, the relation between the two is limited to the
features they have in common, which are not representative of all the aspects
republican autonomy must take into account. I will briefly present what these aspects
are, and conclude that the specificity of republican autonomy is its intrinsic political
aspirations, which is a claim I will develop in full details in the following chapter.
The first reason I have to think republicanism is close to relational theories of
autonomy is that just like freedom as non-domination, these theories are broader and
more inclusive in the way they perceive impediments to autonomy. We know that nondomination not only requires the absence of arbitrary interference but also its
impossibility. It means that the agent must not only be faced with an actual obstacle
but must also be free of the eventuality that such obstacle be put in her way. Relational
theorists don’t defend a strictly similar idea, but their requirements for autonomy
however seem to go in a similar direction. According to them, a person may lack
autonomy, not simply because she is constrained at time T by an alien influence, but
also because she has evolved in an environment where such influence may have taken
place, or could take place. By emphasizing the role our relations to others play in the
formation of our will, relationalists show that it is enough that a person be in a situation
of possible constraint to lose autonomy, even in the absence of actual constraint. For
example, it could be argued from that perspective that it is enough for a woman to be
heteronomous, that she has lived all her life in a patriarchal society which made her
internalize misogynistic ideas – for example, she could wish to start a career in a mandominated field but never conceive to express such a wish. This situation may lead her
to lack the confidence to form and express an authentic opinion, or make independent
choices because she may consider them to be valueless. But she may also spend her
entire life without being actually coerced by a man to do anything, or prohibited from
expressing an opinion or making a choice. The systemic form of oppression she has
suffered from has resulted in a lack of autonomy because of the possibility that such
opinion may be disregarded or that she may be shamed for expressing it. Domination
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works in a similar way: if an agent experiences the impossibility to perform an action,
because of the potential consequences she may be faced with, or if, for the same reason,
the action is simply unconceivable, she already is in a situation of non-freedom.
On the other hand, we also know that republicans hold that not all acts of
interference limit freedom, and that some may even improve it. Similarly, for relational
theorists, not every influence or relation of interpersonal dependence is a limitation to
autonomy. In fact, these relations are unavoidable parts of human life, and must be
included in our definition of autonomy – concept that otherwise, would simply be
impossible to obtain. The parallel is easy to draw: freedom does not require the absence
of all interference, and autonomy does not require the absence of all interpersonal
influence, dependency, care and the like. What matters for both theories is the kind of
interference or relation that is established between agents; this is why a qualitative
evaluation needs to take place. Another consequence of this is that relational autonomy
is by nature more inclined to focus on the way socio-economic matters shape or impact
one’s autonomy. This dimension brings it closer to political theories. The main
purpose of relational approaches, is as Mackenzie and Stoljar write, “to analyse the
implications of the intersubjective and social dimension of selfhood and identify for
conceptions of individual autonomy and moral and political agency”366. Because they
are already committed to a social and political definition of autonomy, republicanism
could learn from relational approaches about the way we can adequately identify, track
and avoid systemic domination and oppression.
3. Republicanism’s Specific Features
Although the two theories can meet, there is no need for republicanism to commit
to a specific approach; not only would it be potentially limiting, but it would also be
dismissive of the fact that the theory possesses specific features itself, which
relationalists may or may not be willing to endorse. I will briefly go over what I think
are these specific features, in order to show that whatever theory of personal autonomy
republicans commit to, they will probably need to be taken into account.
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The first of these features seems to be that autonomy is inherently a political
concept that is only conceivable within the framework of the political community, and
can only be enjoyed alongside the status of citizen – idea that I have developed at
length in previous chapters. Active citizenship, and exercise of public power through
law-making are sine qua non components of republican freedom and autonomy. This
follows the traditional republican idea that freedom is connected to citizenship, and
that one can only be free in a free state. For the Romans, libertas and civitas are two
sides of the same coin367. For Machiavelli, freedom is a form of self-government at the
service of the well-being of society, and is identified with the rule of law 368 . For
Rousseau, a person’s civil freedom is the consequence of the fact that she belongs to
the body citizen; autonomy is precisely the novel elements that emerges once men
enter the civil state. It is what makes the difference between natural freedom and civil
freedom, and Rousseau believes it to be the only truly valuable kind of liberty. It
follows that one of the essential features of republicanism is the importance attached
to the individual as part of the whole of the community, from which she gets her
freedom, her autonomy, as well as a series of rights. Citizenship is an essential part of
republican autonomy because it is in relation to others that the agent is able to identify
the values she will be commit to, and be able to check their compatibility with nondomination. It is only through the tools society provides that she can cultivate selfmastery and collective self-government.
Civic virtue is a republican feature that is typically emphasized in the tradition. We
know that this is a major concern for classic theorists – where it is often associated
with protection from the threat of self-deception and private interest – but we have
little information regarding what civic virtue may look like for neo-republicans. It does
not seem to be a requirement for freedom as non-domination. However, the value of
civic virtue can simply be explained in terms of involvement in the community, which
itself is used as a tool towards the self-development of its members. Dagger explains
that “republicans (…) recognize that individual liberty is secure only in a selfgoverning community, which means that individual rights must be balanced with
public responsibilities if the community is to survive and prosper. Someone who takes
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these public responsibilities seriously is said to display civic virtue”369. Involvement
in the community, public expression of needs and interests, contribution to the general
good, mobilisation in order to maintain benefits or contest injustice: these are only a
few ways civic virtue is being expressed every day in modern societies. Republicanism
must aim at the preservation of these expressions, and see them as conditions for
freedom and autonomy. Not only would this help maintaining some form of political
concord, but it also serves as a way to identify sources of domination. If we agree that
autonomy must be understood as part of the global framework of non-domination, it
means that people must be informed enough such that they identify domination and
are able to protect themselves and others from it. I follow Dagger in the idea that civic
virtue mainly consists in taking this role in the community seriously: not only as a way
to peacefully live with one another, but also to commit to the values that inform a
person’s capacity for self-government.
“To teach people to hold their passions in check and to cultivate devotion to
the common good is therefore to achieve a form of self-governance. In this respect,
civic virtue and autonomy have something in common. (…) In this case, the
republican distinction between dependence and independence has a direct
counterpart in the distinction between heteronomy and autonomy.”370
Autonomy is also a quality that is cultivated with the help of others: though it may
seem paradoxical, no one remains autonomous on their own, and Dagger also says that
people in society have the reciprocal obligation to help others obtaining and
maintaining autonomy371.
I however disagree with Dagger’s idea that this view of civic virtue is compatible
with a liberal perspective and that more generally, the distinction between republicans
and liberals need not be as sharp as it is372 . His goal is to argue in favour of the
compatibility of the two theories, and of a form of republican liberalism based on the
idea that both theories may be equally attached to the value of autonomy. My
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perception is that this idea is based on a flawed premise: the assumption that liberalism
is appropriately committed to the value of autonomy, an idea that I have rejected. I
believe that a sharp distinction between liberals and republicans is necessary, first
because we cannot endorse freedom as non-domination without rejecting freedom as
non-interference, and since freedom as non-interference can be said to be the essence
of liberalism, we cannot endorse one theory without rejecting the other. I also believe
that one of the specific features of republicanism is its openness to the question of selfgovernment, but that this idea is incompatible with liberal values. The question is
therefore not “are republicans as attached to autonomy as liberals are?”, but “since
liberals are unable to appropriately commit to autonomy, how can republicans replace
them in this task, and succeed where liberals have failed?”. Because the theories rely
on two dramatically distinct claims – the openness to autonomy being one of the
barometers of their distinctiveness – I believe that the prospect of building a form of
republican liberalism is doomed to failure.
To these elements can be added the importance of avoiding corruption, which is
also an apparently bigger concern for classic republicans than it is for modern
advocates of the theory. Historically, corruption is often described as one of the biggest
threats to freedom. It is typically defined as dishonest behaviour, often perpetuated by
a corrupting agent in power, who looks to influence another agent through fraudulent
means – often involving bribery. But it can also be understood as the action of
prioritizing one’s self-interest at the expense of the common good373. Dagger explains
that classic republicans fear corruption because it leads to the neglecting of one’s civil
duty374. But it would be a mistake to think that the importance of avoiding corruption
only belong to the past: it remains relevant today as a tool to avoid domination as well
as heteronomy.
Corruption places both parties in a state of vulnerability, each for different reasons.
The corrupted agent is in the state of vulnerability because at the mercy of the
corrupting agent, who holds a position of power – because of the possibility of
blackmailing for example. She is under the domination of an agent who can interfere
with her life at any juncture, and her well-being only depends on the powerful agent’s
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will to remain on her side. But the corrupting agent is facing the risk of domination as
well: because she has engaged in fraudulent activities, she has broken the social
contract that aimed at preserving her freedom from domination – assuming she lives
in an ideal republican society. She no longer benefits from the state’s protection. For
Robert Sparling as well, corruption is still a worry for modern republicans, because it
causes dependence. He distinguishes the dependence that comes from domination, and
the dependence that comes from corruption. The first type strictly refers to the
subordination to arbitrary power, while the second type “derives from a condition of
material subordination”375. He argues that both should be a source of worry. However,
Sparling finds regrettable that Pettit excludes bribery and reward from the realm of
domination, and accuses him of distancing himself from the republican tradition that
he claims to perpetuate376.
But other forms of modern corruption pose a potential threat to freedom, and
they need not involve financial bribery and reward. We can call corruption anything
that deprives an agent of her capacity to clearly identify her values and benefits, and
this at the benefit of another’s self-interests. Manipulating speeches and demagogy for
example, can be considered forms of corruption, because they can considerably
influence people to the point that they no longer perceive what their true interests are.
Temptation and persuasion can be other aspects of it: the very aim of advertisement
for example, is to influence people’s choices while preserving the idea that they remain
masters of their decisions. Ruth Grant argues that many cases of incentives pose a
certain number of ethical problems and ultimately obstruct our freedom 377 . The
problem of incentives is that they are often deceptive, despite giving the impression
that people maintain power in their choices – which they do to some extent378. Grant
challenges the standard idea that incentives are only market mechanisms used as
alternatives to political control and used to maintain a certain degree of independence
from the State 379 . Her claim is that on the contrary, far from being the result of
automatic forces of the market, they can be tools of political and social power, and
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present a risk of coercion, without having to insist or convince380. Though we probably
need to draw a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate incentives, I share with
Grant the worry that providing people with choices may deceive them into thinking
they are in possession of freedom of choice, or autonomy, when they are in fact deeply
influenced. Neo-republicans should be concerned with all forms of deception that lead
people to wrongly believe they are in possession of autonomy, and the state of
dependence and vulnerability it places people in. Republican institutions and laws
should be made in such a way that the distinction between legitimate incentives and
disguised acts of coercion can be easily made.
One further question that could be asked is whether republican autonomy should
be procedural or substantive. Pettit often expresses concerns for value pluralism, and
affirms that the aspirations of neo-republicanism break with the tradition because they
are universal in nature381. Pettit also describes non-domination as a neutral goal rather
than a constraint. This may lead us to think that neo-republicans would probably be
more inclined towards a procedural approach, more compatible with a pluralistic view
on values. However, autonomy can also be considered substantive because it is
committed to the rules of non-domination: in that case, only actions that fall into this
box can qualify as autonomous behaviour. Even if non-domination is neutral – and
this is a debate in and of itself – the fact that it shapes and conditions the structure of
our autonomy adds a dose of substance to the matter: actions that do not follow its
structural laws are simply ruled out. In fact, it has been argued that freedom as nondomination may solve the debate between the two views in the context of relational
approaches. Danielle Wenner recognizes that relational approaches on autonomy have
correctly pointed out the problems of liberal conceptions, but worries that they provide
ambiguous guidance regarding what, in our social embeddedness, constitutes
oppression and what should be preserved382. She argues that adding freedom as nondomination to the mix allows us to distinguish between the two without having to
determine which preferences are problematic and which are permissible. The
autonomy that results from that is not about finding a higher or true self, but rather
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about the relations of power and oppression that limit our available options. But
irrespective of the approach we choose, it seems that autonomy for republicans must
be aligned with the specifics features I have presented here. This also adds an element
for the endorsement of a weak substantive view, the idea that without committing to a
particular moral view, the constitutive elements of the theory must be conditions for
the self-government of republican citizens.
Conclusion
From these observations, we can conclude that first, republican personal autonomy
should not be overly rationalist, and should put a greater emphasis on authenticity and
integrity than on competency as it is usually presented. It is closer in nature to
relational approaches, though I haven’t argued for a full endorsement of the theory, as
it would be potentially limiting and probably inadequate. But the two theories can
certainly meet when it comes to interpret and evaluate one’s autonomy at the light of
elements that are political in nature. Autonomy from a republican perspective must
also meet the requirements of republicanism, and respond to the demands of civic
virtue and non-corruption broadly construed. These elements are however most likely
intertwined: each of them contributes to the promotion of the others, in a reciprocal
way. More specifically, autonomy for republicans must be intrinsically connected to
non-domination, and non-domination depends on the existence of a proper political
structure. This is why, rather than to look for specifically internal criteria, we might be
more efficient in our attempt to define personal autonomy if we connect it to political
autonomy as two sides of a same coin. My final chapter will focus on the development
of the idea that for personal autonomy to be obtained, political autonomy must also be
secured, both at the scale of a country but also globally. I will defend the idea that
instead of endorsing a specific theory of autonomy and make it fit our requirements,
we should understand the nature of republican autonomy as a political concept,
dependent on the proper state of global affairs.
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CHAPTER VI
Political Autonomy
and Globalized Non-Domination

Introduction
The generally shared republican idea about freedom is that one can only be free
in a free state. Freedom as non-domination is not only an individual matter, but
depends on the political system in which people live. Republicans are therefore
concerned with the various ways individuals may be oppressed as members of a
society, but also with the ways the political community they are part of can be
dominated by other states or non-political groups. My goal in this chapter is to extend
this idea to the concept of autonomy, and defend the claim that the best way to define
republican autonomy is to conceive it as dependent on the autonomy of the country
they live in. The kind of autonomy we need for republicanism must be political in
nature if it is to respond to the demands of non-domination as a political concept. My
claim has two sides: it implies that the autonomy of the citizen vis-à-vis her state and
fellow members of society is guaranteed and promoted, but also that the country itself
enjoys a level of autonomy vis-à-vis other states, which requires a form of globalized
non-domination. The problem of international non-domination has only been
addressed fairly recently, as neo-republicans have come to acknowledge the various
ways globalization and disparities of resources and power can affect the freedom of
states and consequently of their members. This chapter draws a picture of domination
worldwide and highlights the effects it has on the freedom of states and citizens. I start
with a definition of political autonomy, which takes multiple forms: I argue that nondomination is a necessary condition for the political autonomy of states, but that it is
not a sufficient condition. I then present the various ways globalization poses a threat
to the non-domination of countries and people. I go over a few solutions for these
issues, and their limitations. These solutions remain incomplete because by focusing
on non-domination only, they fail to provide ways to preserve and promote political
autonomy. Finally, I list the main requirements I identify for both global non208

domination and political autonomy of states and citizens. I admit that these
requirements may not fix the problem entirely or permanently: we may need to accept
that autonomy, just like non-domination, is a skill that needs practice and may not be
fully reachable. However, I think the republican ideal should be to aim at the
acquisition of as much freedom as possible, in all its forms, and I believe that the
requirements I present are the more accessible and secure way to do so. I argue for the
maximization of political autonomy, recognizing that although the solutions I present
may face obstacles, the attempt remains worthwhile.
I.

Political Autonomy, International Non-Domination and Globalization

1. Political Autonomy and Free State: Definition
What does it mean for a state to be free? And is it the same as being politically
autonomous? By political autonomy, we can understand two things. First, it refers to
a nation’s independence and ability to provide for its own population without the help
or interference of other nations. This form of autonomy does not concern the
individuals themselves but the community in which they live. A country enjoys a
certain level of autonomy when it is self-governing, and is not under the control of
another, or depends on another for its survival. A region can be autonomous or partly
autonomous as well: for example, three of the constituents of the United Kingdom –
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales are semi-autonomous regions that enjoy some
degree of independence in legislative affairs, though sovereignty belongs to the British
Parliament. Secondly, political autonomy can be understood as the political
application of personal autonomy for citizens of a given nation. It also refers to the
ability for citizens to identify their values and needs, make demands and be heard by
their given state. It also is the possibility for them to act on said values, as members of
a political community. Finally, it refers to people’s position as actors in the political
sphere, as creators of laws: it is self-government when “self” is considered as a
political entity. I will start by giving a definition of a free state from the perspective of
freedom as non-domination: this definition has two requirements, first that the state be
non-dominating in its structure, second, that it is non-dominated by other states. I will
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then explain what political republican autonomy is compared to mere freedom as nondomination, and why it should not be left aside.
The general republican idea is that one can only be free in a free state383. Skinner
writes, following the tradition, that “when we speak of living in a free state, what we
mean is that we are living in a self-governing community, one in which the will of its
citizens is recognised as the basis of law and government” 384 . From a republican
perspective, a free country is a country where the rules of freedom as non-domination
are in place, both internally and externally. Internally, it means that the people enjoys
freedom from the arbitrary will of a ruler, a powerful group, the government, and the
like. The laws and regulations are made in such a way that no intentional arbitrary
interference occurs, or has the possibility to occur.
But a state must also be free from domination by other states, this is why nondomination is applied externally as well. As Pettit says, establishing freedom as nondomination internally will not be enough for people to actually enjoy the status of free
citizens385. They also need to enjoy non-domination from the exterior, which means
they should not be part of a state that is at the mercy of an alien force. Pettit explains
that this can happen in three ways: first, a country may be dominated by another more
powerful country – in the case of war or invasion for example. Second, a country may
suffer control from a non-governmental private body – for example, corporations,
terrorist movements, powerful individuals, etc. Third, Pettit mentions that nongovernmental public bodies may also exercise alien control, and cites the United
Nations, the World Bank, or the European Union as examples386.
In all these cases, we see that the first condition of a person’s freedom is the nondominated status of the country in which she lives, and not the other way around.
Republicanism does not provide a picture of freedom conceived as being the
responsibility of individuals, who then gathered together would form a free society.
On the contrary, the pre-requisite of their individual liberty is that society is formed
on the basis of non-domination first. This is coherent with Pettit’s idea that freedom
as non-domination “is not an ideal that should be left to individuals to pursue in a
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decentralized way”387. Republican freedom relies on the pursuit, establishment, and
maintaining of political power.
Pettit is right to consider these internal and external threats as acts of domination,
and his definition of a free state provides useful insights into what kind of invasion or
coercion a country might suffer. I will go over these various threats in more details in
a following section. However, it seems that by focusing only on freedom as nondomination, the picture he provides misses a few elements. My first addition would be
to say that a free state and a politically autonomous state are two slightly different
things, and so are the corresponding status of the citizens that live in these states. First,
it is not the same for a citizen to live in a free state, and for her to actually enjoy
political autonomy. Second, a country may be free from the alien forces Pettit
describes, but not actually enjoy autonomy itself. These considerations seem worth
considering if we are looking to maximize people’s freedom in general. Secondly, I
would add non-intentional alien forces to the list of what can obstruct a country’s
political autonomy as well as its citizens’.
Internally, a country may provide freedom as non-domination for its citizens,
without providing political autonomy. It means that they can be under no arbitrary
interference from another citizen or from the state itself, while having no capacity for
political self-government. By internal political autonomy, I mean the capacity of a
citizen to be an active part of a self-governing society. For example, non-dominated
agents may enjoy a level of freedom, but may have no understanding of political
matters, no education regarding what their role as citizens are or can be, no possibility
to makes demands, or to have a guarantee these demands will be heard if they are, and
so on.
From an external perspective, a country can lack autonomy while enjoying
freedom from domination. On a basic level, a region may be non-autonomous simply
because it is not politically independent from the country it belongs to. For proponents
of independent Catalonia, the fact that the region legally belongs to Spain despite
having its own growing economy, language and culture is sign that its autonomy, as
well as the autonomy is its population, is violated. I will not be discussing the validity
of these independence demands; this example is meant to show that there can be non-
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domination without political autonomy, on a purely external and structural level. This
should not lead us to think that this kind of autonomy is necessarily desirable, only
that it is distinct from mere non-domination.
From another perspective, that a country is free from potential control of an alien
power, whatever that power is, does not make it able to act as an independent body. It
may still be in a state of dependence on other levels, or require assistance for the most
basic of its needs. For example, Haiti, after the 2010 earthquake, because of its already
difficult condition mixed with the violence of the event, required assistance from the
international community, as well as humanitarian association, non-governmental
organisations, etc. The survival and well-being of its population depended on this help,
given that the country is already one of the poorest in the world. This type of
benevolent interference does not constitute domination, and the earthquake, because it
is a natural catastrophe, does not count as arbitrary power: it simply is an effect of
chance. The international acts of solidarity did not constitute impediment on its
autonomy, but the fact that they were required was a sign that such autonomy was
never here in the first place. We could think of many examples of this kind: the purpose
is to show that political or economic dependency of a country on another, or a group
of others, often results in an incapacity for said country to decide of its own fate, and
on its own terms.
Finally, by focusing on intentional arbitrary interference, Pettit leaves out many
elements that can impair our autonomy, many of which are not the product of an
intentional will. For example, the socio-economic situation of a nation, or of a group
within this nation, will have an impact on people’s capacity to decide for themselves,
to be involved in the community or simply to feel like their voices have the same
weight as the voices of the well-off. Lack of resources generally produces a
minimization of available choices, but also a diminution of ways to act towards these
choices, were they available. We can also extend this to simple acts of misfortune: the
geographic location of a country, its lack of natural resources, its proximity with other
threatening nations, and so on, may be effects of chance that would not constitute
domination. But these parameters may obstruct the autonomy of said country and its
population. For example, South Koreans regularly complain that the poor quality of
their air is due to their proximity with China, and that because of this unfortunate state
of affairs, they suffer the repercussions of economic choices that are not their own.
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This is in no way an act of domination, but it can have an impact on the country’s
autonomy, on its citizen’s lives and ability to make choices.
Political autonomy does not however require that countries live in a complete state
of autarchy, in fact, a higher degree of global solidarity and a higher amount of fair
interferences is probably what is required to improve the current situation in the
international order. But these examples show that political autonomy may be impacted
without any act of domination as Pettit understands it. As Artiga says, “the
requirement of an intentional agent intending to interfere in one’s activities strongly
limited the scope of the republican notion of freedom, in such a way that economic
situation or social status remain largely unaffected”388. If republicans wish to provide
a theory of freedom that has repercussions on the global scale, they should be
concerned with international and national political autonomy, and the non-intentional
ways it may be obstructed.
2. The Threat of Globalization
In this section, I will go over some of the main ways both external and internal
political autonomy can be threatened by the current state of international affairs. I start
with the principle that freedom as non-domination is a prerequisite to political
autonomy, but also that political autonomy’s final goal is the perpetuation and
strengthening of non-domination. The list of obstacles is far from exhaustive, but is
meant to point out some of the major ways domination can occur and prevent a country
and its citizens from overcoming their condition of subordination. None of these can
be said to be the cause of global domination alone, as Laborde and Ronzoni say:
“domination in the international sphere is connected to global inequality, poverty, and
lack of effective accountable institutional regulation at the global level, but cannot be
reduced to any of these issues alone”389.
a) Interdependence, homogeneity
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If a country is dependent on another on a certain level of things, chances are it will
lack a level of freedom as non-domination, and of political autonomy. Dependence of
one country on another can take many forms; for example, it can simply be due to a
lack of natural resources, or an overuse of these resources by a country that has more
possibilities to afford them. The problem only worsens when these resources are fossil
fuels or non-renewable. If a country is disempowered because of its economic or
political situation, it will naturally depend on the assistance of others for the survival
of its system, and the well-being of its population. For example, Ethiopia’s decreasing
economy has been recently booming after the Chinese government decided to invest
in its infrastructure, rebuild some of their roads and train services, and that Chinese
companies had chosen to relocate their factories there, employing thousands of
workers. These changes, which may improve people’s overall well-being, come at the
expense of the country’s ability to independently decide of its own fate – ability that
only seems to get more and more out of sight as Ethiopia has taken out a significant
loan from China.
Globally, this kind of intertwined relationship between a powerful country and a
weaker one creates a situation of dependence that is opposed to the republican ideal of
non-domination, regardless of the good this relationship can bring. That China has
taken Ethiopia out of an economic and social crisis is not reprehensible in and of itself,
but it creates a situation where Ethiopia depends on China’s assistance and good will.
It is an obstacle to political autonomy because it creates an impossibility to act as a
political entity without the help or approval of the powerful state in charge.
Even if there is no such disparity between the wealth and resources of countries,
when a nation is in a relationship of mutual dependence with another, or belongs to a
group where decisions must be taken with homogeneity – through consensus – there
can be a loss of political autonomy for the countries involved. This relationship can
imply requirements that may impair a country’s capacity to make its own political
choices. For example, for certain decisions to be made on a number of matters,
members of the European Union need to vote unanimously. These matters include for
example taxation reforms. A European Union member may have an interest in creating
policies to minimize tax evasion or tax avoidance within Europe. A concrete example
would be to forbid private companies to make profit in a country while officially being
registered in another that has a lighter tax rate, which given the free circulation of
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goods and people policy, is currently impossible. That in order to make such law, all
members of the European union, including countries like Ireland whose economy has
largely benefited from such practices, need to vote unanimously, considerably
minimizes the chances that this could happen in a foreseeable future. Countries whose
interests are that such laws exist are therefore obstructed in their attempt to provide for
their own citizens. The requirement of unanimity in the process of making common
political decisions may have some advantages – for example, to make sure that a
certain form of equity between countries that are more or less powerful is respected.
But it can also fail to recognize the qualitative distinctions between needs, resources
and interests of the various European populations. Political autonomy must take into
account the variety of needs countries may have, and allow them to make non-arbitrary
political decisions such that their citizens are not deprived of any good they consider
of public interest, for reasons that can be related to them only.
b) Private interference and corporations
When political decisions are interfered with in order to defend private interests at
the expense of the public good, there is a risk of losing freedom as non-domination
and political autonomy by the same token. Pettit mentions the risk that corporations
can pose to the liberty of nations, and denounces two fallacies that are commonly
believed about them390. These two fallacies may seem to pose a tension, I will explain
that they actually are two sides of the same risk. The first fallacy is the idea that
corporations are not real agents, that they are only “dense site of market-like activity”,
and “networks of individuals” 391. According to this, there is no legal reason to treat
corporations as agents, with the responsibility and juridical implications that this
would entail. Pettit explains that this view is common amongst economic circles,
where corporate bodies are often simply seen as the result of a contractual
arrangement. But Pettit is right to point out that although not every contractual
agreement results in the emergence of an agent, it doesn’t follow that no such
arrangement can ever result in such emergence. One of the reasons Pettit has to think
they may be seen as agents, is that they represent themselves as agents, who are reliable
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in their actions, and speak for themselves. He also says that they pursue certain
purposes and justify their action by the facts that they have judgments and goals that
are similar to those of an agent392. But I would also add that most importantly, as a
group that speaks for itself as a reliable entity, they have a power of influence, and can
use incentives such that they may interfere with public affairs. If the purpose of the
interference is the benefit of said corporation at the expense of the population’s
interests, freedom as non-domination as well as political autonomy is violated. The
additional problem with the fallacy is that by denying their status as moral agents,
corporations may also deny their responsibility in their interferences and their
consequences, complicating juridical actions and the capacity for the population to get
reparation for potential damages.
The second fallacy Pettit presents is the idea that corporations have autonomous
rights, which is also common in economic circles. The problem here is that allowing
corporations autonomous rights would be breaking up with the equality principle that
each individual’s interests has the same weight in the public sphere. Therefore, we
should allow corporations rights on the basis of the individuals that compose it, not as
an entity of its own 393 . He takes the example of American elections, where
corporations are allowed the right to financially support a candidate the same way an
individual would. In this case, people run the risk to see elections being influenced by
a more powerful agent; in consequence, those on the other side may feel intimidated
or powerless. This situation disturbs the political scene because it violates the principle
that individual voices ought to be equally heard; the problem is also that the
corporation’s global decision may overcome the interests of some of those that
compose it. As Pettit mentions, one may argue that corporations have interests of their
own that are different from those of the individuals that constitute them. It makes it
unclear, in this case, which interests ought to be respected in priority. Pettit responds
that corporations depend on the individuals who constitute them for their existence,
their functioning, and their sustainability. Therefore, the interests of the corporate body
are not interests of its own, but can only be linked to the interests of its parts. These
interests can be discordant, but they must all be taken into consideration with an equal
attention. However, the voice of a corporation, if we grant it autonomous rights, will
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also be louder than the voice of any individual outside of it. As Pettit says, “we can
allow corporate bodies to have autonomous rights only if we are prepared to reject
the idea that the law should treat people as equals in determining what rights (…) they
are to enjoy”394.
One could say there is a tension in demanding that we treat corporations as moral
agents, but also denying them individual rights. I however don’t think that this is the
purpose of Pettit’s argument; his endeavour is mostly an attempt to observe, describe
and point out inconsistencies in the way corporations occupy public and moral space.
The problem is that our attitude towards corporations is ambiguous: we allow them
the possibility to avoid the responsibility of moral agents, but we also provide them
the possibility to claim the rights of an individual. In doing so, we let them obtain the
best of both worlds without the contribution that comes with each of these standpoints.
This situation creates and unbalance that impacts the freedom and autonomy of the
rest of the community, as potential abuse of power on one end necessarily implies less
power on the other.
It seems clear that corporations and private interference may obstruct a country’s
autonomy in various ways. First, corporations may act as powerful agents that
influence the political scene without taking the moral responsibility that would be
expected from a moral agent. Second, they may claim to have as many autonomous
rights as an individual, while being more powerful and therefore more visible, which
violates the principle that all citizens’ interests should be equally respected. Finally, in
both of these cases, it can influence the public by the use of resources or incentives in
a way that disrupt people’s capacity to make informed political decisions aiming at the
realisation of their true interests.
c) Disparity of resources and political instability
I have already argued that inequality amongst people increases their chances to
lose personal autonomy, because they may lose the involvement required to act as an
informed citizen. This claim implies that in many ways, personal and political
autonomy are linked. But there are other strictly political ways a country may be at
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risk of not only domination but also a loss of autonomy due to its material
disadvantages. The examples of Ethiopia and Haiti show that when a country is in a
situation of economic struggle, the chances that they will become dependent from
another country or organisation’s help are higher than for those that are capable of a
certain degree of self-sufficiency. Economic dependency does not necessarily generate
domination, but opens the door to it: first, the dependent country is not in a position to
equally bargain for the good it needs, and is likely to accept less than fair deals as long
as the survival of its population is ensured. Secondly, it facilitates the use of arbitrary
power for the helping country or organisation, which is in a position to act with its own
interests in mind. Thirdly, the dependent country is unlikely to resist domination
should it arise, because unable to face the potential consequences of resistance. For
Pettit, poverty and insecurity undermine a country’s freedom as non-domination, as
well as its citizens’, showing that the personal fate of an individual is linked to her
social and political condition.
“And poverty and insecurity mean that individuals are fair game for the
domination of the more powerful; they would have none of the resources of
personal independence that might empower them against predators, and they
would lack the resources of an effective culture or law that would provide them
with a degree of protection.”395
Similarly, if a country is facing a political crisis, in such ways that institutions
are no longer able to secure citizens from domination – from other citizens, groups, or
the state itself – it loses its free country status. Following Pettit, we may say that these
countries qualify as ineffective and non-representative: “States that are ineffective or
non-representative give rise to problems of abuse, poverty, and insecurity that they
cannot themselves be expected to put right; they may even be at the source of those
ills”396. Political instability creates the conditions for domination in two ways: firstly,
the country may be unable to resist domination from another more structured and
powerful country wishing to take advantage of it. Secondly, from an internal
perspective, political instability creates the conditions for groups or individuals to take
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control over others, as the country may be too divided and institutions may be too weak
and disorganized to offer protection from such abuse. This kind of situation may
however produce apparently positive outcomes: the Arab Spring that started in Tunisia
in 2010 and spread in several countries in North Africa and the Middle East, was a
popular response to the years of abuse theses populations had faced from their
respective leaders, as well as the poverty and corruption that went with them.
However, very few of these revolutions resulted in an improvement of the people’s
condition. In fact, because of the fragility of the institutions and the weakness of the
political and social resources available to citizens, most of them ended in civil wars or
gave birth to an even more authoritarian regime. Ineffective and non-representative
states don’t only pose a threat to their own internal or external autonomy, as Pettit
says, they also put the whole world order at risk, as they may contribute to the
emergence of terrorist groups, global epidemics, be the cause of environmental
damage, generate waves of illegal immigration and so on397. Because globalization
implies relations of deep connexion between political actors worldwide, if a country
suffers domination one way or another, it is likely to affect the global population as
well.
d) Environmental issues
The fact that globalization connects countries together implies that their respective
situations are likely to impact that of their neighbours, or those with which they are in
close relation of exchange. This is even more true when it comes to environmental
issues. I mentioned the case of South Korean citizens who often accuse China’s
massive coal production of spoiling the quality of their air. But many other examples
of this can be found. For examples, for decades, China was taking care of recycling
most of the world’s waste, especially plastic. The country, however, decided to restrict
its recycling activity in early 2018, leading countries of the world to send their waste
to poorer, less powerful countries, which are not in position to establish a fair deal.
Countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, or the Philippines are now accepting thousands of
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tons of waste each year, which has considerably multiplied the number of recycling
factories, often at the expense of the local population and its environment.
Some countries are also more vulnerable to the effects of climate change than
others, not only because of their geographical location, but mostly because their
economic situation does not allow them to face the issues to come with the required
infrastructures. In 2013, a British risk study institute made a list of the sixty-seven
countries which will be impacted by climate change the most 398 . The degree of
vulnerability often coincides with the level of poverty the countries are in – countries
like Bangladesh, Sierra Leone, Haiti, Sudan or Cambodia are some of those for which
the risks are considered extreme. It is not difficult to see how the political autonomy
of these countries and their populations can be impacted by such an unfortunate state
of affairs.
However, the threat of global warming does not constitute an act of domination as
Pettit understands it: it is not an act of arbitrary intentional interference. I would argue
that environmental issues are closer to domination than they are to natural effects of
chance, catastrophes or accidents. Firstly, they are the product of a system in place;
they also are predictable in the long term and in some ways avoidable, when a natural
catastrophe has no cause that is attributable to any moral agent, group, or system –
unless the natural catastrophe is related to climate change for example. Secondly,
global warming can also be seen as the result of decisions that have initially been made
by intentional actors, and from which more vulnerable actors suffer the indirect
consequences. What distinguishes the impact of a purely accidental natural
catastrophe, and that of one that is directly related to climate change? And what makes
one closer to domination than the other? Apart from the fact that one is an unavoidable
accident and the other the product of a system for which we can predict the outcomes,
the main reason is probably that environmental issues are the consequences of a series
of decisions that, even if they did not have the intention to provoke catastrophes, are
the sign that some agents have the power to indirectly or directly produce such
outcome. On the contrary, natural accidents cannot be blamed on anything but fate,
resulting in a difference in the way we receive and process them. The intuition is that,
in the case of climate change catastrophes, things could be different; that they are not
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comes from the fact that there is a power in place – with the possibility that this power
acts arbitrarily. Accepting the situation, in this case, equates to give up on something
– power, equality, fairness, etc. – when accepting natural accidents as something no
one can change may be more internally freeing than limiting. The limitation that goes
with the kind of environmental problems I have describe, is accompanied by the
feeling of disempowerment at the face of a situation that need not be this way. The
political autonomy of the countries affected suffers, as well as the political autonomy
of their citizens, whose actions are limited or obstructed by actual or potential
devastating events, often forcing them to change the course of their lives – as we can
see with growing cases of climate change-related migration.

II.

Possible Solutions and Their Limitations

One need not be a republican to worry about these issues and their impact on
people’s freedom. However, some neo-republicans have also started to analyse these
problems in light of non-domination, and provide potential solutions. Here, I will go
over some of them, both from non-republicans and republicans. I argue, with Laborde
and Ronzoni 399 , that the first set of non-republican solutions fail to capture the
relationship of domination that is at stake in the context of globalization. But I argue
as well that the neo-republican solutions also fail to capture the distinction between a
country’s freedom as non-domination and its autonomy.
1. Non-Republican Solutions: Cosmopolitan and Social Liberal Distributive
Justice
As Laborde and Ronzoni mention, current discussions about global distributive
justice aim at providing solutions to the problems enumerated above. One of these
solutions come from cosmopolitans, who consider the current state of affairs as a
global concern. If we agree that justice is a global ideal, therefore, a fair distribution
of goods should be made regardless of the citizenship of individuals400. Distributive
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justice is not a matter of what each state can equally give to its members but what the
global community can arrange such that resources are equally distributed amongst
actors worldwide. The problem with this solution is that although inequality of
resources should be a concern because it creates inequality of power and facilitates
domination, if we focus on resources alone, we risk omitting other dynamics of power
between states that may not have anything to do with resources. As Laborde and
Ronzoni say, “normative issues regarding the structure of power within existing or
possible systems of global governance are still thereby neglected”401. I would also add
that focusing on global distributive justice alone misses the internal problem of
domination, and the dynamics of power and submission that can be in place within a
country, regardless of its resources. A country can already be benefiting from the
current global distributive policy, but be exercising internal domination upon its
population, or a fragment of it. Cosmopolitan ideals of global distributive justice may
be praiseworthy but are insufficient to account for all the forms of injustice that may
occur irrespective of a country’s resources.
Social liberals have been concerned with this problem: as Laborde and Ronzoni
mention, they have tried to determine in which way distributive justice can be
institutionally established. Their focus is on local, intra-national requirements for a fair
treatment of people. However, they also fail to properly address the issue, by
neglecting “the way in which global power relations undermine the necessary
conditions for domestic justice itself”402. These two solutions are therefore inadequate,
because they either fail to see what internal power dynamics can be in place such that
citizens are unfree regardless of their resources, or they miss the problem of globalized
domination that no domestic distributive justice can by itself make up for. These nonrepublican accounts fail to provide an adequate solution to the problem of global
injustice, because their picture is either too broad or too narrow. Turning to
republicanism is helpful because it frames the problem in the context of domination,
and by consequence, is able to account for dynamics of power that are both internal
and external, as well as those that are independent from the resources a country may
have.
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2. Republican Solutions: Globalized Non-Domination
Laborde and Ronzoni present a few of the options that are available for
republicans who wish to solve the issue of global domination, or at least reduce it. I
will present some of these ideas, as well as some of Pettit’s suggestions on the matter,
but argue that they are largely unsatisfying.
A first solution could be to dispense with national systems of governance to
adopt a global republic, since states don’t seem to provide the adequate structure
within with we can guarantee non-domination, both domestically and worldwide403.
This solution is problematic because it seems to miss that historically, republicanism
aims at the promotion of regimes that are as close to citizens as possible, and requires
an accurate tracking of their needs and interests. It is hard to see how a global
government would be able to adequately track the benefits of billions of people, all
living in different climates, environments, and with a disparate variety of resources
available. Maintaining the republic as small as possible might also be a way to more
efficiently preserve people from state domination404: at a broader level, we run the risk
of losing transparency in the way political decisions are taken. It is also easy to see
how a globalized republic would make the democratic process more complex and
opaque. Laborde and Ronzoni also mention that the idea of keeping governments as
close to the people as possible may historically be the heart of republicanism405. They
also notice that today, “the current global crisis has, if anything, strengthened ideas
of self-government within existing politics, as well as indignation, on the part of
citizens, towards loss of control over domestic institutions”, and take the example of
the defiance southern European countries often have towards the European Union. As
they explain, mutual non-domination requires a “self-ascriptive and self-recognizing
demos”. In other words, it requires an autonomous body-citizen made of autonomous
agents – situation that seems at odds with the idea of a global state.
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The second solution goes in the opposite direction and consists in making states
fully independent of one another, leading to a form of ultra-nationalism. This would
have the benefit of reversing the process of globalization, and eliminating the problems
of global domination it generates. But this proposition is not a sustainable alternative
either, first because it is unlikely to be globally accepted in a world that values
circulation and market freedom. Secondly, the same way a globalised republic could
easily turn into a hegemonic tyranny; this kind of strict autarchy could result in local
forms of domination which would no longer be managed by neutral international
organizations
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. Nothing therefore would prevent states from intra-muros

domination. Let us remember that the ideal of republican freedom implies that some
instances of interference are not only permissible but also desirable as they may
produce more freedom. A system of closed doors between nations would take away
the benefits that such benevolent interference could provide. There are also situations
where referring to state membership as a means to establish which rights people are
entitled to, may pose serious moral problems that republicans, as freedom advocates,
should be concerned with – for example, welcoming refugees from a country in war.
The third solution is moderate and consists in forming a multi-level system of
governance, where non-domination would be the barometer of political decisions. This
would result in a decentralized multi-faceted self-governing society, which could have
local, regional, national or global forms of governments, where “sovereignty would be
dispersed according to what minimizes domination”407. This idea is ambitious and can
seem promising to some: it has the merit of providing an alternative between globalism
and nationalism, and keeps the focus where it should be – the ideal of non-domination.
However, it can also seem too utopian to be sustainable. My main issue with this kind
of system is that it makes it difficult to see by who or what the repartition of
sovereignty would be determined. This project, if taken seriously, would need further
clarification about the conditions according to which power would be distributed
between regions, nations or transnational groups. It would also have to leave a large
space for the autonomy of each group in power, while making sure they respect the
needs of their members, and are also held accountable on the global scene. The size
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and power of these groups would also need to be checked, such that none could take
over another. These requirements may be too demanding, and while it is a promising
picture, we may be better off trying to maintain and improve our current state-based
system.
Pettit addresses similar problems regarding the possibility of regulations by
international agencies. He is mostly concerned about the idea of allowing a single state,
which he calls “benevolent-despot”, to play the role of a world police officer, checking
whether states respectively respect principles of non-domination within their borders
and outside408. According to him, an alternative would be a sort of international regime
which would function as a regular state, that is, with constitutional authority and a
balanced system of power. Pettit says that it would “guard against the problem of
dominium or private power by establishing a rule of imperium or public power”,
which would “empower the weak and restrain the strong”. Unlike the benevolent
despot, it would “be subject to the check of an equal citizenry” and therefore unable
to exercise arbitrary interference. However, the same problems raised by Laborde and
Ronzoni apply. There is also no real certitude about whether this global institution can
really exercise non-alien control. But most importantly, the scope of this organization
may be too large to see the subtle ways domination between and within states can
occur: “The forms whereby more powerful states can control less powerful states are
so various that no form of central regulation, and certainly not the sort that is
associated with currently existing bodies, could effectively prevent state-state
domination” 409 . This solution could only have a limited effect on the plague of
domination worldwide, and it would also pose a potential threat to the self-governing
aspirations of countries and groups.
But international bodies as they are arranged today also have some advantages.
Pettit’s second proposition is to maintain the current state of affairs regarding states,
and to propose that we pay close attention to discussions between governments about
world issues. He says that these conversations, though they may never lead to a full
consensus, can “establish a currency of considerations that all sides recognize as
relevant to global organization”. Pettit calls these considerations “common reasons”,
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and argues that they are crucial in the way countries can related to one another, and
respond to each other’s demands, without the need for a third party. They are the
conditions to the possibility of cooperation between countries, and they will make
states able to accept international regulations which they know to share with others in
a system of reciprocity 410 . These reasons must be shared by the international
community, such that a country that would violate one of them would be held
responsible and accused both by its members and by the other countries of going
against rules that are respected worldwide. Pettit rejects the accusation of being overly
optimistic in his idea, and implies that the fear of disgrace and shame is enough for a
leader to prefer to respect international common reasons. The acceptance of these
common reasons as mutually beneficial between states is for Pettit the only way that
they can establish regulations to mitigate the power of some, while encouraging the
growth of others. It is for him the only means to reach non-domination on the global
scale.
However, this picture seems indeed overly hopeful, and close to wishfulthinking. Just like we don’t know if non-domination will actually bring about
autonomy, we cannot be certain that dialogue will enable countries to recognise their
mutual interest and establish authoritative common reasons. This doesn’t mean it
cannot happen – for example, the European Union is often described as the result of
European countries’ common will to live in peace. But it is unlikely that common
reasons will be found on the global scale, and even if they were, it is unlikely they
would be equally respected. The fear of being internationally or internally shamed has
been proven through history – old and recent – to be an insufficient reason for a leader
not to do what was intended. The multitude of needs, the disparity of power and
resources, and the already-in-place systemic domination that can occur between
countries and within their borders, make the establishment of common reasons look
unrealistic. The problem is that it relies on a weak but necessary assumption: that
countries will indeed wish to cooperate and find common reasons.
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Some of these attempts are promising and can provide parts of the solution for
the reduction of systemic global domination. My concern is that all of the republican
ones are focused on the avoidance of domination in its narrow definition. None of
them express a concern for political autonomy as a separate – though related – concept
worthy of attention. The claim I have defended previously was that there are other
ways to be unfree than simply to be dominated, and that non-domination does not
always mean freedom, when autonomy is not secured. The pattern repeats itself on the
political level as well: what makes a citizen free is not simply the avoidance of
domination, but the capacity to make use of her political capacities. To get rid of
domination on the global scale does not make countries able to be self-sufficient, or
politically and economically able decide for themselves. It also does not equip citizens
with tools to be politically informed. Not only are these solutions unable to eliminate
domination worldwide, but they also remain silent regarding ways people and
countries can reach and exercise self-government in a way that promotes globalized
freedom as non-domination as well.

III.

Republican Political Autonomy: Requirements

We have seen that the ways a country can lose its freedom as non-domination and
political autonomy can take many forms, we have also seen that these two concepts
are related but also distinct. Freedom as non-domination is a necessary condition for
political autonomy, both external and internal, however, it is not enough to ensure it.
In this final section, I will go over what I think the requirements for political autonomy
are, from a republican perspective, that is, from a perspective that values the principle
of non-domination as an ideal that is to be generalized, and also respects the ideals of
the republican tradition. I believe that it is crucial that we once again take a firm step
towards a positive definition of republican autonomy, as the best way to answer the
questions left open by both liberalism and neo-Roman republicanism. In the case of
globalized freedom as non-domination, it means advocating for a system in which
citizens exercise self-government through public engagement and the making of laws,
which requires that the state provides such possibility, and is itself in a position of selfdetermination in a positive sense. It may however be important to remind ourselves
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that autonomy, just like freedom, is not an all-or-nothing-at-all concept: it comes with
degrees, it can fluctuate with time, and it needs to be practiced and cultivated. This
means that we may have to give up the ideal of establishing freedom as nondomination and political autonomy once and for all and completely, but we should
instead aim at its maximization.
The conditions that I present are means to reach this seemingly reasonable and
reachable ideal. They are what is in our power to do, such that the possibility of nondomination and political autonomy are maximized. The first condition of political selfgovernment is a system of independence and sovereignty of nations with a possibility
of intervention on a non-arbitrary basis. The second condition is a level of economic
and political self-sufficiency of states – admitting that full sufficiency is probably an
unreachable ideal. The third condition is distributive justice that is applied within
states, which must also be provided with the tools to control alien forces that may work
against equality. The fourth condition is a high degree of representation and
democracy: however, I do not argue for the value of democracy in and of itself, but I
take it as an instrumental tool that requires both an informed use of it and an adequate
interpretation of its results. Each condition has an external and an internal value: I
explain for each of them why they are useful to establish political autonomy globally
or within a country’s borders.
1. The Value of Small States, and Independence in International Relations
We have seen that the idea of a global republic seems both unrealistic and
potentially dangerous: danger mostly comes from the absence of a third regulating
party, and the risks of hegemony that this could entail. We have also seen that this goes
against two ideas: first, traditionally, republicanism seems fit for smaller independent
states. I am not drawing the conclusion that only a small state can be republican, but
historically, there seems to be a repetitive pattern and emphasis on city-republics more
than on larger states. We see this trend with the Ancient Greece city-states, or polis.
According to historians, Greek city-states at the time would have a population of
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between 400 and 800 males, and would not exceed 100 km2.411 To this number needs
to be added women, children and slaves, but none of them would be taking part in
political affairs. We can easily imagine how the democratic process was facilitated by
the small number of citizens, especially when we know that the system of voting was
done by raising hands. A small territory also offers the advantage of facilitating
political participation, because it provides more knowledge of the affairs of the city.
As citizens live closer to each other and in similar conditions, they may be more aware
of each other’s needs and able to relate to them. As for Romans, even though they
rejected the Greek democratic model, they also valued popular sovereignty and the
organization of Rome was one of a city-state. This can seem paradoxical given the
imperialistic nature of the Roman Empire. However, true res publica cannot be just
any body politic: it is the type of system that was in place in Rome, which, for the
Romans, was intrinsically dependent on the mixed constitution. Skinner describes the
importance of the Italian city-republics during the Renaissance: “By the opening years
of the duecento, many of the richest communes of Lombardy and Tuscany had thus
acquired the status of independent city-republics, with written constitutions
guaranteeing their elective and self-governing arrangements”412. He mentions that the
rediscovery of Aristotle’s texts played a role in the way these communes where
organized, but also that they lived according to the Roman law, and followed a similar
mixed constitutional system. Finally, another example of the value of a small state in
the republican tradition can be found in Rousseau: “Just as nature has set limits to the
size of a well-made man, and outside those limits makes only giants and dwarfs, so
also for the constitution of a state to be at its best, there are upper and lower bounds
to the size of the state if it isn’t to be too large for good government or too small for
self-maintenance. Every body politic has a maximum strength that it can’t exceed, and
that it won’t even reach that maximum if it becomes too large. (…) Generally speaking
a small state is stronger in proportion than a great one”413. That Rousseau sees values
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in a small independent state is not surprising considering that his ideal model of society
is the city of Sparta.
The independence and sovereignty of the states is also important to preserve
because it seems to be in people’s interests: the growing need for self-government and
independence from bigger globalizing structures – such as the EU – seems to be the
expression of a certain need, that if we are concerned with interest-tracking, is
probably worthy of attention. Finally, countries and regions have aspirations and
requirements that are unique, and due to various factors. For them to exercise selfgovernment, they must be sovereign in the realisation of these needs. Smaller states
that enjoy a certain degree of independence from the larger group they belong to are
able to be closer to their members such that this sort of tracking can be made.
What does it mean for a nation or for a group to be independent? First, it means
that it does not rely on the assistance of another nation of group for its survival – I will
develop this idea in further details in the section about self-sufficiency. Second, it must
enjoy a form of political independence in the way laws and regulations are made:
which does not mean that the legitimacy of these laws can never be checked by a third
party. Members of the community in question should be able to evaluate such laws in
order to see if they respond to their needs, such that control is not alien but internal,
and comes from the beneficiaries of the regulations themselves. This implies that
individuals themselves enjoy a level of independence from one another, from the
community they are part of, of from non-state alien forces such as corporations. They
must be capable of articulating their needs, on the basis of what they identify as
essential and valuable for their well-being as citizens, at the condition that these needs
remain aligned with non-domination and the autonomy of their fellow citizens. They
must enjoy independence from the influence that private bodies may exercise via for
all kinds of incentives, and that can create conflict between their needs as members of
the body-citizen and their desires as individuals. It should be added that anything that
promotes independence of opinion, such as the presence of free media or education to
critical thinking, must be encouraged as tools be able to participate in the public life
as an informed member of the community. However, the independence that is required
at the individual level should not lead us to adopt an individualistic view of needs –
implying that people can never be influenced, helped or encouraged by others without
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losing autonomy. Citizenship is shaped in relation to the political environment people
live in: because not every influence is invasive, citizens may often require the
assistance of others to understand their own role in the political community.
Political independence must also be compatible with non-arbitrary interference: on
the global scale, it means that states have a right to interfere with another state’s
sovereignty momentarily in order to prevent an act of domination. It means that some
kind of intervention is not only permissible but also desirable if it preserves people’s
freedom. But this kind of control must be controlled itself and interventions should
always be made on a non-arbitrary basis, meaning that they must be made with the
interests of the dominated people in mind only. Institutions may for example be subject
to contracts with other states or third-party institutions in charge of global surveillance
– which is more or less the role of the UN. On an internal level, the state must also
interfere in order to stop domination or to prevent it before it happens. Maynor argues
that direct state interference is required for the learning of civic virtue such that the
values of non-domination and independence are respected 414 . He says that “the
inculcation of these virtues and values also seeks to orient republican citizens in a
particular direction so that their lives are enriched and they can do well by
themselves”. This requires that citizens “are prepared to play an active role in their
own non-domination by letting others and the state become award of their interests”.
The state has an active role to play in the promotion of this skill. The idea that political
autonomy on the individual level requires independence does not entail state
neutrality: it is coherent with the republican idea that some forms of interference may
in fact produce more freedom.
A last question could be asked regarding who in the community deserves to be
politically independent and autonomous? Many regions in the world wish to detach
from the state they legally belong to, and form independent states themselves. Some
of these demands can be judged as very legitimate claims, but it seems impracticable
to allow any region or small group to claim a status of independence on the justification
that their needs, heritage, and access to resources slightly differ from those of their
neighbours. To determine what and who deserves to be called autonomous is a difficult
task that I will not attempt to achieve here. I will simply say that promoting the
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autonomy of citizens on an individual level is helpful to evaluate the quality and
legitimacy of their demands. When a demand is collectively made by an assembly of
informed citizens, aware of the laws of the republic, and able to argue for their claims,
the state may be more likely to give it weight. Promoting political autonomy of citizens
is therefore not only intrinsically good, but it is also instrumentally valuable to
determine whether the needs and interests they express are valid, assuming the state is
also informed enough to appropriately judge of such validity. It allows citizens to take
part in the collective conversation, as legitimate political interlocutors and actors.
2. Self-Sufficiency
To be independent, a country must also show a certain capacity for selfsufficiency, and this on the political scale as much as on the economic level. Does it
mean that if a country relies on the help of another, or on charity organizations to be
able to satisfy its population’s basic needs, it is necessary at risk of domination? One
thing we may say is that the assisting institutions will not necessary take the advantage
to dominate: if it follows the principle of non-domination, assistance may remain
benevolent and useful. However, the assurance that it remains as such depends on the
nature of the organization and on the kind of help that is proposed: in other words, it
depends on the will of the interferer, thus increasing the risk of domination. The risk
here, does not merely comes from the possibility of interference, but from the
interferee’s powerlessness in resisting it, putting it at the mercy of the interferer’s good
will. To make sure that this risk is avoided, not only should we ensure that the motives
for the assistance are non-arbitrary – immediately and in the long run – but we must
also guarantee that structures of control are in place in case said motives cease to be
benevolent. Most importantly, the helping body must work towards the independence
and self-sufficiency of the body that needs assistance. It must be willing, but also
desirous, to let it go on its own once it has recovered the power to do so.
To be self-sufficient politically, a country must be sovereign in its political
decisions, and they must be respected by the international community. Economically,
it means that the country has access to the resources that are needed for its people not
only to survive but reach a level of well-being. On an individual level, self-sufficiency
is the capacity for citizens to reach a level of well-being that enables them to live their
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life independently of a third party’s help. The OECD estimates that self-sufficiency is
measures according to the “extend of participation in the economy and society and
how well individuals are able to get through daily life on their own”415. Globally, selfsufficiency of states should be an object of concern and also a common desire shared
by the international community. If we look at the republican tradition, this question is
a recurrent concern. For Aristotle, self-sufficiency is what the city should aim at, which
he defines as the ability to acquire everything while being in need of nothing416. For
the Greeks, self-sufficiency is also a normative concept: not only a city must have
enough to live on its own but it also must provide enough for its citizens to live well417.
For the Romans and Machiavelli, the requirements of a city’s freedom are of the same
nature. Machiavelli writes that a state “can never become a perfect republic wherein
every contingency has not been foreseen and provided by the laws”418.
But the ideal of self-sufficiency of people is slightly ambiguous: as Robert
Mayhew mentions, it’s difficult to see how one can even be in need of nothing, since
for Aristotle, we are political beings and live in close relationships with other members
of the community. This is also true for a city or a state, as political bodies are often
connected to one another. As he says, “neither an individual nor a city can provide
everything he or it needs himself or itself”419. How then are we to reach such level of
self-sufficiency and the freedom that it is meant to entail? Furthermore, isn’t the ideal
of self-sufficiency at odds with the republican emphasis on community and political
implication of individuals? Does it bring us closer to the liberal claim that individuals
should be left to choose the course of their life because they are the only ones able to
do so?
The first way to answer the question of feasibility is to say, with Aristotle, that a
city must not be required to have “everything” to be self-sufficient, but to have
everything that is essential for life – and make it accessible. Mayhew mentions that a
city is always more self-sufficient than its citizens420: individuals never have access to
these necessities on their own, and can only be self-sufficient in the context of the city
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they live in. That is why for Aristotle, self-sufficiency should be a priority of the city,
and a by-product for the citizens. This is coherent with the republican idea that first
comes the free states, and then the free people. Another way to answer the first
question is to consider that self-sufficiency of a city and its people is not incompatible
with interrelation between states or between citizens. Again, just like not every act of
interference is an invasion of freedom, not every relation is a mark of dependence. To
make sure freedom is not at risk, however, we must ensure that the aim of the relation
is the maximization of self-sufficiency for both parties. Simply put, the parties engaged
in such relation must share the desire to be self-sufficient and to promote other’s selfsufficiency. The political relations that occur between states must follow this rule. This
confirms that the republican ideal of political autonomy does not require autarchy, but
a system of interrelations in which all share the desire to promote the self-sufficiency
of all parties involved.
Finally, self-sufficiency in this way is neither at odd with republicanism, nor is it
closer to a more liberal and individualistic ideal. As individuals, our self-sufficiency
depends on the relationship of non-domination we have with one another; it cannot be
an ideal that is reachable on its own. The state also has a role to play: it must directly
interfere such that the values that are essential to the well-being of the republic can be
shared. Economically, it must provide the essential necessities without which
individuals cannot reach their full potential nor can they participate in the life of the
city as informed citizens. Social safety nets are all means to ensure that the selfsufficiency of the people can be obtain – in the form of either universal healthcare,
minimum wage, a shorter week of work, basic income or any type of welfare that
maximizes people’s capacity to depend on nothing other than their own public goods.
This implies however that we subscribe to the idea that these services belong to the
public and are the property of each member of the community. Access to these goods
are therefore not incoherent with the idea of being self-sufficient, but are in fact means
to escape dependence on non-state bodies.
One could argue that globally, full self-sufficiency is a big and unrealistic demand.
Countries interfere with each other constantly through exchanges of goods, or mutual
assistance in a very minimally regulated manner. But that the current situation of the
market is as such, doesn’t mean that nations cannot aim at improving their condition
and gaining more and more self-sufficiency, or minimizing the relations of mutual
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dependence. But just because I depend on another state for something, does not
necessarily mean I am dominated or vulnerable to domination. We must of course
distinguish between a situation where I lose autonomy because of dependence, and
one where I simply engage in a fair exchange. Several things must be established: first,
a genuine desire to provide assistance to another state is not a ground for domination,
but may be a sign that this state is in a position of weakness, not only regarding the
aspect in question, but generally. This observation must alert us on the possibility that
such fair exchange turns into domination in the future, therefore reinforced
surveillance on this relation may be necessary. Secondly, the exchanges may produce
benefits for both parties, but none of these parties should enjoy these benefits at the
expense of the other. Another good way to distinguish between the two kinds of
exchanges, is to evaluate their necessity for the country’s survival: exchanges of a nonessential goods may induce less risks than exchanges of something a population is
highly dependent on for its survival. The latter, again, does not necessarily produce
domination, but maximizes the risk that it happens. A way to reduce such imbalance,
would be to assist a country, not in the acquisition of the required good through
exchange, but in the development of infrastructures that will ultimately produce such
good: which is to provide a state with tools to develop as much autonomy as possible.
In any case, more demanding regulations seem to key to avoid dependence between
states. Current market freedom and minimal state regulation regarding commercial
exchanges may be incompatible with the ideals of republicanism and freedom as nondomination – the irony being that free market is presented as a way to improve every
party’s autonomy.
My goal was not to defend an all-or-nothing picture of sufficiency and autonomy,
only to present ways to maximize both, and to alert on potential slippery situations.
That autonomy and non-domination are demanding ideals does not mean we should
not do everything to obtain even some minimal degree of each.
3. Distributive Justice
For these ideals to be realized, republicans need a theory of distributive justice that
is global and national at the same time. The focus of neo-republicans, however, has
not been on global distributive justice as much as it has been on the avoidance of
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domination at the individual or national level. As Laborde mentions, the current theory
can easily lead one to think that republicanism is only a theory of “bounded
citizenship” or that it simply is not concerned with issues of socio-economic matters421.
Pettit addresses some of these issues, but the focus remains on finding ways to
maximize the application of non-domination worldwide, starting from the example of
states that have already reached that goal. His attempt is praiseworthy in many ways,
but does not quite address the root cause of the problem of systemic domination
between states.
We have seen that cosmopolitans don’t seem to bring a viable solution either, as
the idea of global distributive justice they provide is both utopian and blind to the
problem of domination that can occur at the state level. Social liberals who focus on
internal ways to protect people from injustice ignore, on the other hand, the dynamics
of power that can happen on the global scale, and that can be caused by the application
of the market freedom they tend to promote – unfair trade deals, binding treaties, loans
and debts, etc. We need a republican theory of distributive justice that takes into
account both dynamics, and that is not only concerned with how to maximize freedom
as non-domination starting from states as they are, but that has the ambition to think
of state relations as they can be. As a starting point, we may need to commit to the idea
that social inequality is unjust and that equality is desirable, for the reason that when
people who are in a vulnerable economic state are also vulnerable to domination. The
quest for freedom is a luxury that will not be prioritized if the basic needs of people
aren’t met. As Laborde says, “there are absolute resource pre-conditions (nutrition,
basic health care and education) without which individuals cannot function as citizens
at all. (…) The condition of extreme poverty and neediness is one of disempowerment,
undermining of rational agency or autonomy”422. When I say that republicans must be
ambitious regarding distributive justice, I mean that a level of realistic utopia may be
permissible when it comes to finding what the best theory could be. I mean by this that
the fact that the world as it is may never wish to implement these principles should not
stop us from trying to find them, at the conditions that they remain applicable. We also
must accept two things: first, as I have mentioned earlier, that non-domination and full
autonomy of states and people may never be completely reached or guaranteed.
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Second, that the ways to maximize our chances to reach it may be more constraining
than neo-republicans seem willing to accept – meaning that they may require the
endorsement of a much fuller positive definition of republican freedom.
If we reject a cosmopolitan view of distributive justice, for the reason that it ignores
the intra-national dynamics, it means that we must work on global and national
distribution hand in hand. First, states must have policies of distribution that are subject
to checking from other states. Second, they must maintain relationships of nondomination with other states, which should be regulated by a constraining third party.
Pettit proposes that poor states get together and form a kind of union that would
provide a remedy against the domination of powerful states423. This is only a solution
to some extent, first because it does not solve the problem of distributive injustice
within these states, and also because it does not address the – maybe bigger – problem
of domination by non-state bodies 424 . Multinational corporations may be a bigger
threat to distributive justice than states, because unlike them, they are much less
subject to regulations – whether these regulations are democratic or come from
international organizations. Because they pose such a threat to justice and have such
power to dominate, republicans must identify ways to keep the use of this power at
bay: non-state bodies must be subject, just like states, to international regulations.
One possible way would be, following Pettit’s idea, to treat corporations as moral
agents, such that they would be made morally and legally accountable for their actions.
Another solution would be for state to gain control over corporations through the
establishment of constraining taxation policies, and ambitious reforms to limit tax
evasion – as to drastically reduce corporation’s possibilities of offshoring. But these
reforms, to effectively reduce distributive injustice worldwide, would need to be
globally agreed upon and reciprocally implemented – a similar picture than that of the
global agreement on climate of 2015, where only two countries refused to sign. They
must also be significantly constraining, and apply to non-state bodies as well as
governmental institutions.
A few issues remain: first, the probability that such agreement would be found
is extremely low, given the world as it is today – which does not mean it is practically
unrealistic. Second, a third party similar to international organizations already existing
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(United Nations, WHO, Unicef, etc.), would need to play the role of referee. This type
of organizations is not immune against domination either, unless they are checked by
a supra-institution themselves, and so on. Maybe the best way to reach the goal of
global distributive justice is for states and non-state bodies to realize that the benefit
they obtain in a reciprocal system of non-domination where disparities of wealth are
counterbalanced by international solidarity. But until such benefit becomes apparent
to the most powerful of these bodies – and maybe the environmental crisis we are
experiencing now could be a starting point – the probability that reciprocal cooperation
would occur at this stage is quite low. The irony is that constraining laws work better
at keeping domination at bay on the larger scale than cooperation based on mutual
interests does.
States should also implement a similar kind of policies within their borders.
Distributive justice between citizens of a state is the condition for their general selfdevelopment not only personally but also politically. This prevents people from
working multiple and/or alienating jobs, going into debts for necessary goods such as
education or health, buying the cheapest food options at the expenses of their health,
or never being able to retire with a good enough pension. As Laborde says, in an
optimal situation, a republic should be a regime under which “individuals relate to
each other as citizens, collectively decide how best to equalize the particular resources
and opportunities necessary for the enjoyment of citizenship in their state”425. But
even without such ideal state of affairs, a republic may implement constraining
regulations such that the equalization of resources is facilitated. As long as this
interference is non-arbitrary, it will promote citizen’s autonomy, and it follows the
Rousseauist idea that “no republic can be found if inequalities are too large, and the
poor can be bought by the rich”426. As I have said earlier, constraining taxation laws,
work regulations and a strong system of social security nets must be seen as
instruments to secure people’s non-domination, such that citizens can conduct their
lives according to their true interests, free from the necessity to make ends meet.
Lovett, with other republicans and economists has emphasized the benefits that a
universal basic income could have in order to maximize non-domination427. The idea
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of basic income has been raised multiple times and remains an interesting idea: the
promise from a republican standpoint is that assuring a basic income to every citizen
would eliminate the risk of submitting to domination in order to satisfy basic needs.
The problem with Lovett’s conception is that it remains committed to the defence of
free market as it is today, and assumes that the implementation of a basic income would
be sufficient to compensate any imbalance of distribution created by the current world
order428. A basic income would be insufficient without constraining regulations that
dramatically reduce the possibility of resource disparities, and could even become
another dominating tool – if, for example, it encourages companies to drastically
reduce minimum wage. Distributive justice, therefore, needs to be implemented
through direct interference at every level of the political order. Only when disparities
are reduced can citizens be able to democratically represent themselves as informed
political agents.
4. Democratic Procedures
Here I will argue that healthy democratic institutions, that allow citizens to have
an equal voice in the community, are required in order for the positive vision of
republican autonomy I endorse to function and sustain, but that the value of democracy
should remain instrumental. The point I will argue for is that democracy is
instrumentally valuable, because it is the most efficient way to identify people’s
interests, both individually and collectively. The link between the two – individual
interests and their realization through public power – is what I believe is at the core of
the conception of autonomy I wish to put forward. If non-arbitrary laws need to be
made according to the interests of those who will be subjected to them, these interests
must be identified by the possessors of legislative power – in the case of popular
sovereignty, the people themselves. To be able to identify their own needs, people
must be able to deliberate with others, as well as to reach a certain level of selfknowledge. In other words, citizens must be capable of political autonomy: the
capacity to form political demands and opinions that are not influenced by alien or
arbitrary power. Again, this kind of autonomy is not incompatible with deliberation
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with others, or the mutual sharing of information and political arguments: it
acknowledges the fact that people live in a common political sphere and that their
needs are influenced by this proximity. Influence becomes alien when the individual
in question has no capacity to question whether an idea fits with her own values, or is
imposed through an intimidating, manipulating or dominating process.
Democracy seems to be the best system to provide the appropriate platform of
expression. As Pettit says himself, the concept is directly linked to autonomy, as it
refers to the self-rule of a people, with the condition that what makes a people selfruling is that “they are never just the victim of those beliefs and desires: they are able
to examine them at will and, depending on how the examination goes, able to maintain
or amend them”429. But the republican standpoint on popular self-government is quite
ambiguous. As Laborde mentions, the focus of neo-republicans is not on direct
democracy as such, but on the maximization of non-domination among citizens430.
Democracy is this sense is a defence tool that citizens can use to check whether they
are subject to an alien power. Pettit is also cautious about a populist interpretation of
democratic activities and stays away from the claim that freedom requires political
involvement – thus reinforcing his negative standpoint. This is why, according to
Patchen Markell, Pettit cannot commit to the idea of democracy as intrinsic good, for
it would be “to lapse back into the ‘populist’ valorization of collective autonomy or
self-rule that has given republicanism a bad name” 431. However, Pettit also provides
a picture of political legitimacy that is based on people’s self-expressed needs: “the
requirement of guarding against public domination, thereby delivering political
legitimacy, turns out to demand a rich array of popular controls over government: in
effect, a distinctive form of democracy”432. The tradition offers a similarly ambiguous
picture: with the exception of Greek democracies, classic republicans are all in some
ways reticent to the idea of direct democracy, though all advocate for some form of
political participation as requirement for freedom. Democracy however, is in
accordance with non-domination as it provides ways for people to identify their
interests, and bring them to the front.
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I believe that Pettit’s worry about democracy as an intrinsic good is justifiable, but
not for the reasons he advances – the fear of a populist interpretation. I will argue that
endorsing a positive view on freedom as collective self-rule need not lead to populism.
Furthermore, without such endorsement, we have to rule out political involvement as
part of republican liberty, and therefore are limited to a definition that only covers
some aspects of political freedom. However, I will also argue that this commitment to
a positive view is compatible with a conception of democracy as an instrumental good,
and that it is in fact what we should favour. For democracy to be an instrument of
autonomy, it requires not only that people can politically participate in an informed
manner, but also that the state must provide multiple occasions for this participation
and respond appropriately. I suggest that autonomy is what keeps the risk of populism
at bay, and as I have argued in a previous chapter, that it acts as a regulative principle
as well.
According to Markell, the inefficiency of freedom as non-domination comes from
its inability to distinguish between domination per se, and what he calls
“usurpation”433. Pettit’s focus on the former only leads to an incomplete theory that
fails to cover this second aspect of injustice. The problem comes from the
generalization of the slave to master relationship as the only picture of unfreedom:
although this picture is correct, it is far from sufficient. As Markell says, “it is one
thing to be treated like a piece of property, and quite another to be treated, say, as a
child; and not just in having the protective hand of a parent interfere with your conduct
for your own good, but also and more insidiously in having the world ordered in ways
that narrow the field of situations in which any conduct on your part might be called
for” 434 . Usurpation, as he describes it, deprives agents from the possibility of
involvement, and therefore steals a significant aspect of agency – when Pettit’s view
focuses on how to control arbitrary interference. This is an important addition that I
believe is coherent with the positive picture that I propose. I however believe that we
could take a further step: freedom requires does not require mere involvement but
informed involvement. To use Markell’s words, it is not a matter of what is happening
through you or your activity only, but what is happening through you as informed
agent: through agents whose interests and authentic desires have appropriately been
433
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identified. Furthermore, following the idea that this kind of autonomy requires the
appropriation and exercise of public power by the people, we may add that republican
freedom must include democratic activities as a means to reach this kind of
involvement – through deliberation. This addition provides a new and richer way of
conceptualizing agency from a republican perspective: collective self-rule is the
mechanism through which agents, possessor of public power, realize their own will.
I believe that this interpretation of republican freedom allows us to provide a third
way between liberalism and neo-Roman republicanism. But how can we avoid the
populist interpretation Pettit is concerned about? I have already explained that extreme
caution regarding positive freedom can be misplaced; the commitment to freedom as
non-domination already guarantees protection. A fuller endorsement of freedom as
collective self-government does not necessarily entail that the will of the people must
be respected irrespective of the direction of that will, and simply because popular
opinions have intrinsic value. The kind of autonomy I favour is of a substantive kind;
popular decisions need to go through an appropriate process, and their content must
be collectively checked through the lens of non-domination to ensure of their
legitimacy. I therefore follow Pettit in his defence of democracy as an instrumental
good, as a means to the higher end of republican freedom. The value of democratic
decisions is not that they are the expression of the people per se, but that their
mechanism produces the most robust and sustainable way to identify people’s true
interests and create corresponding laws, through which citizens realize their autonomy
collectively and individually as possessors of public power.
The claim that democracy requires informed citizens to give birth to fully effective
regulations can however be questioned by advocates of democracy as an intrinsic
good. Many theorists argue that democratic power does not require an assembly of
expert citizens to be considered legitimate. Hélène Landemore holds the view that
democracy is a smart collective process “that tapes into the intelligence of the people
as a group”435. She says that this collective intelligence emerges from the democratic
process, and is not merely the sum of people’s interests. The emergence of this
collective intelligence applies to people when they form a group rather than to
individuals: democracy is therefore superior to the rule of one or the rule of the experts,
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because it collects the interests of people in a way that is qualitatively superior to the
expression of these needs at the individual level. The idea that the will of the people
emerges when they are united in an assembly is an appealing idea: it releases us from
the requirement that people must be educated and informed in order to make correct
political decisions. As republicans, there also is a natural desire to favour the idea of a
will emerging from the people as group, rather than to adopt a reductionist or
individualistic approach.
However, the historical fact that democratic decisions may not always lead to
desirable outcomes should make us sceptical of this claim. Because we know for a fact
that democratic procedures don’t always lead to collective intelligence, we are faced
with a choice. We can either choose to commit to the ideal of democracy as an intrinsic
good, and decide that any outcome it generates is in fact the best outcome, for the
simple reason that it is the representation of the will of the people at a specific time.
Or, we can accept that collective intelligence is limited to the people’s capacity to
display political intelligence themselves as individuals: democracy here is only a tool
that makes the expression of this intelligence possible and visible, but it is not an end
in and of itself. This second option is more desirable for a few reasons. It still values
democracy as a desirable good, but it does not force us to bite the bullet and accept
any democratic decision as valuable. In other words, it leaves people free to make
errors in their political judgements. It also does not mean that we must agree with
Jason Brennan that political decisions should be left to experts 436 . While ordinary
citizens may make mistake regarding their best interests, we can only encourage them
to express them as best as they can: these interests are the basis of the legitimacy of
our republican institutions. We must therefore accept that democracy may not always
lead to the best possible outcome, but still be a valuable tool – rather than an ideal.
What we need to do as republicans, is to encourage people in the identification of their
interests, by the promotion of both non-domination and autonomous deliberations. In
fact, a good way to evaluate people’s capacity to make informed decisions in a
republican way is to check whether these are aligned with the principles of nondomination, which does not require expertise. It does however require knowledge
about one’s interests, and about the common good: a level of civic education is needed
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such that democratic deliberations can produce the best outcome. More specifically,
democratic procedures are instrumentally valuable because they provide the platform
people need to act as political agents in a way that other regimes don’t: they allow
them to get information, form an opinion, deliberate, speak up, etc. But the value of
democracy is limited if it remains a tool on the side of the people, with no guarantee
of reciprocity. In short, it should not only be a theory of how people can express
themselves, but also include possibilities for the government to respond to popular
demands. It therefore implies both participation on the side of the people and
proportionate response on the side of the state. As Thomas Christiano says, the purpose
of democratic endeavour is both epistemic and practical437 : it is first to reveal the
interests of people, and second, to respond to them in a way that is satisfying for the
biggest number. The rejection of democracy as intrinsic good can be compatible with
a view of freedom as collective self-rule, to the extent that such rule properly tracks
citizen’s interests.
The purpose of democratic procedures must be to enable people to participate as
autonomous citizens while knowing their voice will be heard. This knowledge is what
promotes democratic behaviour amongst ordinary citizens: in contrast, the feeling that
decisions remain in the hand of experts often leads to a lack of political involvement.
This is a recurrent and easily observable phenomenon: the 2019 European elections
only brought 50,86% to the polls, which is in fact the highest number of voters since
1994438. Generally, the feeling that demands will be dismissed, or that the political,
social or ethnical group they belong to suffers a lack of representation, are factors that
may lead people to develop a form of voter apathy. Republicans should therefore be
concerned with the question of representation, such that democracy can truly provide
the epistemic and practical benefits it is capable of. This is especially true if like Pettit
says, non-domination is compatible with preservation of diversity and pluralism439.
Political autonomy, as I have said, is not only the capacity to form an independent
political opinion. It must also have positive repercussion: people must enjoy the
benefits of their political independence – know they are not at risk of reprimand
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assuming their opinion is aligned with non-domination – and act as independent
citizens confident that the state has each society member’s best interest at heart.
Democratic procedures, though largely perfectible, provide the most adequate
platform for this kind of autonomy to emerge.
Conclusion
If we must commit to a definition of autonomy from a republican standpoint, it
must be a political one: it implies that personal self-governance is dependent on the
level of political self-determination citizens and states may enjoy. Republican
institutions must therefore be directed towards the realization of these ideals. Only if
political autonomy is being taken into consideration as a determining factor of people’s
freedom, can republicanism be a true alternative to the standard liberal view. The
advantage of the republican ideal broadly construed is that it does not separate the
concepts of persons, freedom, or autonomy, from the concepts of citizenship, society,
and the rule of law. To answer questions about the political independence of a state is
also to answer questions about a person’s freedom; the intertwined nature of
republican concepts is what makes the theory whole, and particularly attractive. I do
not believe that the ideals I have described in this chapter are unreachable as long as
the vision is ambitious. The question may simply be of little value: any movement
towards the realization of more non-domination and more autonomy is always to be
promoted, irrespective of the probability for these ideals to be fully obtained. The goal
of this chapter was to provide ideological avenues to do so.
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CONCLUSION

Form these various observations, we can safely say that the neo-republican
project is much more than an alternative to liberalism regarding the question of
freedom. It is the continuation of a rich and complex tradition, and just like any other
republican schools of thought in history, it is also the reflection of the concerns and
interests of its time. Freedom as non-domination as it is currently described, is the
indication that positive concepts remain more difficult to tackle in today’s political
philosophy. My intuition at the beginning of this work was that this reticence wasn’t
grounded in a true understanding of what autonomy is from a political perspective; my
belief was that the concept of positive freedom should not be left to “the enemies of
liberty”. This intuition has been confirmed by the recognition that there are multiple
ways to be unfree, and that they need not have anything to do with non-arbitrary
interference. Leaving aspects of unfreedom unnecessarily uncovered is problematic: it
shows that the theory is incomplete in significant respects.
My goal here was to attend to this problem, without rejecting the theory as a
whole. I hope to have highlighted the benefits of extending freedom as nondomination, and the promising outcomes of this endeavour. My conviction remains
that if we start including autonomy in the list of our requirements for republican
freedom, we broaden the horizon of what we can attend to, and that this prospect
should only lead to optimism. Enlarging the scope of what unfreedom can be, and of
what requires political attention, is the first step towards the maximization of
republican ideals.
I have tried to challenge the common belief that autonomy is inherently a
liberal concept, especially when defined negatively. My observations have led me to
the conclusion that not only is autonomy’s nature too substantial for liberalism to give
it appropriate weight, but it can also be considered as a true republican concept. Basing
my reasoning on history, and the persistence of common concepts throughout the
tradition, I have come to realize that republicanism harbours more than freedom as
non-domination, and that republican freedom is larger than the absence of arbitrary
interference. The vast republican scope leaves significant room for self-government to
be given appropriate attention.
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Freedom as non-domination as Pettit and other neo-republicans define it, is
indicative of the modern theory’s failure to recognize the complexity and richness of
its own concepts. This failure should not distract us from the importance of attributing
freedom as non-domination the merit it deserves, but it should alert us on the necessity
to improve our understanding of what republican freedom can cover. My research was
motivated by the constant wish to constructively contribute to the elaboration of a more
complete definition, rather than on the rejection of ideas. It was the product of a sincere
belief in republicanism’s promises.
The failures and limitations I have identified can be fixed if appropriate
attention is given to people’s self-government along with their non-dominated state. It
provides an extra barometer to evaluated freedom-limiting interferences and
experiences. It also gives pragmatic value to our definition. From this standpoint, many
aspects of our freedom and unfreedom remain to be explored, as people’s autonomy
may be impacted in a multitude of ways.
Most importantly, I believe it is time for political philosophers to approach the
question of positive freedom without fear, and to start considering that our own
personal freedom can never be fully reached if not implemented and protected by
positive laws, which, if made according to an appropriate process, are only the
reflexion of our own interests and needs. Only then may we start seeing our public
involvement, however minimal, as the source of our own freedom. Only then can we
become fully possessors of public power. As republicans, we should pay attention to
anything that prohibits us from reaching our full potential as citizens: by this, I mean
experiencing our citizenship in the most informed way possible. Promoting the
development of self-government, in the context of participation to the life of the
republic, is a tool that can only strengthen our non-dominated status. I believe that the
promises of republicanism will be fulfilled if we ambitiously and collectively address
this question.
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